State v. Robert M. Sneed ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
MAY 1998 SESSION
May 5, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee, ) No. 03C01-9708-CR-00327
)
) Sullivan County
v. )
) Honorable R. Jerry Beck, Judge
)
ROBERT M. SNEED, ) (Habitual motor vehicle offender)
)
Appellant. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Robert M. Sneed, Pro Se John Knox Walkup
1817 Oakwood Drive Attorney General of Tennessee
Kingsport, TN 37664 and
Todd R. Kelley
Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
H. Greeley Welles, Jr.
District Attorney General
P.O. Box 526
Blountville, TN 37617-0526
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The defendant, Robert M. Sneed, appeals as of right from the judgment of
the Sullivan County Criminal Court declaring him to be a habitual motor vehicle
offender, thereby barring him from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of
Tennessee. He raises various issues dealing with (1) the sufficiency of the evidence of
the predicate convictions, (2) the constitutionality of the convicting, sentencing, and
Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) proceedings, particularly regarding due
process and double jeopardy, and (3) the failure of the trial court to appoint him counsel
for this appeal. We affirm the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court declaring the defendant to be a habitual
motor vehicle offender was entered on July 25, 1997. The trial court based this
conviction upon the following predicate convictions regarding driving under the
influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and driving with a revoked license (DRL):
OFFENSE COURT CONVICTION DATE
DRL Sullivan County General Sessions Court March 23, 1995
DUI Sullivan County Criminal Court May 10, 1996
DUI Sullivan County General Sessions Court October 1, 1996
As a starting point, we note certain propositions of law that dispose of
many of the defendant’s contentions. An MVHO proceeding is civil in nature, not
criminal. See Everhart v. State, 563 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). It
involves revocation of the privilege of driving, not the deprivation of a property right. Id.It is remedial in nature and does not constitute multiple punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause relative to the prior convictions upon which the proceeding is based.
See State v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Malady, 952 S.W.2d
440, 442 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Also, the defendant may not collaterally attack
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predicate convictions during an MVHO proceeding. See Everhart, 563 S.W.2d at 797-98.
Under these principles, any complaint about the constitutional validity of the predicate
convictions or of the MVHO process must fail. Similarly, given the civil nature of the
proceeding, the defendant has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel.
Likewise, no such statutory right exists.
The remaining issue is whether sufficient predicate convictions existed to
justify the defendant being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender. On this point,
the defendant asserts that the DUI conviction of May 10, 1996, was not final because it
was on appeal to this court when the trial court entered the MVHO judgment. The
record bears this out, even though the defendant has failed to make the transcript of
the MVHO hearing a part of the record on appeal. We take judicial notice of the fact
that the case was on appeal at the time of the trial court hearing. See State v. Robert
M. Sneed, No. 03C01-9610-CR-00371, Sullivan County (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30,
1997).
The defendant notes that the MVHO act defines a conviction for its
purposes as a “final conviction.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(1). He asserts that this
means that a conviction that is on appeal may not be used as a predicate conviction in
an MVHO proceeding.
In response, the state relies upon State v. Loden, 920 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995), a driving on a revoked license case. In Loden, the defendant
claimed that because the DUI conviction that led to license revocation was still on
appeal, the revocation was not effective at the time that he was charged with DRL. He
relied upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-501, which requires the department of safety to
revoke a license upon receipt of a record of a conviction for certain offenses, including
DUI, “when such conviction has become final.” In Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-503,
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conviction is defined for the purposes of the Driver Licenses chapter as a “final
conviction.”
In considering what a “final conviction” means, this court stated that it
should look to “the context of the entire statutory scheme” and quoted from what it
called the legislature’s stated “purposes of the motor vehicle statute.” Loden, 920
S.W.2d at 264.1 This court also stated that “a defendant is presumed guilty after
judgment,” citing a case that states this proposition relative to an appellate standard of
review in determining if the evidence is sufficient to convict. Id.; see State v. Tuggle,
639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). It then concluded that “to allow an individual
convicted of and presumed to be guilty of driving while intoxicated to continue to
operate a motor vehicle pending appeal would be inconsistent with the legislature’s
statement of public policy.” Loden, 920 S.W.2d at 264.
We view Loden to be precedential authority to which we will adhere. This
means that the defendant’s predicate convictions were final for the purpose of declaring
him to be a habitual motor vehicle offender.
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Public policy. -- It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state to:
(1) Provide maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise
use the public highways of the state;
(2) Deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on such
highw ays to pe rson s wh o by th eir conduct and record have demonstrated
their indifference to the safe ty and welfa re of othe rs an d the ir disrespect for
the laws of the state; and
(3) Disc oura ge re petitio n of u nlaw ful ac ts by in dividu als against the
peace and dignity of this state and its political subdivisions, and to impose
the added deprivation of the privilege of operating motor vehicles upon
habitual offenders who have been conv icted repe ated ly of violations of laws
involving the operation of motor vehicles.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-602.
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In consideration of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
______________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
__________________________
Joe G. Riley, Judge
__________________________
James Curwood W itt, Jr., Judge
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