State of Tennessee v. Travis Young ( 2005 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2005
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TRAVIS YOUNG
    Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
    Nos. 03-05457, 59 W. Otis Higgs, Jr., Judge
    No. W2004-01752-CCA-R3-CD - Filed June 23, 2005
    Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted in case no. 03-05457 of two counts of aggravated
    assault, a Class C felony, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and one count
    of evading arrest, a Class D felony . Defendant was convicted in case No. 03-05459 of two counts
    of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony,
    against victim Christopher Bridges. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple
    offender, to six years for each of his Class C and Class D felony convictions. The trial court merged
    Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions in counts one and two in case No. 03-05459, and
    sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to ten years for the aggravated robbery
    conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No. 03-05457 to be served
    concurrently. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No. 03-05459 to be served
    concurrently with each other and consecutively to Defendant’s sentence in case No. 03-05457, for
    an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
    convicting evidence and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Defendant does not challenge
    the length of his sentences. Following our review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.
    We remand for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to make specific findings
    justifying the imposition of consecutive sentencing, failed to identify and support the enhancement
    factors used to enhance Defendant’s sentences for his Class D and Class B felony convictions; and
    failed to identify which specific convictions it was relying upon to classify Defendant as a multiple
    offender for sentencing him for his Class D and Class C felony convictions.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Trial Court Affirmed in Part
    and Reversed in Part; Convictions are Affirmed,
    Sentences are Reversed, and these cases are Remanded for a New Sentencing Hearing
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT , JR.,
    and J.C. MCLIN , JJ., joined.
    Robert Wilson Jones, District Public Defender; W. Mark Ward, Assistant Public Defender; and
    Timothy Albers, Assistant Public Defender, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Travis Young.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Rachel E. Willis, Assistant Attorney General;
    William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; Paul Goodman, Assistant District Attorney General;
    and Michael McCusker, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. Background
    Christopher Bridges testified that he knew Defendant only by his nickname “T-Money.” On
    February 25, 2003, Mr. Bridges picked Defendant up at his house in Memphis around 10:00 a.m.,
    and the two men went to lunch at Church’s Chicken, a restaurant. Mr. Bridges said that it had been
    snowing, and the restaurant’s dining room was closed. Mr. Bridges bought food at the drive-through
    window, and the two men went to the Southern Sun Motel to eat their lunch. Mr. Bridges explained
    that he did not want to drive around in the snow.
    During lunch, Defendant went into the bathroom. When he returned, he was armed with a
    revolver. Defendant told Mr. Bridges to give him his money, jewelry and car keys. After Mr.
    Bridges complied with the demands, Defendant left the motel room and told Mr. Bridges not to come
    out of the room or he would “blow [his] head off.” Mr. Bridges, however, followed Defendant to
    Mr. Bridges’ car and asked Defendant to at least return his driver’s license and other keys.
    Defendant shot Mr. Bridges in the leg twice and drove off. Mr. Bridges said he owned a white 1994
    Mazda 626.
    On cross-examination, Mr. Bridges said that he had known Defendant for about two months,
    and the two men were becoming friends. Mr. Bridges said that he had been to the Southern Sun
    Motel before, but not with Defendant.
    On February 27, 2003, Officer Harold Tellez with the Memphis Police Department and
    Officer Jeffrey Jensen with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department were riding patrol together in
    an unmarked police car. They had previously received information from the West Precinct Task
    Force concerning the stolen Mazda, including the vehicle’s license plate number and a picture of
    Defendant. The officers spotted a white Mazda traveling south on Elvis Presley Boulevard. Officer
    Jensen pulled in behind the Mazda, and Officer Tellez verified that the vehicle’s license plate
    number matched Mr. Bridges’ license plate number. Officer Jensen activated his emergency
    equipment, but Defendant refused to pull over. The cars reached an intersection, and Defendant
    slammed on his brakes. Officer Jensen’s vehicle and another police car which had joined the pursuit
    swerved to miss Defendant’s vehicle, and both police cars ended up in front of the Mazda.
    Defendant drove between the two police cars, hitting Officer Jensen’s vehicle in the process.
    Officer Jensen and Officer Tellez continued to follow Defendant. Defendant turned abruptly
    onto an entrance ramp to the interstate, and Officer Jenson’s vehicle spun out of control when he
    attempted to follow. The vehicle stopped in the mud next to the road. Officer Tellez pushed the
    vehicle back onto the ramp, and the two rejoined the chase.
    -2-
    Defendant drove toward the Mississippi state line. Several Mississippi police vehicles had
    set up a roadblock across the interstate near the state line. When Defendant spotted the roadblock,
    he made a u-turn and headed back to Memphis. When Officer Jensen attempted to turn around, his
    vehicle got stuck in the wet ground on the median.
    Officer Tellez said that he was concerned that he and Officer Jensen were going to be injured
    during the chase. He said that the chase occurred around 7:00 p.m or 8:00 p.m., and there was “a
    lot of” traffic on the road, especially the interstate. Both officers said they were trained to handle
    pursuit situations.
    Officer Casey Kirby with the Memphis Police Department said that he became the first
    vehicle in line behind the Mazda when Defendant exited the interstate after the u-turn near the state
    line. Officer Kirby was driving a marked police car and had activated his emergency equipment.
    Defendant kept braking sharply in an attempt to make Officer Kirby’s car strike the Mazda in the
    rear.
    Defendant entered the interstate again, and Officer Kirby was able to pull up beside
    Defendant. Defendant swerved his vehicle into Officer Kirby’s, causing the police car to crash into
    the guard rail. Defendant’s car spun around because of the impact, and the Mazda stopped facing
    the wrong way on the interstate. Officer Kirby said that at times during the pursuit he was driving
    around 125 miles per hour.
    Officer Carolyn Chambers with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department was driving an
    unmarked police car behind Officer Kirby’s vehicle. She said that Defendant’s vehicle hit her car
    head on. Her air bags deployed but she managed to get out of the car. Officer Chambers said that
    Defendant frequently braked his vehicle during the pursuit, trying to get the police cars to hit the
    Mazda in the rear. Officer Chambers said that Defendant had the volume of the Mazda’s radio
    turned up, and he was talking on his cell phone as he drove.
    Officer Greg Tacker with the Memphis Police Department said that between forty and fifty
    police vehicles were ultimately involved in the chase. Officer Tacker said that at times the vehicles
    involved were driving between 100 and 110 miles per hour. Officer Tacker saw the Mazda strike
    Officer Kirby’s car. Officer Tacker said that only one person exited the Mazda when it stopped.
    Defendant ran across the interstate and down an embankment. He was attempting to climb the chain
    link fence surrounding the interstate when police dogs brought him down. Officer Tacker
    handcuffed and searched Defendant. He did not find any drugs or weapons on Defendant.
    Officer Norman Peter Benjamin searched Defendant when he was brought to the Regional
    Medical Center for treatment of his dog bites. Officer Benjamin said he found various items with
    Mr. Bridges’ name, an earring, and a ring in Defendant’s pockets.
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    Officer Richard Phillips knew that Defendant used the nickname “T-Money.” He included
    Defendant’s photograph in a line-up which was shown to Mr. Bridges. Mr. Bridges identified
    Defendant as the man who robbed him and stole his car.
    II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, we must review the
    evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution in determining whether a rational trier of fact
    could have found all the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
    Virginia, 443 U.S.307, 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789, 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
     (1979). Once a jury finds a
    defendant guilty, his or her presumption of innocence is removed and replaced with a presumption
    of guilt. State v. Black, 
    815 S.W.2d 166
    , 175 (Tenn. 1991). The defendant has the burden of
    overcoming this presumption, and the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
    evidence along with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence. Id.; State
    v. Tuggle, 
    639 S.W.2d 913
    , 914 (Tenn. 1982). The jury is presumed to have resolved all conflicts
    and drawn any reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v. Sheffield, 
    676 S.W.2d 542
    , 547
    (Tenn. 1984). Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given
    the evidence, and all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact and not this
    court. State v. Bland, 
    958 S.W.2d 651
    , 659 (Tenn. 1997). These rules are applicable to findings of
    guilt predicated upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and
    circumstantial evidence. State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
    Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault of Christopher
    Bridges. A person commits aggravated assault if he or she intentionally or knowingly commits an
    assault against another which causes serious bodily injury to the person, or the perpetrator uses or
    displays a deadly weapon during the assault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1). As relevant here,
    an assault is committed when the perpetrator “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily
    injury to another.” Id. § 39-13-101(a)(1).
    “Robbery” is defined as “the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of
    another by violence or putting the person in fear.” Id. § 39-13-401(a). A robbery offense is elevated
    to aggravated robbery if the robbery is accomplished with a deadly weapon or the victim suffers
    serious bodily injury. Id. § 39-13-402(a).
    Christopher Bridges testified that Defendant went into the motel room’s bathroom and armed
    himself with a revolver. Defendant took Mr. Bridges’ money, jewelry and car keys. When Mr.
    Bridges approached Defendant as he sat in Mr. Bridges’ car, Defendant shot Mr. Bridges twice in
    the leg. Officer Benjamin recovered some of Mr. Bridges’ stolen property from Defendant after
    Defendant was arrested on February 27, 2003 while driving Mr. Bridges’ Mazda. Defendant argues
    that Mr. Bridges’ credibility was in dispute because of the questionable circumstances under which
    the two men met on the day of the offenses. The assessment of a witness’s credibility, however, “is
    always left to the jury.” State v. Coley, 
    32 S.W.3d 831
    , 835 (Tenn. 2000). The evidence is sufficient
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    for a rational trier of fact to find Defendant guilty of all of the essential elements of aggravated
    robbery and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault against Officer Chambers and
    Officer Kirby. The indictment charged Defendant with committing the offenses by intentionally or
    knowingly using a deadly weapon, namely a motor vehicle, which caused the officers to reasonably
    fear imminent bodily injury. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101(a)(2) and 39-13-102(a)(1)(b). A
    motor vehicle can constitute a deadly weapon for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-
    13-102(a)(1)(b). See State v. Tate, 
    912 S.W.2d 785
    , 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Officer Kirby
    testified that Defendant intentionally swerved his vehicle into his marked police car causing Officer
    Kirby to crash into the guard rail. Officer Kirby said the vehicles were traveling “pretty fast” when
    he was hit, and that he was scared that he was going to be seriously injured or killed. Officer
    Chambers said that Defendant accelerated his vehicle after Officer Kirby’s car was immobilized and
    struck her vehicle head on. Officer Chambers estimated that the cars were traveling approximately
    sixty miles per hour at that point, and the impact activated her vehicle’s air bags. Officer Chambers
    said that she suffered soreness in her upper body as a result of the crash. Based on the testimony
    presented, the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly or
    intentionally drove his car into the vehicles of Officers Kirby and Chambers at a high rate of speed
    causing them to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. The evidence is sufficient to support
    Defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault.
    Defendant was convicted of two counts of reckless assault against Officers Tellez and Jensen.
    A person:
    acts recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding the conduct or the result
    of the conduct when the person is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial
    and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk
    must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation
    from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
    circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(c).
    Defendant led Officers Tellez and Jensen on a high speed chase through secondary roads as
    well as the interstate. Officer Tellez testified that Defendant braked hard at an intersection causing
    Officer Jensen’s vehicle to spin around when he attempted to stop. Defendant’s car struck the
    officers’ vehicle as he squeezed past them at the intersection. Defendant swerved abruptly onto an
    entrance ramp to the interstate. Officer Jensen attempted to follow, and his vehicle spun around
    several times. Based on the circumstances surrounding the high speed chase, a reasonable jury could
    conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded the
    risk to Officers Tellez and Jensen created by his conduct. See State v. Gillon, 
    15 S.W.3d 492
    , 497
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). The evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s two convictions of
    reckless aggravated assault.
    -5-
    Defendant was convicted of Class D felony evading arrest. “It is unlawful for any person,
    while operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, alley or highway in this state, to intentionally
    flee . . . any law enforcement officer, after having received any signal from such officer to bring the
    vehicle to a stop.” Id. § 39-16-603(b)(1). Felony evading arrest is a Class D felony if “the attempt
    to allude create[d] a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties.” Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 39-16-603(b)(3).
    Officer Tellez testified that Officer Jensen activated the emergency equipment of their
    vehicle while they pursued Defendant. Officer Tacker said that forty to fifty police vehicles
    eventually joined the high speed chase. After Defendant’s car stopped, Defendant fled on foot and
    was attempting to scale the chain link fence surrounding the interstate when he was brought down
    by police dogs. Officer Tellez said that the chase occurred around 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m., and that
    there was a lot of traffic on the roads, particularly the interstate. At some point, patrol cars blocked
    the entrance ramps to the interstate so that civilian traffic could not enter. However, Officer Tellez
    said that Defendant ignored stop signs while driving on the secondary roads, and drove between 50
    to 55 m.p.h. in the residential areas, and 60 to 65 m.p.h. in the business districts. Officer Tellez said
    that Defendant’s driving was a threat to the other motor vehicles on the road during the pursuit. The
    evidence is sufficient to establish that Defendant fled from law enforcement officers after receiving
    a signal to stop, and his flight in a motor vehicle created a risk of death or injury to other motorists
    on the road during the chase. The record clearly supports the jury’s finding that Defendant was
    guilty of Class D felony evading arrest beyond a reasonable doubt.
    III. Sentencing Issues
    At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the pre-sentence report and the
    circumstances surrounding the commission of the offenses. The trial court found that Defendant had
    committed two offenses as a juvenile involving theft of property over $500, which would be
    classified as Class E felonies if Defendant had committed the offenses as an adult. Based on the
    presence of these two juvenile adjudications, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II,
    multiple offender, for his Class D felony convictions for reckless aggravated assault and felony
    evading arrest, and his Class C felony convictions for aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced
    Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, for his Class B felony conviction.
    Without specifying which enhancement or mitigating factors it considered, if any, the trial
    court sentenced Defendant to six years for each Class D felony conviction; six years for each Class
    C felony aggravated assault conviction; and ten years for his Class B felony aggravated robbery
    conviction.
    In addition, without any discussion, the trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No.
    03-05459 to run consecutively to the sentences in case No. 03-05457. A trial court may impose
    consecutive sentences if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of one or more of
    the statutory criteria in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115. The trial court is also required
    to determine whether consecutive sentencing is “justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the
    -6-
    offense” and “no greater than that deserved for the offense committed.” Id. §§ 40-35-102(1) and -
    103(2). If the trial court bases its imposition of consecutive sentencing on a finding that Defendant
    is a “dangerous offender,” it must find that an extended sentence is necessary to protect the public
    from further criminal conduct by Defendant, and that consecutive sentencing is reasonably related
    to the severity of the offenses. State v. Lane, 
    3 S.W.3d 456
    , 461 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Wilkerson,
    
    905 S.W.2d 933
    , 938 (Tenn. 1995). The trial court made no findings on the record to support its
    imposition of consecutive sentencing.
    A defendant who challenges his or her sentence has the burden of proving the sentence
    imposed by the trial court is improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Commission
    Comments; State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 169 (Tenn. 1991). It is the duty of this Court to conduct
    a de novo review of the record with a presumption the trial court’s determinations are correct when
    a defendant appeals the length, range or manner of service of his or her sentence. Tenn. Code Ann.
    § 40-35-401(d). This presumption, however, is conditioned upon an affirmative showing in the
    record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and
    circumstances. State v. Pettus, 
    986 S.W.2d 540
    , 543-44 (Tenn. 1999). If the trial court fails to
    consider the requisite sentencing principles, our review is de novo without a presumption of
    correctness. Id.
    The trial court imposed the minimum sentence within the sentencing range for a Range II,
    multiple offender, convicted of a Class C felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(b)(3). The record
    in this case, however, is totally devoid of any findings supporting the enhancement of Defendant’s
    sentences for his Class D and Class B felony convictions, or the imposition of consecutive
    sentencing. “To facilitate appellate review, the trial court ‘must place on the record its reasons for
    arriving at the final sentencing decision, identify the mitigating and enhancement factors found, state
    the specific facts supporting each enhancement factor found, and articulate how the mitigating and
    enhancement factors have been evaluated and balanced in determining the sentence.” State v. Poole,
    
    945 S.W.2d 93
    , 96 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting State v. Jones, 
    883 S.W.2d 597
    , 601 (Tenn. 1994)); see
    also State v. Ervin, 
    939 S.W.2d 581
    , 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The Sentencing Act also
    requires the trial court to make specific findings embodying the general principles of sentencing
    before imposing consecutive sentencing. Lane, 3 S.W.3d at 460-61. In addition, the trial court must
    make specific findings regarding the Wilkerson factors if the defendant is classified as a “dangerous
    offender.” Id. Without any findings whatsoever, this Court is unable to conduct a meaningful
    appellate review.
    Although not raised by Defendant as an issue on appeal, we note for purposes of resentencing
    that the record does not appear to support the trial court’s classification of Defendant as a Range II,
    multiple offender when sentencing him for his Class C and Class D felony convictions. When
    convicted of a Class C or Class D felony, a defendant will be considered a “multiple offender” if he
    or she has received “a minimum of two. . . but not more than four . . . prior felony convictions within
    the conviction class, a higher class, or within the next two lower felony classes . . . .” Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 40-35-106(a)(1). The State presented a judgment in case No. 99-00561 at the sentencing
    hearing which showed that Defendant was convicted as an adult of theft of property over $500 value,
    -7-
    a Class E felony. According to the pre-sentence report, the remainder of Defendant’s criminal
    history as an adult includes one misdemeanor criminal trespass conviction, one misdemeanor
    conviction for theft of property less than $500 value, and one misdemeanor conviction for simple
    possession of marijuana.
    It appears, therefore, that the trial court based Defendant’s multiple offender status on two
    juvenile adjudications for theft of property over $500 but less than $1,000 value, which, if committed
    as an adult, would be Class E felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-105(2). A juvenile
    adjudication, however, will not be considered a “prior conviction” for the purposes of determining
    the defendant’s multiple offender status, unless: (1) the juvenile act would constitute a felony if
    committed as an adult; (2) the juvenile act resulted in the juvenile’s transfer to criminal court to be
    dealt with as an adult pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134; and (3) the defendant
    was convicted of the felony in criminal court. Id.
    According to the pre-sentence report, Defendant committed the offenses of theft of property
    over $500 value on April 11, 1999, when he was thirteen years old, and again on October 13, 1994,
    when he was fourteen years old. For the first theft offense, Defendant was placed under the
    supervision of the Youth Services Bureau’s Hanover House Program. After commission of the
    second theft offense, Defendant was placed in the Youth Services Bureau’s Shelby Training Center.
    Because Defendant was not dealt with as an adult for these offenses, and because Defendant’s adult
    criminal record shows only one Class E felony conviction, we conclude that the trial court erred in
    sentencing Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, for his Class D and Class C felony
    convictions.
    Because the trial court failed to articulate which enhancement or mitigating factors it
    considered in determining the length of Defendant’s sentence and failed to make specific findings
    supporting its imposition of consecutive sentencing, we remand this case to the trial court for a new
    sentencing hearing. On remand, the trial court must identify any mitigating and enhancement factors
    found, state the specific facts supporting each enhancement factor, and articulate how the mitigating
    and enhancement factors have been evaluated and balanced in determining the length of Defendant’s
    sentences. The trial court must also identify the specific prior convictions it is relying upon if it
    again finds that Defendant is a Range II, multiple offender.
    If the trial court concludes that consecutive sentences should be imposed, the trial court must
    state which facts in the record it finds to support this determination, how the effective aggregate
    sentence relates to the seriousness of the offenses, and whether the effective aggregate sentence is
    “no greater than that deserved for the offense.” See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102(1) and 40-35-
    103(2). In addition, if the trial court bases its imposition of consecutive sentencing on a finding that
    Defendant is a “dangerous offender,” “there must exist ‘particular facts’ which show that consecutive
    sentencing is ‘reasonably related to the severity of the offenses’ and serves to protect society ‘from
    further . . . aggravated criminal conduct.’” Lane, 3 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d
    at 938).
    -8-
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions, but remand to the trial court
    for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.
    ___________________________________
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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