Gregory Eidson v. State of Tennessee ( 2005 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs May 11, 2005
    GREGORY EIDSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumner County
    No. 604-2001 Jane Wheatcraft, Judge
    No. M2005-00150-CCA-R3-HC - Filed June 8, 2005
    The Petitioner, Gregory Eidson, filed a petition for wit of habeas corpus seeking relief from allegedly
    void judgments, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that
    the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding that there exists reversible
    error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court, we reverse its dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition
    for habeas corpus relief, and we remand the case for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary
    hearing.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed and
    Remanded
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE OGLE and
    ALAN E. GLENN , JJ., joined.
    Gregory Eidson, pro se, Clifton, Tennessee.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Assistant Attorney General;
    Lawrence Ray Whitley, District Attorney General; and Joe James, Assistant District Attorney
    General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. Facts
    The Petitioner pled guilty to fourth offense DUI (Count 2) committed on January 6, 2001,
    and to four counts of violating the Habitual Traffic Offender (“HTO”) law, committed on: January
    6, 2001 (Count 1); February 12, 2001 (Count 5); June 12, 2001 (Count 8); and July 15, 2001 (Count
    9). The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to two years in prison for Count 1 and to eleven months
    and twenty-nine days for Count 2, and it ordered that those two sentences run concurrently. For the
    remaining three HTO convictions, Count 5, Count 8, and Count 9, the trial court ordered the
    Petitioner to serve two years in prison for each count, and it ordered that the sentences run
    concurrently with each other. It then ordered that the sentences in Count 1 and Count 2 run
    consecutively to the sentence for Count 5, Count 8, and Count 9. Thus, the Petitioner’s effective
    sentence was four years, to serve in the Tennessee Department of Corrections.
    The Petitioner was originally declared a habitual traffic offender on July 14, 1997. He filed
    a habeas corpus petition challenging that judgment of conviction, which the habeas corpus court
    dismissed. On appeal, this Court affirmed that dismissal. Gregory Eidson v. State, No. M2004-
    02528-CCA-R3-HC, 
    2005 WL 292444
    , at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 1, 2005), perm.
    app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2005). The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief from the
    five judgments of conviction in this case alleging: (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
    the judgment in this case because the statute of limitations had run on the DUI offense; (2) that the
    prior DUI offense from September 14, 1995, is void because it was entered by a probate court, which
    lacks jurisdiction in criminal cases; and (3) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order that three
    of the sentences for the HTO convictions run concurrently because they were committed while the
    Petitioner was released on three different bonds. The habeas corpus court dismissed the Petitioner’s
    petition, finding that he is not being held illegally, and the judgments in this case were entered by
    a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the court found that the Petitioner received legal
    sentences within the appropriate range, and his sentences had not expired. It is from this order that
    the Petitioner now appeals.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his
    petition because, as he alleged in his petition: (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the
    judgment in this case because the statute of limitations had run on the DUI conviction; (2) that the
    prior DUI offense from September 14, 1995, is void because it was entered by a probate court, which
    lacks jurisdiction in criminal cases; and (3) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order that three
    of the sentences for the HTO convictions run concurrently because they were committed while the
    Petitioner was released on three different bonds. He also presents multiple other issues for our
    review, including that: (1) the habeas corpus court failed to provide him records so that he could file
    an accurate petition; (2) the habeas corpus judge is not a “judge” within the meaning of “any judge”
    as stated in the statute; and (3) the judge had a duty to appoint counsel and hold a hearing.
    Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees its citizens the right to seek
    habeas corpus relief. In Tennessee, a “person imprisoned or restrained of [his or her] liberty, under
    any pretense whatsoever . . . may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such
    imprisonment . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (2000). The grounds upon which habeas corpus
    relief will be granted are very narrow. Hickman v. State, 
    153 S.W.3d 16
    , 20 (Tenn. 2004); State v.
    Ritchie, 
    20 S.W.3d 624
    , 630 (Tenn. 2000). “Unlike the post-conviction petition, the purpose of a
    habeas corpus petition is to contest void and not merely voidable judgments.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d
    at 20; Potts v. State, 
    833 S.W.2d 60
    , 62 (Tenn. 1992). Therefore, in order to state a cognizable claim
    for habeas corpus relief, the petition must contest a void judgment. Id. “A void judgment is one in
    which the judgment is facially invalid because the court did not have the statutory authority to render
    such judgment . . . . A voidable judgment is one which is facially valid and requires proof beyond
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    the face of the record or judgment to demonstrate its voidableness.” Dykes v. Compton, 
    978 S.W.2d 528
    , 529 (Tenn. 1998) (citing Archer v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 157
    , 161 (Tenn. 1993)). Thus, a writ of
    habeas corpus is available only when it appears on the face of the judgment or the record that the
    convicting court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence the defendant, or that the sentence
    of imprisonment or other restraint has expired. Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 164; Potts, 833 S.W.2d at 62.
    The petitioner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
    conviction is void or that the prison term has expired. Passarella v. State, 
    891 S.W.2d 619
    , 627
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Furthermore, the procedural requirements for habeas corpus relief are
    mandatory and must be scrupulously followed. Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 165. It is permissible for a
    trial court to summarily dismiss a petition of habeas corpus without the appointment of a lawyer and
    without an evidentiary hearing if there is nothing on the face of the judgment to indicate that the
    convictions addressed therein are void. Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 20; Passarella, 891 S.W.2d at 627;
    Rodney Buford v. State, No. M1999-00487-CCA-R3-PC, 
    2000 WL 1131867
    , at *2 (Tenn. Crim.
    App., at Nashville, July 28, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2001). Because the
    determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a question of law, our review is
    de novo with no presumption of correctness. Hart v. State, 
    21 S.W.3d 901
    , 903 (Tenn. 2000).
    At the outset, we note that the Petitioner has substantially complied with the statutory
    requirements for habeas corpus relief. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-105, a
    petition for habeas corpus relief “should be made to the court or judge most convenient in point of
    distance to the applicant, unless a sufficient reason be given in the petition for not applying to such
    court or judge.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-105. The procedural provisions of the habeas corpus
    statutes are mandatory and must be scrupulously followed. See Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 165. The
    mere fact that witnesses or files may be located in another county are insufficient reasons to permit
    deviation from the statutory requirements. See Jimmy Wayne Wilson v. State, No. 03C01-9806-CR-
    00206, 
    1999 WL 420495
    , at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, June 24, 1999), perm. app. denied
    (Tenn. Nov. 22, 1999). In this case, the Petitioner is incarcerated in Lake County, and, therefore, that
    is the county in which the petition should have been filed. However, the Petitioner previously filed
    a habeas corpus petition in Lake County and it was transferred to Sumner County. In the Petitioner’s
    petition, he asserted that, because of this, and because his first petition for habeas corpus relief was
    pending in Sumner County, Sumner County was the only court that could grant him habeas corpus
    relief. We conclude that the Petitioner provided a sufficient reason in his petition for not filing the
    petition in the most convenient court. Therefore, we will address each of the Petitioner’s issues.
    The Petitioner first contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him because
    the statute of limitations had run on the DUI offense. The judgment of conviction for this offense
    was entered on January 23, 2002, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to eleven months and
    twenty-nine days. The Petitioner filed his petition for habeas corpus relief on December 17, 2004,
    alleging that this judgment was void, which is after his sentence on this conviction had been served.
    The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “a person is not ‘restrained of liberty’ for purposes of
    the habeas corpus statute unless the challenged judgment itself imposes a restraint upon the
    petitioners freedom of action or movement.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23. Further, “Use of the
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    challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a separate conviction is not a restraint of
    liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction” after the sentence
    on the original conviction has expired. Id. In the case under submission, because the Petitioner
    completed serving the sentence for the DUI conviction prior to filing his petition for habeas corpus
    relief, the Petitioner is not restrained of liberty by that judgment. The Petitioner has, therefore, failed
    to state a legal cause of action for a writ of habeas corpus. See State v. Buster Chandler, No. E2003-
    02619-CCA-R3-HC, 
    2004 WL 2775487
    , at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 3, 2004), no
    perm. app. filed. This issue is without merit.
    The Petitioner next asserts that his conviction in 1995 for DUI is void because the judgment
    was entered by the Davidson County Probate Court, which lacked jurisdiction. This Court has
    previously held that probate court has jurisdiction over criminal cases. State v. Coolidge, 
    915 S.W.2d 820
    , 824 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled on other grounds State v. Troutman, 
    979 S.W.2d 271
     (Tenn. 1998). This issue is without merit.
    The Petitioner next asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order that three of
    the sentences for the HTO convictions in Count 5, Count 8, and Count 9 run concurrently because
    they were committed while the Petitioner was released on three different bonds. The Petitioner
    contends that the trial court should have ordered that these sentences run consecutively to each other,
    for an effective sentence of six years, rather than two years. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-
    20-111(b) (2003) provides:
    In any case in which a defendant commits a felony while such defendant was released
    on bail . . ., and the defendant is convicted of both such offenses, the trial judge shall
    not have discretion as to whether the sentences shall run concurrently or
    cumulatively, but shall order that such sentences be served cumulatively.
    A sentence imposed in direct contravention to a statutory mandate is void. See McLaney v.
    Bell, 
    59 S.W.3d 90
    , 94 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Burkhart, 
    566 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tenn. 1978).
    According to statutory sentencing requirements, where offenses are committed while a defendant is
    out on bail or parole, the sentences in each case must run consecutively to one another, not
    concurrently. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-111(b); see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(C).1
    1
    Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3) provides:
    Mandatory Consecutive Sentences. W here a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses from one trial
    or where the defendant has additional sentences not yet fully served as the result of the convictions in
    the same or other court and the law requires consecutive sentences, the sentence shall be consecutive
    whether the judgment explicitly so orders or not. This rule shall apply:
    (A) To a sentence for a felony committed while on parole for a felony;
    (B) To a sentence for escape or for a felony committed while on escape;
    (C) To a sentence for a felony where the defendant was released on bail and the
    defendant is convicted of both offenses; and
    (D) Any other ground provided by law.
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    In McLaney v. Bell, our supreme court held that where the face of a judgment or the record
    of the underlying proceedings demonstrates that a petitioner received illegal concurrent sentencing,
    the judgment of conviction is void and habeas corpus relief is available. 59 S.W.3d at 91. The
    petitioner in McLaney alleged that his plea bargain agreement resulted in an illegal concurrent
    sentence, in violation of the statute that requires consecutive sentencing if a felony is committed
    when a defendant is on bail from a prior felony. Id. at 92. Our Supreme Court reversed the summary
    dismissal of the petition and remanded the case to the habeas court for the appointment of counsel
    and an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 95. The Court instructed that, should the habeas court determine
    that the petitioner was on bail when he committed the offenses and thus that the sentences he
    received were void, it should transfer the case to the convicting court, where the petitioner would
    be entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial for the offenses. Id. at 95-96.
    In light of McLaney, we conclude that we are constrained to remand this case to the habeas
    corpus court for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
    Petitioner was on bail when he committed the offenses in Count 5, Count 8, and Count 9, and for
    a determination of whether the sentences for those convictions must run consecutively to each other,
    making the sentences he received void. If so, the habeas corpus court should allow the Petitioner
    to withdraw his guilty pleas for these counts or proceed to trial for the offenses.
    We conclude that all of the Petitioner’s other issues are waived and without merit.
    III. Conclusion
    In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we reverse the judgment
    of the habeas corpus court, and we remand the case for the appointment of counsel and for an
    evidentiary hearing.
    __________________________________
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
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Document Info

Docket Number: M2005-00150-CCA-R3-HC

Judges: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer

Filed Date: 6/8/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014