State v. David Eaton ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MARCH 1999 SESSION
FILED
October 25, 1999
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9802-CR-00043
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellee, * SHELBY COUNTY Appellate Court Clerk
VS. * Hon. Chris Craft, Judge
DAV ID B. EA TON , * (Leaving Scene of Accide nt)
Appe llant. *
For Ap pellant: For Appellee:
Brett B. Stein John Knox Walkup
236 Adams Avenue Attorney General & Reporter
Memphis, TN 38103
(on appea l) Peter M. Coughlan
Assistant Attorney General
Thomas E. Hansom 425 Fifth Avenu e North
659 Freeman 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Memphis, TN 38122 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
(at trial)
Dan Byer
Assistant District Attorney General
District Attorney General's Office
201 Poplar Avenue, 3rd Floor
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:_____________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, David B. Eaton, was indicted for driving under the
influence, reckless driving, and leaving the scene of an accident. He was convicted
only for leaving the scene of an accident. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-101. The trial
court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Shelby
County Workhouse with ninety days to be served and the remainder suspended
upon the defendant being placed upon supervised probation for eleven months and
twenty-nine days. The defendant was also fined $1,000.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to
support the conviction. We conclude that it is.
On June 1, 1996, Aline Turner was stopped at a traffic light in
Memphis when her vehicle was struck from the rear by a black Peugeot driven by
the defendant. According to Ms. Turner, the defendant got out of his automobile
and approached the driver's side of her vehicle. When asked if she was all right,
she responded that she was not. The defendant then returned to his vehicle and
drove away.
Memphis police officer John Bynum Cobb, III, who was on routine
patrol duty in the vicinity, witnessed the collision. Officer Cobb testified at trial that
he saw a black Peugeot strike the rear of Ms. Turner's vehicle and observed the
defendant get out of the car and walk towards Ms. Turner's vehicle. According to
Officer Cobb the defendant then turned, looked in the direction of the squad car,
and drove away.
Officer Cobb and his partner, Joe Newborn, pursued the defendant.
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The officers had the blue lights of the squad car flashing and the siren on in an effort
to bring him to a halt. The defendant did not heed requests to pull over but was
finally apprehended when traffic congestion blocked his path. Officers asked him to
turn off his ignition and had to repeat this request several times before the
defendant complied. The officers observed that the defendant had difficulty getting
his keys out of the ignition and putting them in his pocket. In addition, the officer
had to ask the defendant several times to step outside of his car. There was a delay
of twenty to thirty seconds. Officers Cobb and Newborn testified that the
defendant's speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, and he smelled of
alcohol. When Officer Cobb asked the defendant if he had been drinking, both he
and Officer Newborn heard the defendant admit to drinking Jack Daniels.
Russell E. Young, a DUI technician with the Memphis Police
Department, observed the defendant at the scene and testified that he believed the
defendant was under the influence of some substance other than alcohol. He asked
the defendant about any medication he was taking and the defendant replied that he
was taking medication for depression. When Officer Young also asked permission
to administer a breathalyser test, the defendant initially consented but later withdrew
consent.
Dr. John Purvis Milnor, III, M.D., who appeared as a witness for the
defense, testified that the defendant was suffering from hypoglycemia at the time of
his arrest. He further explained that during a hypoglycemic episode a person would
have slurred speech and lack the ability to concentrate. According to Dr. Milnor's
testimony, a person could function in such a state but would only be able to do
routine tasks. Dr. Milnor likened the state to sleepwalking and said it could take the
appearance of a stupor.
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The defendant testified that he had been under the care of a doctor
since June 1, 1996, for the purpose of treating heart palpitations and had just begun
taking medication. He further testified that after getting in his car he began to
perspire a lot as if he had the flu. He claimed that he could not recall anything about
the accident.
On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom. State v.
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are
matters entrusted to the jury as triers of fact. Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the
relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);
State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1073(1984); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).
Here, the defendant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-101. By the terms of the statute, a driver is
guilty of leaving the scene of an accident if he or she possesses the requisite mens
rea, that is, if the driver "knowingly" flees. The defendant claims that the evidence is
insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that he possessed the requisite mens rea
because he could not have acted knowingly while having a hypoglycemic episode.
The state, however, put on evidence that the defendant's behavior was not
consistent with a hypoglycemic episode, and that, while under the influence of
alcohol, he was fully cognizant at the time of the collision.
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In our view, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to
conclude that the defendant acted knowingly by leaving the scene of the accident.
The jury acted within its prerogative by rejecting the defendant's assertion and
accrediting certain parts of the testimony offered by the state.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-101 also provides, in relevant part, that "the
driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to ... any person shall
immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident ...." The defendant
argues that he could not be convicted of leaving the scene of an accident because
there was no testimony that Aline Turner suffered injury. At trial, however, Ms.
Turner testified that as the defendant's car struck her vehicle, she was knocked
through the red light at which she was stopped. She also testified that when the
defendant asked her if she was all right she replied "No." On cross examination,
Ms. Turner testified that she had pain in her neck and back, that she had trouble
moving her neck, and that the pain became worse after she stepped out of the car.
Officer Tracy Lynn Washington testified that an ambulance was called to the scene
to provide treatment for Ms. Turner. In our view, this testimony was sufficient to
establish Ms. Turner did in fact suffer an injury as required by the statute. The
issue, therefore, is without merit.
Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed.
_____________________________
Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
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CONCUR:
_________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
_________________________
Thomas T. W oodall, Judge
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