State v. Paris A. Weaver ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE
October 20, 1999
AUGUST 1999 SESSION Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9902-CR-00052
Appellee, * HAMILTON COUNTY
VS. * Honorable Stephen M. Bevil, Judge
PARIS A. WEAVER, * (Aggravated Assault)
Appellant. *
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
ARDENA J. GARTH PAUL G. SUMMERS
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
DONNA ROBINSON MILLER MARVIN S. BLAIR, JR.
and Assistant Attorney General
CHRISTIAN CODER 425 Fifth Avenue North
Assistant District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243
701 Cherry Street, Suite 300
Chattanooga, TN 37402 WILLIAM H. COX, III
District Attorney General
H. C. BRIGHT, III
Assistant District Attorney
600 Market Street, Suite 310
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED: _______________
AFFIRMED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
OPINION
INTRODUCTION
The defendant, Paris A. Weaver, appeals from the Hamilton County
Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation. The defendant contends that the
trial court had insufficient evidence to support revocation. We AFFIRM the trial
court’s order revoking probation.
BACKGROUND
On June 3, 1998, the defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated
assault with an agreed sentence of eight years at Range II to be served in split
confinement. Defendant was required to serve 100% of an eleven month and
twenty-nine day active confinement sentence and was ordered to be released on
November 30, 1998, with the balance to be served in supervised probation. The
defendant was further ordered by the court as a special condition of probation to
have no contact of any kind with Angela Burrell, the victim of defendant’s
aggravated assault.
On July 2, 1998, a Petition to Revoke was filed by the state in response to
a letter written to the victim by the defendant while he was incarcerated. On
September 16, 1998, the Hamilton County Court held a hearing in consideration
of the state’s petition, at which the defendant admitted to writing and mailing the
letter. The victim testified that she felt threatened by the letter especially the
words, “I will see you soon.” However, the defendant testified that the letter was
written with no intent to threaten or harass but rather to express regret, apology
and Christian sentiment. The trial court upon hearing this testimony granted the
Petition to Revoke and ordered that the defendant serve his full sentence in
incarceration. From that decision, the defendant now appeals.
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ANALYSIS
The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the
Hamilton County Court’s decision to revoke his probation. We disagree.
A trial court may revoke a sentence of probation upon a finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated the conditions of
his probation. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-35-311. The judgment of the trial court will
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Williamson, 619 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). In order for this
Court to be warranted in finding an abuse of discretion in a probation revocation
case, it must be established that the record contains no substantial evidence to
support the conclusion of the trial judge that a violation of the conditions of
probation has occurred. See State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978);
State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The proof of a
probation violation need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is
sufficient if it allows the trial judge to make a conscientious and intelligent
judgment. See State v. Milton, 673 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
Our review of the record demonstrates that the state established sufficient
facts during the hearing to permit the trial judge to make an intelligent judgement.
At the hearing, it was established that:
(1) As a special condition of defendant’s probation, the defendant
was ordered by the court to have “no contact of any kind with
the victim;”
(2) The defendant, while incarcerated, wrote a letter to the victim
stating among other things, “I know that I should not do this but
I am writing to you...” and “I will see you soon;” and
(3) The victim found this letter threatening.
The trial court had sufficient basis to find a probation violation. The
probation order made no exception for written communication, and thus the trial
court reasonably concluded that the letter constituted contact in violation of the
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probation condition. The victim further testified, quite understandably, that this
letter, especially the words, “I will see you soon,” frightened her. The defendant
would argue that we take these words innocently in a restrictive context confined
to the plain language of the letter; but this we will not do. Defendant’s words
exist in a complicated context of violence, a context where a history of abuse
culminated in a blow with a deadly object to the side of the victim’s head, and a
context where simple words trigger fear. The court sought to end this fear and
protect the victim by conditioning the defendant’s release. The defendant
accepted the court’s condition and now must accept the consequence of its
violation. With one letter, the defendant violated the right of his victim to be free
from further harassment and challenged the integrity of the court. Accordingly,
we echo the sentiments of the trial court and affirm its decision:
[Y]ou’re the one the Court told to stay away from her and not to
have any contact with her. You told me you would and you get out
there -- I can not have people, Mr. Weaver, intimidating people that
are victims of their criminal activity, I can’t have that.
I specifically ordered you not to have any contact with her
whatsoever, and you did it anyway. You’ve intimidated her when
you told her you’ll see her soon. I can understand why she would
have been threatened by that and why she would have fear after
everything that’s gone on. I can’t tolerate that, Mr. Weaver, I can’t
have people deliberately violating the order when its protection of
somebody else, I just can’t have that done.
Further, we note that the trial court’s decision coincides with the important
legislative policy against domestic abuse. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-
618. We recognize, like the legislature, the seriousness of domestic abuse as a
crime and the pressing need to afford its victims assurance and protection. In
this case, the court’s duty is to stand behind its order and provide this victim of
abuse some level of safety and peace.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the trial court’s order revoking the defendant’s probation.
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__________________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
CONCUR:
____________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
____________________________
ALAN E. GLENN, Judge
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