Jacques Bennett v. State of Tennessee ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE
October 5, 1999
APRIL 1999 SESSION Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
JACQUES B. BENNETT, * C.C.A. 03C01-9809-CR-00338
Appellant, * HAMILTON COUNTY
vs. * Hon. Douglas A. Meyer, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Motion to Vacate/Set Aside
Judgment/Plea)
Appellee. *
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Jacques B. Bennett John Knox Walkup
STSRCF Attorney General and Reporter
Route 4, Box 600 425 Fifth Avenue North
Pikeville, TN 37367 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Ellen H. Pollack
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED - RULE 20
NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Jacques B. Bennett, appeals the summary dismissal of
his “Motion to Vacate/Set Aside Judgment/Plea: and, to Declare Said
Judgment/Plea Void” by the Hamilton County Criminal Court on January 9, 1998.
Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that this is an appropriate
case for affirmance pursuant to Ct. of Crim. App. Rule 20.
On November 9, 1992, the petitioner pled guilty in the Hamilton County
Criminal Court to first degree murder. According to the petitioner, he then filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea on December 13, 1992.1 The trial court denied the
petitioner’s motion and, on January 5, 1993, entered a judgment of conviction,
sentencing the petitioner to imprisonment for life. On July 6, 1993, the petitioner
filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised the following grounds for
relief: (1) whether he voluntarily and knowingly entered his guilty plea; (2) whether
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (3) whether the trial court erroneously
denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his motion to vacate or set aside
the plea agreement; and (4) whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept his
guilty plea. The trial court denied the petition, and this court affirmed the trial court’s
judgment. Bennett v. State, No. 03C01-9512-CR-00391, 1996 WL 492158 (Tenn.
Crim. App. at Knoxville, August 28, 1996), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1997).
On December 30, 1997, the petitioner filed the instant “motion,”
alleging that (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, (2) the trial court
erroneously denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and (3) he was not
present when the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The trial court
1
In his brief, the petitioner states that he also filed motions to withdraw his guilty plea on May
19, 1993 , and on N ovem ber 3, 19 94, both o f which m otions we re denied by the trial cour t.
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treated the petitioner’s motion as a petition to reopen his prior petition for post-
conviction relief and declined to afford relief. The trial court based its denial of relief
upon this court’s prior determination of the petitioner’s allegations and additionally
concluded that the petition is time-barred. On appeal, the petitioner disputes the
trial court’s findings and additionally alleges that the trial court violated the federal
and state constitutions and Tenn. R. Crim. P. 43 and 44 by sentencing him to
imprisonment for life in his absence and in the absence of his attorney.
Initially, we note that the trial court properly treated the petitioner’s
“motion” as a petition to reopen his prior petition for post-conviction relief. A trial
court is not bound by the title of a pleading but has discretion to treat the pleading
according to the relief sought. Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tenn.
1995); Caruthers v. State, No. 02C01-9806-CC-00162, 1999 WL 55938, at *2
(Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, February 9, 1999). The petitioner’s judgment of
conviction having long since become final, post-conviction proceedings constituted
the petitioner’s sole remaining avenue of relief in the Hamilton County Criminal
Court. See Newsome v. State, 995 S.W.2d 129, 133-134 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998),
perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1999); State v. Lyons, No. 01C01-9508-CR-00263,
1997 WL 469501, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, August 15, 1997). Yet, the
petitioner had previously filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was resolved
on the merits by the trial court and by this court on appeal. As the State correctly
notes, the 1995 Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides:
This part contemplates the filing of only one (1) petition
for post-conviction relief. In no event may more than one
(1) petition for post-conviction relief be filed attacking a
single judgment. If a prior petition has been filed which
was resolved on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction, any second or subsequent petition shall be
summarily dismissed. A petitioner may move to reopen a
post-conviction proceeding that has been concluded,
under the limited circumstances set out in Tenn. Code.
Ann. § 40-30-217.
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Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-30-202(c) (1997). We conclude that none of the limited
circumstances set out in Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-30-217 (1997) are applicable in this
case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Ct. of Crim.
App. Rule 20.
Norma McGee Ogle, Judge
CONCUR:
Jerry L. Smith, Judge
Joe G. Riley, Judge
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