State v. James Anders ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JANUARY 1999 SESSION
FILED
March 24, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9806-CC-00179
Appellee, )
) Carroll County
V. )
) Honorable C. Creed McGinley, Judge
)
JAMES ALFRED ANDERS, ) (Rape)
)
Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GUY T. WILKINSON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
BILLY R. ROE, JR. J. ROSS DYER
Assistant District Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
117 North Forrest Avenue Criminal Justice Division
Camden, TN 38320 425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
ROBERT “GUS” RADFORD
District Attorney General
ELEANOR CAHILL
Assistant District Attorney General
24th Judicial District
P.O. Box 686
Huntingdon, TN 38344
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
O P I N IO N
James Alfred Anders appeals as of right from a judgment of the Circuit
Court of Carroll County convicting him of rape following a jury trial. The trial
court sentenced him as a range I standard offender to ten years’ confinement,
with a release eligibility of thirty percent. The sole issue presented for our review
is whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s
conviction. We AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment of conviction but MODIFY the
sentence imposed below to conform with statutory mandates.
BACKGROUND
On Friday, June 20, 1997, the defendant rented a room for the weekend
at the Shannon Lee Motel. Donald Hatcher, an acquaintance and co-worker of
the defendant, lived at the Shannon Lee. The defendant visited Hatcher in his
room several times during the next two days. Hatcher testified that the
defendant became irritated and attempted to start a fight with him during one of
these visits. On another occasion, the defendant told him that he had a knife in
his room and that he had stabbed a person. Hatcher asserted that, because of
these incidents, he was afraid of the defendant.
On Sunday, June 22, 1997, the defendant again visited Hatcher in his
room. After the two had talked for some time, the defendant asked Hatcher if he
could see him without his clothes. Hatcher said no. The defendant asked again,
and Hatcher again declined. The defendant then offered Hatcher forty dollars,
but Hatcher still refused. At that point, Hatcher testified, the defendant jumped
up and ran to the door, locked it, and stated, “I’m going to do whatever it takes to
see you out of your clothes.”
According to Hatcher, after the defendant locked the door, he held one
hand behind his back and told Hatcher to remove his clothes. Hatcher began to
disrobe, and the defendant pulled Hatcher’s underwear down and removed his
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shirt. At the defendant’s direction, Hatcher then removed the remainder of his
clothes and lay on the bed. The defendant got on top of Hatcher and attempted
to engage in anal sex. When he was unable to penetrate Hatcher, the defendant
got up and went to his room to retrieve some lubricant.
When the defendant left, Hatcher locked the door and got dressed. He
testified that he intended to leave and contact the police. Before he could
escape, however, the defendant returned and knocked on his door. Hatcher
stated that he opened the door and started to leave, but the defendant would not
let him pass. According to Hatcher, the defendant physically pushed him back
inside the room. The defendant again told Hatcher to undress and to lie on the
bed. Hatcher complied, allegedly out of fear of the defendant.
The defendant then repeated his earlier attempt to engage in anal sex.
Hatcher testified that he did not attempt to physically resist. He stated, however,
that he yelled for help and repeatedly told the defendant to stop. The defendant
did not stop. Instead, according to Hatcher, the defendant held him down with
his hands pinned under him so that he could not remove them and proceeded to
anally penetrate Hatcher with his penis. Hatcher testified that he did not
consent.
When the defendant finished, he put some money on the table and left.
Hatcher showered, got dressed, and went to his sister’s home. He and his sister
then went to the police and reported that the defendant had raped him.
The defendant’s trial testimony materially differed from Hatcher’s only in
that he denied any suggestion of force or coercion and denied that Hatcher had
told him to stop. Rather, he asserted that the act was consensual and
suggested that Hatcher’s allegations were the result of his desire to justify the
incident after his becoming ashamed of having sex with another man.
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ANALYSIS
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tenn. 1985); Tenn. R. App. P.
13(e). The appellee is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. See State v.
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
The credibility of witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the
reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusively to the
trier of fact. See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v.
Gentry, 881 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). A jury verdict for the state
accredits the testimony of the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor
of the state. See State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983).
Moreover, a guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence enjoyed by
defendants at trial and replaces it with a presumption of guilt. See State v.
Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Thus, an appellant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence carries the burden of illustrating to this Court why the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. See State v. Freeman, 943
S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
The defendant has not carried this burden. Rape is defined, in pertinent
part, as the “unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the
defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances . . .
[f]orce or coercion is used to accomplish the act . . . [or] [t]he sexual penetration
is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or
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has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503(a)(1)-(2).
Thus, to sustain the defendant’s conviction, there must be proof of both
(1) sexual penetration and (2) either coercion or lack of consent. The defendant
concedes sexual penetration, but he denies that the act was nonconsensual or
coerced. He argues that Hatcher’s testimony to the contrary is illogical and
uncreditworthy and that the totality of the evidence preponderates in his favor.
In essence, he asks this Court to reweigh the evidence. This we cannot do.
Hatcher testified at trial that he repeatedly told the defendant to stop. This
testimony, if believed by the jury, was clearly sufficient to establish Hatcher’s lack
of consent and that the defendant had reason to know that Hatcher did not
consent. The credibility of witnesses is a question for the trier of fact; the jury
was competent to credit Hatcher’s testimony and discredit that of the defendant.
This issue is without merit.
RELEASE ELIGIBILITY
Finally, although not raised by the parties, we observe that the sentence
imposed below indicates an incorrect release eligibility. During the defendant’s
sentencing hearing, the trial judge twice noted that the defendant would be
required to serve his entire sentence. Nevertheless, the judgment sheet
indicates a release eligibility of thirty percent. An offender who commits rape on
or after July 1, 1995, “shall serve one hundred percent (100%) of the sentence
imposed by the court less sentence credits earned and retained.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-501(I)(1), (2)(G). Because the trial judge was aware of the correct
release eligibility, we need not remand for resentencing. Cf. State v. Delbert Lee
Harris, No. 01C01-9705-CC-00177 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Sept. 30, 1998, at
Nashville) (concluding that remand for resentencing was appropriate when trial
court erred as to release eligibility because trial court’s imposition of sentence
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was uninformed). We modify the sentence below to comport with the above
cited statute.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment of conviction is affirmed. The sentence
imposed below is modified in that the defendant shall have no release eligibility,
and this cause is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent
with this opinion.
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____________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
_____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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