State v. Daniel Bailey ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JANUARY SESSION, 1998
FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) February 23, 1998
) No. 02C01-9612-CR-00456
Appellee ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) SHELBY COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk
vs. )
) Hon. L. T. LAFFERTY, Judge
)
DANIEL M. BAILEY, )
) (Aggravated Rape;
Appellant ) Aggravated Sexual Battery)
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Kathleen L. Caldwell Charles W. Burson
Taylor, Halliburton, Ledbetter Attorney General and Reporter
and Caldwell
44 North Second, Suite 200 Deborah A. Tullis
Memphis, TN 38103 Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
William L. Gibbons
District Attorney General
Charles Bell
Asst. District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301
201 Poplar Street
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Daniel M. Bailey, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of
one count of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial
court imposed consecutive sentences of fifteen years and eight years respectively to
be served in the Department of Correction. The appellant appeals as of right from
these convictions raising as his sole issue the denial of his constitutional right to a
speedy trial.
After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
The procedural background of the case is as follows: The appellant was
indicted on June 17, 1993 on one count of aggravated sexual battery in violation of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502 and on one count of aggravated rape in violation of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504. The indictments, which involve separate victims,
were consolidated for trial. Trial was originally set for April 25, 1994 but on that date
the trial was rescheduled. The record suggests that this continuance was granted
so that the State and defense counsel could explore the possibility of a plea
agreement. The trial court rescheduled the trial for November 7, 1994. The
appellant did not object to the new trial date. On November 7, 1994, the State
requested a new trial date because the State encountered problems in returning the
minor victims to Tennessee to testify. The record indicates that the children were
living with their father in California and there were complications concerning the
children’s travel arrangements due to a custody battle between the children’s
parents. The trial date was again rescheduled for April 17, 1995.1 On that date,
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The appellant alleges that on April 18, 1995 he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment
upon grounds that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. Additionally, he avers in his brief that
he opposed the State’s motions for continuance. However, we note that no opposition, either
orally or by written motion, to the continuances are included in the record before u s. Moreover,
the record contains only one motion to dismiss filed by the appellant. This motion was filed on
March 4, 1996 which was the first day of the appellant’s scheduled trial. Two motions to dismiss
for lack of a speedy trial are appended to the appellant’s brief. These motions reflect the dates of
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the trial date was rescheduled for November 1995. The record does not reflect the
reason for this postponement of trial. In November 1995, the trial court on its own
motion rescheduled the trial for March 1996 due to scheduling conflicts in its
November 1995 trial calendar. The appellant’s trial was then rescheduled for March
4, 1996. The trial was held on March 4 and 5, 1996. In sum, the record reflects
that the appellant’s trial date was rescheduled four times.
At trial, the appellant’s statement to the police admitting to various sexual
assaults of both minor victims was introduced. The proof established that the
appellant was the step-grandfather of both victims who were six and eight years old
at the time of these offenses. The appellant’s charged criminal conduct was
corroborated by the testimony of both victims’ at trial. The jury returned a verdict of
guilty for both offenses. The appellant remained free on bail during the entire time
between indictment and trial. At the time of the offenses, the appellant was married
to the victims’ grandmother. At some point during the rescheduling of the appellant’s
trial dates, his wife allegedly became hostile toward him and filed for divorce.
ANALYSIS
The appellant contends that he was denied his constitutional and statutory
right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, sec. 9; Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-14-101 (1990); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 48. As a basis for this contention,
the appellant argues that he was originally indicted on June 17, 1993 and his trial
did not commence until March 4, 1996, resulting in a lapse of thirty-three months.
He contends that, due to this delay of thirty-three months, he suffered undue
April 18, 1995 and January 30, 1996. Allegations of fact contained in a brief may not be
conside red as e vidence . State v. Be nnett, 798 S.W .2d 783, 789 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1990) cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 915, 111 S.Ct. 2009 (1991). Absent the necessary relevant material in the
record , an appe llate court ca nnot co nsider the merits of an issu e. See Tenn . R. App. P . 24(b).
Thus, we are permitted to consider only the March 4, 1996 motion to dismiss as being
contem porane ously enter ed. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a).
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prejudice because he “lost a highly favorable witness [his wife] and one who would
have contradicted the testimonies of [the minor victims] . . . .”
The speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is designed to “minimize
the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but
nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while
released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the
presence of unresolved criminal charges.” United States v. MacDonald, 465 U.S. 1,
8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502 (1982). The right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of
arrest or indictment, whichever comes first, and continues until the date of the trial.
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 310-12, 106 S.Ct. 648, 653-54 (1986).
When a defendant contends that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, the
reviewing court must conduct a four part balancing test to determine if this right was,
indeed, abridged. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972).
This test includes consideration of (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the
delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) the actual prejudice suffered
by the defendant because of the delay.2 Id.The length of the delay between indictment and trial is a threshold factor,
and, if that delay is not presumptively prejudicial, the other factors need not be
considered. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. The delay in the present
case was thirty-three months. While the length of delay, in and of itself, does not
constitute a denial of a speedy trial given the complex nature of the charges, a delay
of one year or longer “marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable
enough to trigger the Barker inquiry.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652
112 S.Ct. 2686, 2691 n. 1 (1992). Thus, the delay in this case requires further
review.
2
In State v. Bishop, 493 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. 1973), our supreme court implicitly adopted the
Barker balancin g test to de termin e wheth er a defe ndant’s s tate cons titutional and s tatutory right to
a speedy trial has been violated.
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Next, we inquire as to the reasons for the delay. Possible reasons for the
delay are said to fall within four identifiable categories: (1) intentional delay to gain a
tactical advantage over the defense or delay designed to harass the defendant; (2)
bureaucratic indifference or negligence; (3) delay necessary to the fair and effective
prosecution of the case; and (4) delay caused or acquiesced in, by the defense.
State v. Wood, 924 S.W.2d 342, 346-47 (Tenn. 1996).
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted
less heavily but nevertheless should be considered. . . . Finally, a valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate
delay.
Barker, 407 US. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192.
In the present case, the delay arose on two occasions because the State was
unable to secure the attendance of two material witnesses at trial, the victims of the
offenses. As noted in Barker, the location of a missing witness serves to justify
appropriate delay. On another occasion, a continuance was necessitated due to
scheduling conflicts in the court’s trial calendar. We conclude that these reasons for
the delay were neutral and valid in nature and should be weighed less heavily
against the State.
The third prong of the balancing test, the defendant’s assertion of his right to
a speedy trial, was not satisfied until the day his trial commenced. Again, as noted
above, the record does not contain any other motions filed by the appellant nor does
it contain the trial court’s order dismissing this motion. Therefore, we are limited to
consideration of the motion filed on March 4, 1996. The appellant’s delayed
assertion of this right weighs against his claim. Wood, 924 S.W.2d 347 (citing
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. At 2192-93; Bishop, 493 S.W.2d at 85).
Our consideration of the remaining factor, whether the appellant was
prejudiced by the delay, focuses upon (1) any undue and oppressive incarceration;
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(2) the anxiety accompanying a public accusation; and (3) any impairment of the
appellant’s ability to prepare his defense. State v. Kolb, 755 S.W.2d 472, 475
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The record does not demonstrate any oppressive pretrial
incarceration, as the appellant was released on bail pending trial. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that the appellant suffered undue anxiety and concern awaiting
trial. However, the most important inquiry remains, whether the delay impaired the
defendant’s ability to prepare a defense.
The appellant contends that he has been “extremely prejudiced” by the
several continuances because his wife left him during the delay and he had lost “a
favorable witness.” We find nothing in the record which supports this allegation.
Although mention of marital discord is alluded to in the appellant’s brief, again, as
previously noted, we are precluded from considering as evidence factual allegations
contained in the briefs. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). Moreover, we must assume
that, had the wife testified at trial, her testimony would have been motivated by her
desire to tell the truth and not merely because she was married to the appellant. No
prejudice has been shown. This issue is without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
________________________________
JOE B. JONES, Presiding Judge
________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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