State v. LaKeith Lightfoot ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JANUARY 1998 SESSION
FILED
February 18, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
LAKEITH O. LIGHTFOOT, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
) NO. 02C01-9703-CR-00129
Appellant, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. ARTHUR T. BENNETT,
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
D. TYLER KELLY JOHN KNOX WALKUP
213 E. Lafayette Attorney General and Reporter
Jackson, TN 38301-6217
KENNETH W. RUCKER
Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
District Attorney General
PERRY S. HAYES
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Street, Ste. 301
Memphis, TN 38103-1947
OPINION FILED:
REMANDED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
In this post-conviction case the sole issue is whether the petitioner filed his
petition for post-conviction relief within the one-year statute of limitations. Since the
record does not reveal whether or not the pro se petitioner delivered the petition to
the appropriate prison authority for mailing within the statute of limitations, we
remand for further proceedings.
I
Petitioner, Lakeith O. Lightfoot, on January 29, 1996, entered a guilty plea
to second degree murder and received a sentence of 30 years as a Range II
Multiple Offender. The plea of guilty and sentence were the result of a plea
agreement.
A petition for post-conviction relief was filed in the trial court on January 30,
1997. The petition alleges the guilty plea was unintelligently and involuntarily
entered and was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition
reveals that it was executed and sworn to on January 24, 1997, when petitioner was
an inmate at Northwest Correction Center in Lake County, Tennessee.
The trial court summarily dismissed the petition since it was filed one (1) day
beyond the one-year statute of limitations.
II
This matter is governed by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 Compiler’s Notes. This legislation provides that, with
certain exceptions not applicable here, a petition for post-conviction relief must be
filed within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate
court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the
date on which the judgment became final. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a).
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The state contends the petition was filed one (1) day beyond the statute of
limitations and was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioner argues that the
judgment did not become final until 30 days after the entry of the guilty plea, thereby
making the petition timely filed. Furthermore, the defendant contends the petition
was timely filed by delivering the petition into the hands of the appropriate prison
official for mailing.
III
Petitioner firstly contends that his judgment of conviction did not become final
until thirty (30) days after it was entered. We disagree. Defendant’s guilty plea was
entered pursuant to a plea agreement in which the petitioner accepted the
recommended sentence of thirty (30) years and waived his right to appeal. Upon
waiving his right to appeal on the day of entry of the guilty plea, the judgment
became final and the statute of limitations began to run. See Passarella v. State,
891 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Warren v. State, 833 S.W.2d 101,
102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run
January 29, 1996, and expired January 29, 1997.
IV
Petitioner contends his petition was timely filed since it was delivered to
appropriate prison officials for mailing prior to January 30, 1997. The state correctly
notes the record does not reflect the date the petition was delivered to prison
officials.
The Post-Conviction Procedure Act itself does not make any allowances for
inmates with regard to the statute of limitations. However, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-218, enacted rules of practice
and procedure governing post-conviction matters. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 28. These
rules provide that a post-conviction petition filed by a pro se petitioner who is
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incarcerated is deemed to be filed on the date it is received by the appropriate
prison authorities for mailing. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 28, § 2(G).1 Therefore, as the
state concedes, this petition was timely filed if it was delivered to the appropriate
prison official for mailing prior to January 30, 1997.
V
Unfortunately, the record does not contain any kind of certification that the
petition was delivered to a prison official for mailing. Nevertheless, we note that the
petition was actually filed by the criminal court clerk in Shelby County on January
30th, yet executed by the petitioner at Northwest Correction Center in Lake County,
Tennessee, on January 24th. Although it is most likely that the petition was timely
delivered to prison authorities and mailed within the statute of limitations, it is
theoretically possible that the petition was given to someone other than a prison
official and hand delivered to the clerk.
We conclude that the petitioner should be given the opportunity to establish
whether or not the petition was delivered to the appropriate prison official for mailing
within the statute of limitations. If so, the petitioner should be allowed to proceed.
If not, the trial court should make the appropriate findings and dismiss the petition.
This case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
1
Effective July 1, 1997, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 49(c) provides that post-conviction relief
petitions of pro se litigants incarcerated in a correctional facility are deemed timely filed if
delivered to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility within the time fixed for filing.
See also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), holding that
the notice of appeal required by Fed. R. App. P. 4 (a)(1) is considered filed by a pro se inmate
upon delivery to prison authorities.
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____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_______________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
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