State v. Steven Culps ( 1998 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    FILED
    JANUARY 1998 SESSION
    February 12, 1998
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                   )               Appellate C ourt Clerk
    )   NO. 02C01-9705-CC-00163
    Appellee,                       )
    )   MADISON COUNTY
    VS.                                   )
    )   HON. FRANKLIN MURCHISON,
    STEVEN CULPS,                         )   JUDGE
    )
    Appellant.                      )   (Probation Revocation)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                        FOR THE APPELLEE:
    GEORGE MORTON GOOGE                       JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    District Public Defender                  Attorney General and Reporter
    VANESSA D. KING                           CLINTON J. MORGAN
    (at trial and of counsel on appeal)       Assistant Attorney General
    Assistant Public Defender                 Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
    227 West Baltimore                        425 Fifth Avenue North
    Jackson, TN 38301-6137                    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    GREGORY D. SMITH                          JERRY WOODALL
    (on appeal)                               District Attorney General
    Contract Appellate Defender
    One Public Sq., Suite 321                 DONALD H. ALLEN
    Clarksville, TN 37040                     Assistant District Attorney General
    225 Martin Luther King Dr.
    P.O. Box 2825
    Jackson, TN 38302-2825
    OPINION FILED:
    AFFIRMED
    JOE G. RILEY,
    JUDGE
    OPINION
    The defendant, Steven Culps, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court's
    order revoking his probation. The sole issue presented for review is whether the
    trial court erred in revoking his probation. The judgment of the trial court is
    affirmed.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The defendant pled guilty in October 1994 to aggravated burglary and
    theft of property under $500. He was sentenced to intensive probation for six (6)
    years and eleven (11) months twenty-nine (29) days for these offenses,
    respectively. The sentences were to run concurrently.
    In January, February and March of 1995, the defendant tested positive
    for cocaine use. In April 1995, the defendant stopped making required weekly
    visits to his probation officer. In December 1996, a probation violation report was
    filed by the defendant’s probation officer.
    On January 1, 1997, the defendant was arrested and charged with driving
    under the influence, driving on a revoked license, and violating the open
    container and seatbelt laws. He subsequently pled guilty to these charges. By
    virtue of the time of day the defendant was arrested, he was also in violation of
    the curfew provision of his probation.
    After a hearing on January 10, 1997, the trial court noted the defendant’s
    failure to report, his illicit use of drugs, and his conviction for driving under the
    influence. The trial court then revoked the defendant’s probation.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    A trial court may revoke probation and order the imposition of the original
    sentence upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the person has
    2
    violated a condition of probation. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310
    , 311. The
    decision to revoke probation rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
    State v. Mitchell, 
    810 S.W.2d 733
    , 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Probation
    revocations are subject to an abuse of discretion, rather than a de novo standard
    of review. State v. Harkins, 
    811 S.W.2d 79
    , 82 (Tenn. 1991). An abuse of
    discretion is shown if the record is devoid of substantial evidence to support the
    conclusion that a violation of probation has occurred. 
    Id.
     The evidence at the
    revocation hearing need only show that the trial court exercised a conscientious
    and intelligent judgment in making its decision. State v. Leach, 
    914 S.W.2d 104
    ,
    106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
    REVOCATION OF PROBATION
    The defendant contends the trial court erred in revoking his probation.
    The primary basis of this claim is that, because of the defendant’s poor health,
    the trial court should have ordered only a short jail term followed again by
    probation. The trial court recognized the defendant’s health problems and noted
    on the order that the sentence should be served at a special needs prison.
    As stated above, this Court’s standard of review of probation revocation is
    abuse of discretion, not de novo. The record reveals substantial evidence that
    the defendant violated the terms of his probation; therefore, this Court will not
    disturb the judgment of the court below.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
    3
    CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
    ______________________________
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9705-CC-00163

Filed Date: 2/12/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014