Wells v. State ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
OCTOBER SESSION, 1997 December 23, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
TIMOTHY WELLS, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9701-CR-00008
)
Appellant )
)
) McMINN COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. MAYO L. MASHBURN
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF McMINN COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY W ELLS JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Pro Se Attorney General and Reporter
Carter County Work Camp
Caller #1 PETER M. COUGHLAN
Roan Mountain, TN 37687 Assistant Attorney General
425 5th Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
JERRY N. ESTES
District Attorney General
Washington Avenue
Athens, TN 37303
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petitioner, Timothy Wells, appeals as of right pursuant to Rule 3 of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for post-co nviction relief. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction
relief on June 11, 1996. On July 8, 1996, the trial court dismissed the petition
without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Although on different grounds than
relied upo n by the trial jud ge, we a ffirm the jud gmen t of the trial cou rt.
On August 11, 1993, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of
aggravated burglary, five counts of burglary, one count of theft over $1000, one
count of theft over $500, and one misdemeanor count of theft under $500. He
was senten ced as a Ran ge II, mu ltiple offender to six years for aggravated
burglary, four years for each burglary conviction, four years for theft over $1000,
two years for theft over $500, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the
theft under $500 conviction. The sente nces were o rdere d to run conc urren tly
with each other, but the aggravated burglary conviction and the five burg lary
convictions were ordered to be served consecutively to several prior convictions.
The Petition er waiv ed his right to a ppea l.
On June 11, 1996, the Petitioner filed the pro se petition for post-conviction
relief which is the subject of this appeal. In the petition, he argued that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilty plea proceedings and
that his gu ilty pleas were n ot ente red kn owing ly or voluntarily because he did not
understand the consequences of the pleas he was entering. The trial court
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reviewed the petition and reviewed the audio-taped recording of the hearing on
the guilty pleas conducted on August 11, 1993. The trial court dismissed the
Petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the petition
was based on “blatent lies and misrep resenta tions” that w ere witho ut merit. W e
affirm the judgment of the trial court not on this reasoning, but because the
Petitioner’s claims are time-barred.
Although the Petitioner has argued the merits of his pe tition in th is app eal,
the State counters that the petition was properly dismissed because it was time-
barred. The Petitioner acknowledges in his petition that it was filed beyond the
one year statute of limitations, but argues that it should be governed by the prior
Post-Conviction Procedure Act that provided a three-year statute of limitations.
We disagree . At the tim e the P etitione r’s con victions beca me fin al, the statute
of limitations applicable to post-conviction proceedings was three years. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-3 0-102 (repe aled 1995). T he three-year statute of limitations
was subs eque ntly shortened to one year by the new Post-Conviction Procedure
Act, which too k effect on May 10, 19 95. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et
seq. (Supp. 1996). At the time the new Act took effect, the previous three-year
statute of limitations had not expired for the P etitioner.
Of course, the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act governs this petition
and all petitions filed after May 10, 199 5. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et
seq. (Supp. 1996). This Act provides, in pertinent part, that “notwithstanding any
other provision of this part to the contrary, any person having ground for relief
recognized under this part shall have at least one (1) year from May 10, 1995, to
file a petition or a motion to reopen a petition under this part.” Compiler’s Notes
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to Ten n. Cod e Ann. § 40-30-2 01 (Su pp. 199 6) (referring to Acts 1995, ch. 207,
§ 3). Because the previous three-year statute of limitations had not expired for
the Petitioner a t the time th e new A ct took effect, his right to p etition for po st-
conviction relief survived under the new Act. State v. Carter, ___ S.W.2d ___
(Tenn. 19 97).
As a result, the Petitioner had one year from the effective date of the new
Act, May 10 , 1995, to file fo r post-co nviction relief. See Com piler’s Notes to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0-30-20 1 (Sup p. 1996 ) (referring to Acts 19 95, ch. 20 7, § 3);
Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-30-2 02(a) (Supp . 1996). He filed his pe tition for post-
conviction relief on June 1 1, 1996, about one month after the expiration of the
one-year period. The Petitioner has not alleged that he fits within one of the
enumerated exceptions to the on e-year sta tute of limitatio ns. See Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 40-30-202(b) and -202(c) (S upp. 1996 ). Accordingly, we conclude that
the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. Fu rthermore, the trial court may
summarily dismiss a petition that was not filed within the applicable statute of
limitations. See Tenn. C ode Ann . § 40-30-206 (b).
For the reasons set forth in the discussion above, we conclude that the
petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed. The judgment of the
trial court is therefore affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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CONCUR:
____________________________
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
____________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
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