Waddell v. State ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
NOVEMBER 1997 SESSION
December 23, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
BILLY FARRELL WADDELL, )
) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9505-CR-00148
Appellant, )
) Knox County
V. )
) Honorable Ray L. Jenkins, Judge
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post-Conviction - Possession of Narcotics)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Billy Farrell Waddell, Pro Se John Knox Walkup
P.O. Box 2000 Attorney General & Reporter
Wartburg, TN 37887
Peter M. Coughlan
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Randall E. Nichols
District Attorney General
City-County Building
Knoxville, TN 37902
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMMERS,
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Billy Farrell Waddell, pled guilty to possession of narcotics.
Thereafter, he filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty
plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered. Also, he challenges his sentence
as a habitual criminal. He contends that his previous offenses, committed before
the enactment of the habitual criminal statute, cannot constitutionally be used to
enhance his sentencing status. The post-conviction hearing court dismissed the
petition. He appeals this dismissal.
I
The appellant contends that he did not understand that he was being
punished for a felony. He claims that because he was only sentenced to eleven
months and twenty-nine days incarceration he thought he was being sentenced
for a misdemeanor. Therefore, he argues that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily enter his guilty plea. We disagree.
Due process requires that pleas of guilt be knowing and voluntary. Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). Therefore, to constitute a knowing and
voluntary plea, the record must reveal that the appellant intentionally
relinquished a known right. State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn. 1977).
The record shows that the trial judge specifically asked the appellant if
“you desire to enter a plea of guilty to possessing narcotic drugs, which is a
felony punishable, now, as a misdemeanor, sentence to be an eleven month and
twenty-nine day sentence in this case, do you understand that, now?” The
appellant responded that he did, in fact, understand. Furthermore, the appellant
signed a plea waiver form which specifically classified his offense as a felony.
The appellant is no neophyte to the criminal justice process. We find that he
knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. This issue is without merit.
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II
The appellant also contends that his criminal offenses committed prior to
the enactment of the habitual criminal statute cannot constitutionally be used to
enhance his status to that of a habitual offender. To do so, he argues, violates
ex post facto prohibitions.
The use of criminal convictions occurring prior to the enactment of
habitual criminal laws does not violate the ex post facto provisions of the United
States or Tennessee Constitutions. Frazier v. State, 480 S.W.2d 553, 554
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). Increasing the punishment for a habitual criminal is
not punishment for former crimes; it is merely enhanced punishment for the
current crime. State v. Williams, 675 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
Therefore, this issue is without merit.
Accordingly, we find no error of law mandating reversal. The judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
CONCUR:
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______________________________
JOSEPH B. JONES, Presiding Judge
______________________________
CURWOOD W ITT, Judge
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