State v. Mario Scott ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
MAY SESSION, 1998 August 21, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appe llate Court C lerk
STA TE O F TEN NES SEE , ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9710-CR-00404
)
Appellee, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON. CHRIS CRAFT, JUDGE
MAR IO SC OTT , )
)
Appe llant. ) (THEFT; AGGRAVATED ASSA ULT )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
A.C. WHARTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
TONY N. BRAYTON PETER M. COUGHLAN
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Center, Suite 201 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
201 Poplar Avenue 425 Fifth Avenu e North
Memphis, TN 38103 Nashville, TN 37243
JOH N W. P IERO TTI
District Attorn ey Ge neral
DANIEL S. BYER
Assistant District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Center, Suite 301
201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION
The Defen dant, M ario Sco tt, appeals as of right his convictions of aggravated
assa ult and theft of prope rty over the value of one thousa nd dollars following a jury
trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a
Range I Standard offender to four (4) years confinement on the theft conviction and
six (6) years confinement on each aggravated assault conviction. The trial court
ordered the two (2) aggravated assault convictions to be served concurrently, but
consecutive to the theft conviction, for an effective sentence of ten (10) years.
Defe ndan t prese nts the followin g two (2) issu es on appe al:
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of aggravated
assault; and
2. Whether the trial court properly ordered Defendant’s aggravated assault
convictions to be served consecutive to his theft conviction.
We a ffirm the jud gmen t of the trial cou rt.
The facts presented at trial reveal that on March 22, 1995, Marcus Wilson was
driving a blue car when it was stoppe d by the p olice. The Defen dant, M ario Sco tt,
was a passenger in the vehicle. Marcus Wilson testified at trial that he believed that
the car belonged to Defendant and that Defendant offered to sell the car to him for
$1700 .00.
Officer Halfacre of the Memphis Police Department was prev iously given a
photo of Defendant and the blue vehicle from the sergeant in auto theft on the
morning of March 22, 1995. Halfacre was told that the vehicle Defendant was
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driving was stolen and that the vehicle identification number (VIN) had been
changed. The vehicle was parked at the home of Defendant’s mother. Officer
Halfacre was told to wait un til Defend ant got into the vehic le before attemp ting to
make a stop.
About 2:20 that afternoon, Officer Halfacre was observing traffic in front of
Northside High School when Defendant and Marcus Wilson passed by heading
westbound in the stolen vehicle. Officer Halfacre then notified Officers Boyce and
Murray that the stolen car had just passed her going west on Northside. The three
officers followed it to Breedlove and Vollintine where they attempted to pull the
vehic le over. The driver, Marcus Wilson, pulled ov er to the curb and remained in the
car. Officer Halfacre pulled crossways in front of the vehicle so that it could not pull
away. Officer Halfac re exite d her c ar and Defe ndan t got ou t of the s tolen v ehicle
and pointed a nine millimeter automatic handgun at Officers Halfacre and Murray.
Officer Boyce pulled in directly behind the stolen vehicle and was attempting
to exit his p olice cr uiser w hen h is drive r’s side door w as hit b y Office r Murr ay’s
cruiser, causing Officer M urray’s pa sseng er side w indow to shatter. Officer Boyc e’s
door bounced back and hit him in the chest, stunning him momentarily. By the time
Officer B oyce re covere d from th e blow, D efenda nt had e scape d on foo t.
Hearing the win dow of Offic er Mu rray’s car shatter, Officer Halfacre believed
that a gunshot had been fired by Defendant at Officer Murray. Halfacre broadcast
over the radio that her partner had been shot at by Defendant. Halfacre ran over to
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Murr ay’s cruise r to see if she ha d been shot. After d iscoverin g that a gunshot was
not the cause of the broken window and that Officer Murray was unharmed, Officer
Halfacre realized that Defendant had taken off running. Officer Boyce chased after
Defendant on foot. Defendant escaped but was later captured.
Officers Halfacre and Murray testified at trial that Defendant pointed a nine
millimeter autom atic hand gun at them over the roof of the stolen vehicle. Officer
Halfacre testified that s he really “b elieved s he mig ht be fired a t by Ma rio Scott.”
Neither Marcus Wilson nor Officer Boyce were able to testify that they saw
Defendant with a gun on March 22, 1995.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was ins ufficient to
support his convictions of aggravated assault. When an accused challenges the
sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the standard is whether, after reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosection, any rational trier of fact c ould
have found the essential elem ents of the crime b eyond a reaso nable d oubt.
Jackson v. Virgin ia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This standard is applicab le to
findings of guilt predicated upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or a
combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d
776, 779 (Te nn. Crim . App. 19 90). On appea l, the State is entitled to the strongest
legitimate view of the evid ence a nd all infere nces the refrom. State v. Cabbage, 571
S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption
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of innocen ce and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden
in this court of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict
returned by the trier of fact. State v. Williams, 914 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1995 ) (citing State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W .2d 913 , 914 (Te nn. 198 2)); State v.
Grace, 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 197 3).
Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to
be given the evide nce, as we ll as all factual issues raised b y the evidenc e, are
resolved by the trier o f fact, not this c ourt. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1987 ). Nor may this court
reweigh or reeva luate the e vidence . Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835. A jury ve rdict
approved by the trial jud ge acc redits the Sta te’s witn esse s and resolv es all conflicts
in favor of th e State. Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.
In this case, the Sta te mu st prov e that D efend ant inte ntiona lly or kn owin gly
committed an assault as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-101,
and us ed or disp layed a d eadly w eapon . Tenn. C ode An n. § 39-1 3-102(a )(1)(B).
Officer Halfacre , a ten (10) year vete ran of the police de partme nt,
unequivocally stated that when the stolen car w as pulled ove r, Defendant stepped
out of the passenger side of the car and pointed an “automatic weapon” over the roof
of the car at the officers. Officer Halfacre was standing behind her vehicle with an
unobstructed view of Defendant, who was standing only fourteen (14) feet away.
Officer Murray, an eight (8) year veteran of the police department, also testified that
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Defendant had a gun and pointed it at the officers. Officer Murray believed that she
had been shot at when her window shattered. She proceeded to lay down on the
seat of her cruiser in o rder to av oid being shot by D efenda nt. Officer Halfacre also
believed that Officer Murray had been shot at by Defendant. Officer Halfacre even
went so far as to broad cast over her radio that her partner had been shot at by
Defen dant. Officer Boyce and Marcus Wilson testified that they never saw
Defen dant w ith a gun.
When viewing the eviden ce in the light mos t favorable to the S tate, the jury
justifiably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed
aggravated assault. The jury heard conflicting stories and chose to credit the
testimony of Offic ers M urray a nd Ha lfacre. T he res olution of discrepan cies in
testimony, whether caused by an intentional attempt to mislead the jury, or by
variations in witness percep tion, is a m atter for the ju ry to decid e. State v. She ffield,
676 S.W.2d 542, 5 47 (Ten n. 1984 ). The jury h ad mo re than e nough evidenc e to
convict D efenda nt of aggr avated assau lt. This issue is without m erit.
II. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING
Defendant does not contest the length of his sentences, but he does challenge
the manne r in which they a re to be served. The trial court sentenced Defendant to
four (4) years confinement on the theft conviction and six (6) years confinement on
each aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered the two (2) aggravated
assa ult convictions to be served concurrently, but consecutive to the theft conviction
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for an effective sentence of ten (10) years. Defendant argues that the trial court
erred in ordering him to se rve his co nvictions for aggra vated a ssault co nsecu tive to
his conviction for theft. Defendant contends that the sentences should have been
ordered to run con currently ra ther than conse cutively.
When an accused challenges the length, range, or the manner of service of
a sentence, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the sentence with
a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This presumption is “conditioned upon the affirmative
showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and
all relevant facts and circumstanc es.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn.
1991). There are, however, exceptions to the presumption of correctness. First, the
record must d emon strate that th e trial court c onsidered the sentencing principles and
all relevant fa cts and c ircums tances . Id. Seco nd, the presu mptio n doe s not a pply
to the legal conclusions reached by the trial court in sentencing. Third, the
presumption does not ap ply when the determination s made by the trial court are
predicated upon u ncontro verted fa cts. State v. S mith, 898 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn.
Crim. A pp. 199 4), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1 995).
Our review requires an analysis of: (1) The evidence, if any, received at the
trial and sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of
sentencing and the argum ents of co unsel rela tive to sentencing alternatives; (4) the
nature and characteristics of the offense; (5) any mitigating or enhancing factors; (6)
any statements made by the defendant in his ow n beh alf; and (7) the d efend ant’s
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potential for rehab ilitation or treatm ent. Ten n. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, & -
210; see Sta te v. Sm ith, 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1987 ).
If our review reflects that the trial court followed the statutory sentencing
procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after having given due consideration and
proper weight to the facts and principles set out under the sentencing law, and that
the trial court’s findings of fact are adequately supported by the record, then we may
not modify the sentence even if we would h ave pre ferred a d ifferent resu lt. State v.
Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Upon review of the record,
we find that the trial court followed proper statutory sentencing procedure, and
therefore, review by this Court is de novo with a presumption of correctness.
Consecutive sentences shou ld be im pose d only after the proof establishes (1)
that the terms imposed are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses
committed; (2) the sentenc e is necessa ry to protect the public from further criminal
acts by the offende r; and (3) that the defendant meets at least one of the criteria as
set forth in Tennessee Code Annota ted sectio n 40-35 -115(b). State v. Wilkerson,
905 S.W .2d 933 (Te nn. 1995).
The trial court recognized Defendant’s long-term pattern of criminal activity.
See Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2). Defendant’s criminal record includes
convictions for assault, receiving stolen property, driving on a revoked license, and
unlawful posse ssion of a weap on. Wh ile on bond for the revoked license and
weapons offenses, Defendant was convicted for driving on a revoked license and
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reckless driving. Defendant then received two (2) more convictions for driving on a
revoked license. Defendant also has three (3) convictions for selling cocaine or
possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Defendant was on parole for those
convictions when he committed the present offenses. The trial court found
Defe ndan t’s repeated violations of the law to be a “steady stream of crimes . . . with
appa rently no control.” We agree with the trial cou rt and fin d that th is proo f is
sufficient to suppo rt a finding th at Defen dant’s crim inal activity has been extensive.
See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 885 S.W .2d 834 ,839 (Te nn. Crim . App. 19 94).
In ordering consecutive sentencing, the trial cou rt explic itly stated, “I’ve also
considered whether or not that’s a sentence disproportionate to the gravity of these
offenses pursuant to case law.” The trial court found the crimes in the instant case
to be se vere. P olice officers attempted to stop Defendant because he was in a
stolen car, and a s a result, Defen dant pulled a g un on the officers . The trial court
also found Defendant to have “a conscious disregard for the safety of citizens and
a disregard for the courts and orders of the co urt.” Ce rtainly it can be reasoned from
the foregoing statements that the trial court found consecutive sentencing to be
reaso nably related to the sev erity of the cr imes a nd also fo und it nec essary to
protect the public from future crim es by this Defen dant. See Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d
at 939. We agree with the trial court’s finding that consecutive sentencing is
appro priate in this cas e. This issue is withou t merit
Based on all the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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____________________________________
THOMAS T. WO ODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
___________________________________
PAUL G. SUMME RS, Judge
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