State v. Burl Jarrett ( 1998 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON              FILED
    JULY 31, 1998 SESSION        August 21, 1998
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                )
    )    NO. 02C01-9710-CC-00418
    Appellee,                    )
    )    HARDEMAN COUNTY
    VS.                                )
    )    HON. JON KERRY BLACKWOOD,
    BURL JARRETT,                      )    JUDGE
    )
    Appellant.                   )    (Arson - Sentencing)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                      FOR THE APPELLEE:
    DAVID CRICHTON                          JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    111 W. Market Street                    Attorney General and Reporter
    P.O. Box 651
    Bolivar, TN 38008-0651                  GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER
    Assistant Attorney General
    Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    ELIZABETH T. RICE
    District Attorney General
    JERRY W. NORWOOD
    Assistant District Attorney General
    Hardeman County Courthouse
    Bolivar, TN 38008-2359
    OPINION FILED:
    AFFIRMED
    JOE G. RILEY,
    JUDGE
    OPINION
    The defendant, Burl Jarrett, pled guilty for judicial sentencing in the
    Hardeman County Circuit Court to one (1) count of arson, a Class C felony. The
    trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to five (5) years imprisonment. The
    court further ordered that defendant’s sentence run consecutively to a prior felony
    drug conviction. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in (1) imposing
    an excessive sentence, and (2) ordering that his sentence run consecutively to the
    prior drug conviction. After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we
    find no reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    I
    In January 1997, defendant was indicted on two (2) counts of arson. He
    subsequently pled guilty in May 1997 to one (1) count of arson. At the sentencing
    hearing in May 1997, defendant’s probation officer testified that defendant had been
    placed on probation in June 1995 for a state felony drug conviction. Defendant was
    subsequently indicted in federal district court on five (5) counts of distribution of
    cocaine, alleged to have occurred in June 1996 while defendant was on probation
    for the state drug offense. Defendant thereafter pled guilty in federal court to these
    five (5) offenses in February 1997 and was awaiting sentencing. A revocation
    hearing was simultaneously conducted along with defendant’s sentencing hearing
    on the present offense.
    In his testimony, defendant admitted participation in the arson. He testified
    that he fully cooperated with the FBI and ATF in connection with this offense.
    However, he acknowledged that he was scheduled to be a witness for the state in
    his brother’s trial for the present offense, but failed to appear in court that day.1
    The pre-sentence report indicated that defendant had a state criminal record
    1
    Defendant’s brother, Horace Jarrett, was indicted along with defendant on two (2)
    counts of arson. Horace pled guilty to vandalism and received a sentence of six (6) days and
    a $50 fine.
    2
    consisting of one (1) felony drug conviction, one (1) forgery conviction and seven
    (7) misdemeanor convictions, one (1) of which was cocaine related. The report also
    notes that defendant had not yet been sentenced for the five (5) cocaine convictions
    in federal court.
    The trial court found as enhancement factors that (1) defendant had a
    previous history of criminal convictions, 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114
    (1); and (2)
    defendant had a previous history of unwillingness to comply with the conditions of
    a sentence involving release in the community, 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114
    (8).
    As mitigating factors, the trial court found that (1) defendant’s conduct neither
    caused nor threatened serious bodily injury, 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113
    (1); and
    (2) defendant admitted his guilt, 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113
    (13). The trial court
    found that the enhancement factors outweighed the mitigating factors and imposed
    a Range I sentence of five (5) years, one (1) year short of the maximum sentence.
    The trial court further revoked defendant’s probation on his state drug conviction
    based upon his commission of the federal offenses while on state probation.
    The trial court further found that defendant’s record of criminal activity was
    extensive and ordered that defendant’s sentence run consecutively to the probation
    revocation on the state drug conviction. Defendant now brings this appeal.
    II
    Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive
    sentence. Specifically, he alleges that the trial court placed too much emphasis on
    an enhancement factor and erroneously failed to apply certain mitigating factors.
    He further argues that consecutive sentencing is inappropriate.
    A. Standard of Review
    This Court’s review of the sentence imposed by the trial court is de novo with
    a presumption of correctness. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401
    (d). This presumption
    is conditioned upon an affirmative showing in the record that the trial judge
    considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.
    3
    State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 169 (Tenn. 1991). If the trial court fails to comply
    with the statutory directives, there is no presumption of correctness and our review
    is de novo. State v. Poole, 
    945 S.W.2d 93
    , 96 (Tenn. 1997).
    The burden is upon the appealing party to show that the sentence is
    improper. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401
    (d) Sentencing Commission Comments.
    In conducting our review, we are required, pursuant to 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35
    -
    210, to consider the following factors in sentencing:
    (1) [t]he evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing
    hearing; (2) [t]he presentence report; (3) [t]he principles of sentencing
    and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) [t]he nature and
    characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) [e]vidence and
    information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating
    factors in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; and (6) [a]ny statement the
    defendant wishes to make in his own behalf about sentencing.
    B. Excessive Sentence
    Defendant contends that the court placed too much weight on his prior
    criminal record as an enhancement factor. He also suggests that the trial court
    erred in failing to apply as mitigating factors that he assisted the FBI and the ATF
    with information concerning the present offense. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35
    -
    113(9), (10).
    1.
    At the time of sentencing, defendant had a prior criminal record consisting
    of two (2) state felony convictions and seven (7) misdemeanors. Furthermore,
    defendant had pled guilty in February 1997 to five (5) federal drug charges and was
    awaiting sentencing. Although the arson was committed prior to the commission of
    some of the other offenses, a sentencing court can consider criminal behavior which
    occurred prior to the sentencing hearing as evidence of a previous history of
    criminal convictions under 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114
    (1), regardless of whether
    the criminal behavior occurred before or after the commission of the offense under
    consideration. State v. John Allen Chapman, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9604-CC-00137,
    Grundy County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed September 30, 1997, at Nashville). Although
    defendant claims that the trial court placed too much weight upon this factor, the
    weight to be given enhancement and mitigating factors is discretionary with the trial
    4
    court. State v. Leggs, 
    955 S.W.2d 845
    , 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). The trial
    court did not err in placing great weight upon this enhancement factor.
    2.
    Defendant also claims that he assisted the FBI and the ATF by giving
    information concerning the present offense, and this should have been considered
    to mitigate defendant’s sentence. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113
    (9), (10).
    Defendant testified that he cooperated fully with the federal authorities, including
    giving details about the offense. However, there is no other evidence in the record
    that defendant did, in fact, cooperate fully with the federal authorities. Nor does
    defendant point to any evidence which would support the application of these
    mitigating factors other than defendant’s assertions. We further note that defendant
    did not appear in state court to testify at his brother’s trial for the subject offense.
    We, therefore, cannot conclude that the trial court erred in failing to apply 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113
    (9) and (10) as mitigating factors. Even if the trial court
    should have accorded some weight to the alleged cooperation, we still conclude that
    the five (5) year sentence was appropriate.
    3.
    We find no error in the trial court’s application of enhancement and mitigating
    factors in imposing defendant’s sentence. Therefore, we conclude that defendant’s
    Range I sentence of five (5) years for a Class C felony was appropriate. This issue
    is without merit.
    C. Consecutive Sentencing
    Defendant further argues that consecutive sentencing was inappropriate in
    this case. Consecutive sentencing is governed by 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115
    .
    The trial court may order sentences to run consecutively if it finds by a
    preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the required statutory criteria
    exist. State v. Black, 
    924 S.W.2d 912
    , 917 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Furthermore,
    the court is required to determine whether the consecutive sentences (1) are
    reasonably related to the severity of the offenses committed; (2) serve to protect the
    public from further criminal conduct by the offender; and (3) are congruent with
    5
    general principles of sentencing. State v. Wilkerson, 
    905 S.W.2d 933
    , 939 (Tenn.
    1995).
    The trial court found that defendant had an extensive criminal history and
    imposed consecutive sentences on that basis. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115
    (b)(2).
    Defendant had fourteen (14) prior convictions, consisting of six (6) felony drug
    convictions, a conviction for forgery and numerous misdemeanors. Defendant’s
    record of criminal activity is extensive within the meaning of 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40
    -
    35-115(b)(2). See State v. Baker, 
    956 S.W.2d 8
    , 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
    Furthermore, upon our de novo review, this Court finds that consecutive
    sentences are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses committed, serve
    to protect the public from defendant’s further criminal conduct, and are congruent
    with the general principles of sentencing. State v. Wilkerson, 
    905 S.W.2d at 939
    .
    In the interim between the commission of the present offense and his conviction,
    defendant was convicted of six (6) felony drug offenses. The five (5) federal
    offenses were committed while defendant was on probation for the state felony drug
    offense. Furthermore, although the defendant testified that “it won’t never happen
    no more,” defendant has developed a pattern of repeatedly violating and ignoring
    the law. Consecutive sentencing was appropriate.
    This issue has no merit.
    III
    We conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant; therefore,
    the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    6
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
    DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9710-CC-00418

Filed Date: 7/31/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014