State of Tennessee v. James Gooch, a/k/a \"Angie Foot\" ( 1998 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE                  FILED
    MARCH 1998 SESSION
    July 1, 1998
    Cecil W. Crowson
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,           )                          Appellate Court Clerk
    )
    Appellee,        )    No. 01C01-9703-CR-00093
    )
    )    Sumner County
    v.                            )
    )    Honorable Jane Wheatcraft, Judge
    )
    JAMES ALLEN GOOCH, SR.,       )    (Sale of less than one-half gram of
    a/k/a “Angie Foot”            )    cocaine)
    )
    Appellant.       )
    For the Appellant:                 For the Appellee:
    Mark W. Henderson                  John Knox Walkup
    1719 West End Avenue               Attorney General of Tennessee
    Suite 600-E                               and
    Nashville, TN 37203                Georgia Blythe Felner
    Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
    450 James Robertson Parkway
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Lawrence Ray Whitley
    District Attorney General
    and
    Dee Gay
    Assistant District Attorney General
    113 West Main Street
    Gallatin, TN 37066
    OPINION FILED:____________________
    AFFIRMED
    Joseph M. Tipton
    Judge
    OPINION
    The defendant, James Allen Gooch, Sr., a/k/a “Angie Foot,” appeals as of
    right from his conviction upon a guilty plea in the Sumner County Criminal Court for the
    sale of under one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. The defendant was charged
    with two counts of selling less than one-half gram of cocaine, possession of marijuana,
    and possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to an agreement, the defendant
    entered a guilty plea to one count of selling less than one-half gram of cocaine, and the
    remaining charges were dismissed. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I,
    standard offender to five years in the custody of the Department of Correction. The trial
    court also imposed a two-thousand-dollar fine. The defendant contends that the trial
    court erred by failing to consider a sentence other than confinement by the Department
    of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    The record reflects that on April 1, 1996, the defendant sold forty dollars
    worth of crack cocaine to a confidential informant. The next day, the defendant sold
    twenty dollars worth of crack cocaine to the same informant. When the defendant was
    arrested on April 4, 1996, he was in possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.
    At the sentencing hearing, the defendant testified that he had a six-month-
    old son who lived with him. He also stated that he worked full-time for General
    Contractors in Nashville. The defendant stated that he sold drugs to support his
    cocaine habit but said that he was no longer using cocaine. The defendant admitted
    that when he entered his guilty plea six weeks earlier, he would not submit to a drug
    test because he believed that he would test positive for cocaine. He also admitted that
    he had been involved in either the use or sale of drugs for twenty years. He stated that
    when he would travel to buy cocaine he would use it while driving back home. He
    admitted that he could not count the number of people to whom he had sold drugs. He
    admitted that he had numerous prior convictions, mostly misdemeanors, ranging from
    2
    drug offenses to attempted aggravated assault. The defendant testified that he
    continued to sell cocaine and marijuana while he was on probation for another crime.
    The presentence report reflects that the defendant dropped out of school
    in the ninth grade. In the report, the defendant estimated that he used an ounce of
    marijuana and an eight ball of cocaine per week. He had been in two drug and alcohol
    treatment programs and completed only one of those programs. The report states that
    the defendant had thirty-one prior convictions, one for felony drug sale and the
    remainder for misdemeanors involving such things as theft, weapons offenses,
    worthless checks, harassment, possession of a gambling device, unlawful storage of
    liquor for sale, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, attempted aggravated assault,
    assault and battery, public intoxication, aiding and abetting prostitution, and disorderly
    conduct.
    The trial court, denying alternative sentencing, sentenced the defendant to
    five years incarceration. The court recognized that most of the defendant’s prior
    convictions were misdemeanors, but the court expressed concern over the number of
    lives that were affected by the defendant’s long history of drug use and sales.
    Appellate review of sentencing is de novo on the record with a
    presumption that the trial court’s determinations are correct. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-401(d)
    and -402(d). As the Sentencing Commission Comments to these sections note, the
    burden is now on the appealing party to show that the sentencing is improper. This
    means that if the trial court follows the statutory sentencing procedure, makes findings
    of fact that are adequately supported by the record, and gives due consideration and
    proper application of the factors and principles that are relevant to sentencing under the
    1989 Act, we may not disturb the sentence even if a different result were preferred.
    State v. Fletcher, 
    803 S.W.2d 785
    , 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
    3
    As a Range I, standard offender who has been convicted of a Class C
    felony, the defendant is presumed to be a favorable candidate for a sentence other
    than confinement, if there is no evidence to the contrary. See T.C.A. § 40-35-102(5)
    and (6). The presumption in favor of alternative sentencing may be rebutted if (1)
    “confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining the defendant who has a
    long history of criminal conduct,” (2) “confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating
    the seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an
    effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses,” or (3) “measures less
    restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to
    the defendant.” T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C); see State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    ,
    169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
    The defendant contends that the trial court failed to give adequate
    consideration to sentencing alternative to incarceration in the custody of the
    Department of Correction. Specifically, the defendant argues that in light of his
    responsibility for his six-month-old son, the trial court should have given greater
    consideration to sentencing him to some form of probation, house arrest, or
    incarceration with work release.
    Initially, we note that the record does not include a transcript of the guilty
    plea hearing at which the convicting evidence would have been presented by stipulation
    or testimony. In order for us to conduct a proper de novo review, the guilty plea hearing
    transcript should be made a part of the record on appeal. The defendant must prepare
    a transcript of the evidence that is necessary to convey a fair, accurate and complete
    account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.
    T.R.A.P. 24(b). Absent a record of the guilty plea hearing, at which evidence relevant
    to sentencing is often provided, we are unable to perform a complete de novo review.
    4
    In any event, although the trial court did not provide a record of findings
    and considerations as contemplated by the sentencing laws, we conclude that the
    record supports the sentence imposed. The trial court indicated that the defendant’s
    long criminal history and the resulting danger to society outweighed all other
    considerations. With the defendant having thirty-one prior convictions, thirteen of which
    are drug-related, we conclude that the evidence supports the sentence imposed. We
    do not believe that the claimed hardship on the defendant’s family warrants a different
    result under the circumstances of this case.
    In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment
    of conviction entered by the trial court is affirmed.
    Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
    CONCUR:
    David H. Welles, Judge
    Joe G. Riley, Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01C01-9703-CR-00093

Judges: Judge Joseph M. Tipton

Filed Date: 7/1/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021