State v. Lucky Humphreys ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JULY 1997 SESSION
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9701-CC-00010
)
Appellant, ) LAUDERDALE COUNTY
)
VS. ) HON. JOE H. WALKER, III
LUCKY HUMPHREYS,
)
)
)
JUDGE
FILED
) (DUI) September 17, 1997
Appellee. )
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
FOR THE APPELLEE: FOR THE APPELLANT:
WILLIAM K. RANDOLPH JOHN KNOX WALKUP
P. O. Box 611 Attorney General and Reporter
Dyersburg, TN 38025-0611
DEBORAH A. TULLIS
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
ELIZABETH T. RICE
District Attorney General
MARK E. DAVIDSON
Assistant District Attorney General
302 Market Street
Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The state appeals the dismissal of an indictment for driving under the influence
of an intoxicant. The trial court found that the post-arrest detention of the defendant
constituted punishment and dismissed the indictment based upon a finding of double
jeopardy. We reverse and reinstate the indictment.
FACTS
Defendant, Lucky Humphreys, was arrested for driving under the influence of
an intoxicant. Upon arrival at the jail, defendant refused a breathalyzer test. Under
the sheriff’s policy, DUI arrestees were detained at the jail for approximately eight
hours before being allowed to make bail. If an arrestee was highly intoxicated, he or
she was sometimes allowed to be released to a family member. The rationale for the
detention policy was the safety of the arrestee as well as the safety of the general
public.
The defendant was held for approximately eight hours before being allowed
to make bail. During this time he was not allowed to make a phone call.
The trial court found no showing by the state of the need to keep this
defendant for an eight-hour period for public safety purposes. Although the trial court
recognized the remedial, public safety reasons for detention, the trial court found that
defendant’s detention resulted from the failure to allow him to call a family member
to pick him up and make bond. The trial court ruled that the detention, therefore,
constituted punishment. In summary, the trial court found that the defendant’s
detention was “punishment” for the “same offense” for which he was indicted; to-wit:
driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The trial court dismissed the DUI
indictment finding it to constitute double jeopardy.
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ANALYSIS
The detention policy was intended, at least in part, to protect not only the
arrestee but also the public from someone who had been recently arrested for driving
under the influence of an intoxicant. This is a remedial purpose, not a punitive one,
and does not trigger double jeopardy protection. State v. Pennington, S.W.2d
(Tenn. 1997). If the confinement is remedial and imposed pursuant to a legitimate
governmental purpose, then the confinement is not considered punishment for
double jeopardy purposes. See Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. 1988); State
v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Coolidge, 915 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995). We further find that the detention was not excessive in the
accomplishment of the remedial purpose. See Coolidge, 915 S.W.2d at 824. The
fact that the defendant was not allowed to post bond nor make a phone call to secure
a relative to pick him up does not convert his detention into “punishment.”
For the above reasons, we reinstate the indictment for driving under the
influence of an intoxicant and remand for further proceedings.
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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