State v. Bailey Agnew ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
AUGUST SESSION, 1999 FILED
October 31, 1999
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9901-CR-00015
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
Appellee, )
)
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON . JAME S C. B EASLE Y, JR.,
BAILEY R. AGNEW, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (Habitual Moto r Vehicle Offender)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
EDWIN C. LENOW PAUL G. SUMMERS
100 North Main Building, #2325 Attorney General and Reporter
Memphis, TN 38103
PATRICIA C. KUSSMANN
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
WILLIAM GIBBONS
District Attorney General
PAULA WULFF
Assistant District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301
201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103
ORDER FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED PURSU ANT TO RULE 20
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
ORDER
The Appellant, Bailey R. Agnew, appeals the Shelby County Criminal
Cou rt’s order d eclarin g him an Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 55-10-601, et. seq. On appeal, the Appellant claims that the trial
court erred in den ying his motio n to dis miss the Sta te’s pe tition to h ave him
declared an habitual offender on the grounds that the petition was barred by the
statute of limitations or, in the alternative, th e equitab le doctrine of laches . We
affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of
Appeals.
The Appellant was convicted on October 13, 1992, and June 27, 1997, for
driving while his license was cancelled, suspended or revoked. On August 15,
1997, the Appellant was convicted for the offense of driving under the influence
of an intoxicant. Some time ther eafter, the T ennes see De partme nt of Safe ty
notified the dis trict attor ney’s o ffice that the Appellant had received three (3)
qualifying convictions in five (5) years, making him an habitual offender under the
Motor Vehicle H abitual O ffenders Act. See Tenn. C ode Ann . § 55-10-603 (2)(A).
On February 13, 1998, the State filed a petition to have the Appe llant declared
an habitual offen der.
The Appellant contends that Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-606 requires the
district attorney to “forthwith” file the petition upon re ceiving no tice that a
defendant has the requ isite number o f convictions to be declared an habitual
offender. Thus , he m aintains that the State’s petition is time-barred under the
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statute of limitations and under the doctrine of laches because the assistant
district attorney did not file the petition to declare him an habitual offender
immediately upon receipt of notice.
To establish the defense of laches, the Defendant must prove (1) an
inexcu sably long delay in bringing the suit, and (2) prejudice to the Defendant as
a result of the delay. Jansen v. Clayton, 816 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tenn. App. 1991).
The assistant district attorney who filed the petition estimated that he received
notice of the Appellan t’s habitual offender sta tus in Decem ber 1997. T he trial
court found that a delay of two (2) months in filing the petition was not
inexcu sable nor inappropriate, and we agree. The application of the doctrine of
laches lies within the trial court’s discretion and will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretio n. State v. Gipson, 940 S.W .2d 73, 76 (Tenn . Crim. A pp.
1996). The trial court did not abuse its discretion.1
The Appellant further claims that the petition is barred under the statute of
limitations. However, although the prosecutor has a duty to “proceed with due
diligence to file a p etition,” th is Court has held that no statute of limitations applies
under the Moto r Vehicle Habitua l Offende rs Act. State v. Roge r W . Freeman,
C.C.A. No. 03C 01-9208-C R-00268, 1 993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 349, at *2,
Sullivan Coun ty (Tenn. Crim . App. filed June 1 , 1993, at Kno xville).
After reviewing the record before this Court, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in failing to dismiss the Sta te’s petition to declare the Appellant an
1
It is doubtful that the doctrine of laches would even apply in this case. “[T]he doctrine
of laches is not generally imputed to a governmental agency by the action of an office
holder.” State v. Gipson, 940 S.W.2d at 75.
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Habitual Motor Veh icle Offender. Ac cordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Costs o f this
appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Bailey R. Agnew, for which let execution issue.
____________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
___________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
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