State v. Edward Davis ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
DECEMBER 1998 SESSION FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9712-CC-00480
Appellee, * FAYETTE COUNTY
March 19, 1999
VS. * Hon. Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge
EDWARD L. DAVIS, * (Sexual battery)
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellant. *
Appellate C ourt Clerk
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Edward B. Johnson John Knox Walkup
Attorney Attorney General and Reporter
112 East Court Square
Somerville, TN 38068 Marvin E. Clements, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Elizabeth T. Rice
District Attorney General
302 Market Street
Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Edward L. Davis, was convicted of sexual battery, a
class E felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-505. The trial court imposed a Range I
sentence of one year and required the defendant to serve eighteen days in the
county jail and the remainder of his sentence on intensive supervision with
Corrections Management Corporation, a community based alternative. The
defendant was required to perform one hundred hours of community service, abide
by the terms of a behavioral contract, and pay court costs.
In this appeal of right, the defendant presents the following issues for
review:
(I) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction for sexual battery;
(II) whether the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial
and irrelevant testimony; and
(III) whether the trial court erred by refusing to charge
the lesser offense of assault.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On November 26, 1996, the defendant was working as a substitute
teacher in a special education classroom of the Fayette County Schools. During the
course of the day, a teaching assistant, Mary Grandberry, entered the classroom
and saw the defendant standing next to LH, 1 the victim. The defendant had placed
his hand under the victim's clothing. At trial, Ms. Grandberry testified that she had
looked twice because she was so surprised before returning to her classroom. A
few minutes later, she informed another teacher of the defendant's conduct. Ms.
1
It is the policy of this court not to divulge the names of minor victims of sexual abuse.
2
Grandberry then confronted the defendant, who asked her to "drop it." She replied,
"You asked me to drop this. You've got a daughter. Would you want it to happen to
your daughter?" The defendant then answered, "No." Ms. Grandberry described
the victim as "disturbed" after the incident.
On cross-examination, Ms. Grandberry testified that special education
students are taught life skills in the classroom kitchen. A cabinet and sink are
directly opposite from the doorway to the classroom kitchen. Ms. Grandberry stated
that she stood in the doorway as she saw the defendant touching the victim. She
testified that the defendant and victim were standing by the sink, facing one another,
with the defendant's left side and the victim's right side visible to Ms. Grandberry.
She recalled that the defendant's right hand was under the victim's dress touching
her pubic area and denied that her view was obscured by the defendant. Ms.
Grandberry explained that she did not intervene because "he know[s] the rules."
The victim, seventeen years old at the time of the offense, testified that
the defendant, who had asked her to prepare coffee for him, slipped his hand under
her dress and into her pantyhose, touching her pubic area.
Andrea Hamm, the victim's mother, testified that the victim had been
enrolled in special education classes since kindergarten. She denied either
questioning the victim about the incident or rehearsing her in preparation for trial.
Ms. Hamm maintained that she had preferred that her daughter not testify and that
the two only discussed the incident when the victim indicated a desire to do so. Ms.
Hamm stated that the victim reads on a second or third grade level, can prepare a
bowl of cereal but is not permitted to cook, and is not left at home alone. She
explained that the victim could dress herself but could not wash her hair.
3
Apparently, the victim does perform some chores and cleans her room with
assistance. She has an IQ of 50, placing her in the moderate range of mental
retardation.
Sylvia Faye Person, a teacher of special education, had attended high
school with the defendant and taught school with him at Fayette Ware High School.
When she heard the allegation, she asked the defendant about the incident. His
response was that he knew nothing about the claim. Ms. Person then thought she
had misunderstood the allegation and returned to her classroom. When she passed
the victim in the hallway, the victim, who appeared to be calm, had answered that
she was fine.
The defendant, who was forty-five years of age at the time of trial,
grew up in Fayette County. In 1973, he received a bachelor's degree in sociology
and social work and obtained employment at a residential treatment center for
children with emotional problems and physical disabilities. In 1980, he joined the
military and received training as a medical lab technician. After receiving an
honorable discharge, he took a job testing water at a Maryland wastewater
treatment plant. Eventually, he returned to Fayette County and for the last few
years has worked as a substitute teacher.
At trial, the defendant acknowledged that on the date of the incident
with the victim, he had been asked to teach Mr. Givan's class, a group of severely
emotionally disturbed children. The defendant explained that he had taken his class
to watch a movie with Ms. Bohannan's class. He testified that he had asked the
victim, who was a student in Ms. Bohannan's class, to make some coffee. He
explained that he stood facing the victim near the sink, supervising her actions, and
4
that his left side was closest to the door of the main classroom. He claimed that
when Ms. Grandberry looked from the doorway, he was holding the cup in his right
hand in front of the victim, who was holding the coffeepot. He recalled that Ms.
Grandberry said nothing and left. The defendant denied ever touching the victim's
clothing or her pubic area.
Odis Cox, a school teacher who had known the defendant for thirty-
five years, testified that the defendant was a "regular citizen, upright, Christian, a
young man, and treated everybody fair, and honest to everybody ...." Cox, who was
aware of the defendant's 1994 conviction for DUI, maintained that that incident had
not changed his opinion of the defendant.
Dr. Michael Guinle, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified that he
had extensive experience in determining psychological profiles. He explained that a
psychological profile is a "description of a person's mental state and any pathology
or mental illness" he or she might have. Dr. Guinle, who had reviewed a
psychological report on the victim, stated that in his opinion, someone in the
moderately retarded range is "able to be steered or coached or coerced ...." He
testified that one who is moderately retarded is "very impaired," in recalling events
and could have a "confabulated [memory], which just means [her recollections] can
be contaminated by other things," such as dreams or they may be influenced by
other people. Dr. Guinle subjected the defendant to the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI), a test used nationwide to identify typical sex
offenders. While asserting that the MMPI is ninety percent accurate in identifying
sex offenders, Dr. Guinle stated that, in his opinion, "[the defendant] is functioning
within the average range in terms of intelligence; that he is completely normal on all
tests; and that he was truthful and honest and forthcoming, and provided a valid
5
protocol and he does not fit any known pattern for child abusers, and that it is very
unlikely that he is [one]."
I
Initially, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting
evidence. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal and that the state failed to prove an element of the offense. On appeal, of
course, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571
S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters
entrusted to the jury as trier of fact. Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1978). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant
question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
state, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983);
Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).
The defendant was convicted of sexual battery, defined as the
"unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim
[where t]he defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally
defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless ...." Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-13-505(a)(3) (Supp. 1996). "Mentally defective" means that the person suffers
from "a mental disease or defect which renders that person temporarily or
permanently incapable of appraising the nature of such person's conduct." Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-501(3). "Sexual contact" is defined as follows:
[T]he intentional touching of the victim's ... intimate parts,
or the intentional touching of the clothing over the
6
immediate area of the victim's ... intimate parts, if that
intentional touching can be reasonably construed as
being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(6).
The defendant argues that the state failed to prove that the contact
was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, as required by Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-13-501(6). Evidence of intent, sexual arousal or gratification can be
proven circumstantially. See State v. Hayes, 899 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1995) (citing Hall v. State, 490 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tenn. 1973)). Here, the
victim testified that the defendant placed his hand under her dress and into her
pantyhose, touching her pubic area. The area and nature of the touch are
circumstances from which the jury could conclude that the contact was intended and
for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Because this court may not
substitute its own inferences for those logically drawn by the jury, there was
sufficient proof of sexual contact between the defendant and the victim. Proof that
the victim, who was affected with moderate mental retardation, having an IQ of 50,
qualified as "mentally defective" as defined by statute. Thus, the evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction for sexual battery. The trial court did not err by
denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.
II
Next, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting
irrelevant and inadmissible testimony. The state maintains that because defense
counsel has failed to include citations to the record and failed to make a
contemporaneous objection to the testimony at trial, the issue has been waived.
Generally, a ground has been waived when the defendant fails to
7
lodge an objection or fails to raise an issue on motion for new trial. Tenn. R. App. P.
3(e), 36(a); State v. Baker, 785 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); State v.
Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). A failure to refer to the
record may also result in waiver. Rule 10, R. Ct. Crim. App. While we agree that
technically the issue is waived, we nonetheless conclude that the evidence was
properly admitted.
Initially, the defendant argues that the testimony of Ms. Grandberry
was impeached and that the victim was coached as to her testimony. The credibility
of witnesses, however, is a question for the trier of fact. See Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d
at 835. Defense counsel extensively cross-examined Ms. Grandberry and
submitted expert proof that the victim was susceptible to coaching. The jury
weighed and considered this evidence and, by its verdict, the jury accredited the
testimony of the victim and Ms. Grandberry and rejected that of the defendant. In
consequence, the jury resolved all conflicts in favor of the State's theory. Williams,
657 S.W.2d at 410. See State v. Hoyt, 928 S.W.2d 935, 942 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1995).
The defendant also contends that the trial court improperly permitted
Ms. Hamm to testify that the victim had experienced "bad dreams." Defense
counsel asked Ms. Hamm, "Have you talked with [the victim] about this inciden[t] on
a number of occasions or how many occasions?" Ms. Hamm answered, "Right after
it happened, she talked about it frequently and she would tell me she had bad
dreams ...." The defendant claims that this testimony is non-responsive, prejudicial,
and lacking in any probative value. We disagree. Relevant evidence means
evidence having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
8
it would be without the evidence. State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn.
1978). If evidence is relevant to some matter actually in issue in the case on trial
and its probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect upon the
defendant, then such evidence may be properly admitted. Bunch v. State, 605
S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tenn. 1980). In our view, the testimony of Ms. Hamm was
generally responsive to defense counsel's question. That Ms. Hamm vaguely
described the content of these conversations was beyond the scope of the question.
That the victim had experienced bad dreams after the incident was, however,
probative of the effect of the incident upon the victim. We do not view the reference
to "bad dreams" to have been unduly prejudicial, particularly when viewed in light of
the damaging testimony of both the victim and Ms. Grandberry.
III
The defendant maintains that the trial judge erred by refusing to
instruct the jury as to the lesser offense of assault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101.
The state's position is that there was no proof of the lesser offense and, thus, the
trial court did not err by refusing to charge misdemeanor assault.
The trial judge has a duty to give a complete charge of the law
applicable to the facts of the case. State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn.
1986). There is an obligation "to charge the jury as to all of the law of each offense
included in the indictment, without any request on the part of the defendant to do
so." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110(a). "Pursuant to our statute, rule, and case law
interpretations, defendants are entitled to jury instructions on all [lesser offenses], if
the evidence would support a conviction for the offense." State v. Trusty, 919
S.W.2d 305, 311 (Tenn. 1996). Such a charge "allows the jury to consider all
relevant offenses in determining the appropriate offense, if any, for conviction" and
9
"more evenly balances the rights of the defendant and the prosecution and serves
the interests of justice." Id. It is only when the record is devoid of evidence to
support an inference of guilt of the lesser offense that the trial court is relieved of the
responsibility to charge the lesser crime. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530,
549-50 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tenn. 1990).
Our supreme court has previously determined that assault is neither a
lesser grade offense nor a lesser included offense of sexual battery. State v.
Cleveland, 959 S.W.2d 548, 554 n.5 (Tenn. 1997). In consequence, it was not error
for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on that offense.
Accordingly, the judgment is of the trial court is affirmed.
________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
Thomas T. W oodall, Judge
______________________________
John Everett Williams, Judge
10