Charles D. Price v. State ( 1998 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE           FILED
    JANUARY SESSION, 1998         June 24, 1998
    Cecil W. Crowson
    CHARLES D. PRICE,         )                  Appellate Court Clerk
    C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9702-CR-00042
    )
    Appe llant,         )
    )
    )   DAVIDSON COUNTY
    VS.                       )
    )   HON . SETH N ORM AN
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,       )   JUDGE
    )
    Appe llant.         )   (Habea s Corpu s - Relief)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:            FOR THE APPELLEE:
    THOMAS A. LONGABERGER         JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    300 James Robertson Parkway   Attorney General and Reporter
    Nashville, Tn 37201
    ELLEN H. POLLACK
    Assistant Attorney General
    450 James Robertson Parkway
    Nashville, Tn 37243
    VICTOR S. JOHNSON
    District Attorney General
    STEVE DOZIER
    Assistant District Attorney
    Washington Sq., Ste. 500
    222-2n d Aven ue No rth
    Nashville, TN 37201-1649
    ORDER FILED ________________________
    AFFIRMED PURSU ANT TO RU LE 20
    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
    ORDER
    On November 17, 1995, Appellant, Charles D. Price, en tered a g uilty plea
    to being a habitual motor vehicle offender. After the plea, but before sentencing,
    Appellant broke his back. As a result of requiring medical care and physical
    therap y to help him recove r from his accident, Appellant agreed to a three year
    and one day sentenc e so that he co uld be sent to the Special Ne eds Facility.
    Appellant began serving his sentence November 20, 1995. He was granted
    parole on Febru ary 7, 1997, but was reincarcerated after a parole violation on
    March 4, 1997. Appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, claiming
    that the se ntenc e imp osed in his ca se wa s illegal in that he was im properly
    sentenced as a Ra nge II offen der. App ellant was released from sta te custo dy in
    November 30, 1997.
    It is a we ll-established principle of law that the remedy of habeas corpus
    is limited in scop e as w ell as relief. Archer v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 157
    , 161-
    162(Tenn. 1993). As the Sup reme C ourt held in Archer v. State, a proper petition
    for habe as co rpus re lief ma y be bro ught a t any tim e, while the pe titioner is
    incarcerated to contest a void judgment or an illegal confinement. The remedy of
    a habeas writ is limited to cases where the judgment is void or the term of
    imprisonment has expired. Further, "the only relief that can be given a prisoner
    in a state ha beas c orpus p roceed ing is relea se." State v. Warren, 740 S.W .2d
    427, 42 8 (Ten n. Crim. A pp.198 6).
    -2-
    As a general rule, Tennessee courts will not e ntertain a case that is moot.
    A case will genera lly be considered moot if it no longer se rves as a me ans to
    provide relief to the pre vailing party. See McIntyre v. Traughber, 
    884 S.W.2d 134
    , 137 (Tenn. App. 1994).         The two most recognized exceptions to the
    mootness rule include issues of great public interest and importance to the
    administration of justice and is sues capa ble of repetition yet evading review. 
    Id.
    Whether to take up cases that fit into one of the recognized exceptions to the
    mootn ess do ctrine is disc retionary w ith the app ellate cou rts. 
    Id.
    It is apparent that the instant case is moot since Appellant is no
    longer in state custody. Moreover, from our review of the record, it does not
    appear that this case falls within one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
    IT IS, THER EFOR E, ORD ERED by the Court that the above-styled
    appeal is hereby dismissed pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.
    Costs are taxed to the state.
    ____________________________________
    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________________
    JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
    ___________________________________
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01C01-9702-CR-00042

Filed Date: 6/24/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014