State v. Christopher Max Hall ( 2000 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FEBRUARY SESSION, 2000 FILED
March 23, 2000
STATE OF TENNESSEE, *
* No. M1998-00180-CCA-R3-CD
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellee, * Appellate Court Clerk
* PUTNAM COUNTY
vs. *
* Hon. Leon Burns, Jr., Judge
CHRISTOPHER MAX HALL, *
* (Aggravated Assault and
Appellant. * Misdemeanor Stalking)
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
H. Marshall Judd Paul G. Summers
Asst. Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
215 Reagan Street
Cookeville, TN 38501 David H. Findley
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
425 Fifth Avenue North
David Neal Brady 2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
District Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493
William Edward Gibson
District Attorney General
Ben Fann
Asst. District Attorney General
1516A E. Spring Street
Cookeville, TN 38506
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes, Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Christopher Max Hall, was convicted by a Putnam County jury
of the offenses of aggravated assault and misdemeanor stalking. 1 For aggravated
assault, the trial court imposed a split confinement sentence of four years and six
months with one year of confinement in the jail followed by intensive probation for
the remainder of the sentence. For stalking, the court imposed a concurrent six
months sentence in the county jail. On appeal, the appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence for each conviction and the denial of total probation.
After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
After school dismissed on April 19, 1996, Jimmy Lyons and Amber Griffin,
high school students at Upperman High School in Baxter, walked toward the parking
lot to Jimmy’s vehicle. Jimmy and Amber, who had been dating for five months,
were met in the parking lot by the twenty-four year old appellant. The appellant had
been dating fourteen year old Amber “off and on” for several months. The appellant
began arguing with Amber, ordering her to get into his vehicle. When she refused,
the appellant threatened to “beat up” Jimmy if she did not get in the car. Amber got
into the appellant’s vehicle and told Jimmy that she would meet him a little later that
afternoon at “Crossroads” in Baxter.
Amber rode with the appellant around Baxter as the two discussed their
troubled relationship. When she requested that he take her to”Crossroads,” he
refused and drove past the meeting point. The appellant “pulled a gun out and sat it
down on [her] seat and told [Amber] that he wanted [her] to shoot him.” Amber
1
The victim of the aggravated assault was Amber Griffin; the victim of the stalking offense
was Jim my Lyon s.
2
began screaming hysterically, and the appellant said, “[N]o, I should shoot you.”
Then, the appellant threw the gun on the back seat.
Afterwards, he took Amber back to “Crossroads” and left her with Jimmy. On
the drive to Amber’s home, the appellant sped past Jimmy and positioned his
vehicle so that Jimmy could not maneuver around him. The appellant got out of his
vehicle and told Amber that he was coming to her house that evening. When she
refused, he threw a cigarette butt at Amber and knocked the truck window “off the
track.” Then, the appellant followed Jimmy to Amber’s home.
At trial, Jimmy testified that the appellant would follow him to school and then
follow him home; and on some occasions, the appellant would come into Lyons’
place of employment. The appellant continuously threatened to “beat him up”
because of his relationship with Amber. Jimmy testified that he feared the appellant
“because he was making threats and stalking [him].” He related that he ended his
relationship with Amber soon thereafter.
At the conclusion of the proof, the jury returned guilty verdicts for aggravated
assault of Amber Griffin and stalking of Jimmy Lyons.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The relevant question upon a sufficiency review of a criminal conviction, be it
in the trial court or an appellate court, is whether, “after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). See also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e);
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 29(a). A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence
with which a defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on
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appeal, a convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is
insufficient. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). In determining the
sufficiency of the evidence, this court does not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence.
State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
A. Aggravated Assault
The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his aggravated
assault conviction. Specifically, he argues with regard to the aggravated assault
charge that Amber “did not reasonably fear imminent bodily injury” because the
appellant never aimed the gun at her. He asserts the fact that their relationship
continued for nearly a year after this incident is proof that she did not reasonably
fear for her life. Furthermore, he contends that the State failed to prove the requisite
criminal intent citing State v. Wilson, 924 S.W.2d 648 (Tenn. 1996).
To sustain a conviction for aggravated assault, the State must prove that the
appellant intentionally and knowingly caused “another to reasonably fear imminent
bodily injury” while using or displaying a deadly weapon. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-
13-101(a)(2) (1991); 39-13-102(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1996). A person acts intentionally
“with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is the
person’s conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(a) (1991). One acts knowingly when “with respect to
a result of the person’s conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(b).
Although the appellant argues the victim’s fear was not reasonable because
of his failure to point the gun at the victim, the statute only requires that the gun be
displayed to the victim. Moreover, her relationship with the appellant following this
incident does not bear upon the relevance of this particular incident. The appellant’s
threat while displaying the weapon that “. . . I should shoot you” is sufficient to
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support a finding of “reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury.”2 Accordingly, we
find the proof legally sufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault.
B. Stalking
Although the appellant presents no argument for his stalking conviction
regarding the victim Jimmy Lyons, we conclude that the evidence was legally
sufficient to sustain the conviction. “A person commits the offense of stalking who
intentionally and repeatedly follows or harasses another person in such a manner as
would cause that person to be in reasonable fear of being assaulted, suffering bodily
injury or death.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1996). The offense further
defines the term “follows” to mean “maintaining a visual or physical proximity over a
period of time to a specific person in such a manner as would cause a reasonable
person to have fear of an assault, bodily injury, or death.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
17-315(a)(2)(A). While “harasses” is defined as “a course of conduct directed at a
specific person which would cause a reasonable person to fear an assault, bodily
injury, or death, including, but not limited to, verbal threats, written threats,
vandalism, or unconsented-to physical contact. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
315(a)(2)(B). “Repeatedly” is defined as “on two (2) or more separate occasions.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315(a)(2)(C). See, e.g., State v. Hoxie, 963 S.W.2d 737,
742-743 (Tenn. 1998).
In the present case, the record reflects that the appellant repeatedly (1)
followed Jimmy to and from school; (2) repeatedly threatened to “beat up” Jimmy,
(3) threatened Jimmy at Jimmy’s place of employment; (4) swerved his vehicle so
that Jimmy was unable to pass; (5) threw cigarette butts into his vehicle; and (6)
2
The appellant’s reliance upon Wilson is misplaced. In Wilson, 924 S.W.2d at 651, the
supreme court reversed the defendant’s aggravated assault convictions based upon the lack of
proo f that t he de fend ant fir ed sh ots in to the resid enc e inte ntion ally or k now ingly. T he co urt he ld
that because there was no proof that the defendant knew that anyone was inside the residence
that the req uisite m ens rea was no t proven b y the State. Id. Here, the appellant intentionally or
kno wing ly displa yed th e gun in the p rese nce of the victim coup led w ith the threa t that h e “sh ould
sho ot” his victim .
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damaged the window on Jimmy’s truck. All of these actions would cause a
reasonable person to fear an assault or bodily injury. The appellant’s actions did
achieve his intended results. Accordingly, the record contained sufficient evidence
from which a rational trier of fact could have found the appellant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
II. SENTENCING
Although the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying an
alternative sentence, in fact, the trial court imposed an alternative sentence of split
confinement.3 Nonetheless, because the appellant’s argument only relates to that of
total probation; our de novo review is limited to whether the appellant should have
been granted total probation. The appellant argues that the trial court failed to
consider:
(1) his diagnosis of bi-polar disorder following these offenses;
(2) his voluntary admission into Plateau Mental Health Center and
Moccasin Bend Psychiatric Hospital;
(3) his enrollment in courses at Tennessee Technical Institute;
(4) his change of life since the incident.
(5) his reputation in the community; and
(6) his remorse.
At the time of sentencing, the appellant, a twenty-six year old high school
graduate, testified that he had enrolled at Tennessee Technical Institute and was
taking seventeen hours of classes. Although he had a sporadic work history, he
was currently self-employed in the field of lawn-service and landscaping. The
appellant also served six years in the United States Air Force, receiving an
honorable discharge.
The appellant admitted that he had pending charges for assault, violation of
3
In determining the length of the appellant’s sentence, the trial court applied applied two
enhancement factors: (1) prior criminal history and (8) failure to comply with conditions of release
into the co mm unity. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (1997). The trial court applied one
mitigating factor, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13), that the appellant was currently receiving
counseling and on medication.
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an order of protection, theft of firearms, and vandalism. The presentence report
reflects that the appellant has prior convictions for contributing to the delinquency of
a minor4 and carrying a weapon. For these offenses, the appellant was placed on
two years pretrial diversion in March 1996. During his diversion period, the
appellant failed to report to the probation officer, failed to perform community service
and failed to pay his court costs. Subsequently, the appellant was arrested on the
instant charges and a motion was filed to terminate diversion. Following the present
offenses but prior to the sentencing hearing, the appellant entered guilty pleas to
misdemeanor drug possession and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received
a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days.
The appellant admitted that he had contemplated suicide and had voluntarily
checked into an in-patient mental health facility for treatment. He testified that he
was taking lithium carbonate which helps him control his anger. The accompanying
medical report reflects that the appellant’s problems include “depression, sleep
problems, change of activity level, suicidal thoughts, inability to concentrate,
irritability [sic], and grandiosity . . . . He appears to meet the criteria for . . . Bipoler
[sic] II. . . . he has severe disturbance of functioning in all areas of his life.”
In the presentence report, the appellant stated,
The charge of aggravated assault for which I was convicted did not
happen. The charge is totally false. I have given Amber Griffith [sic] a
ride from school. There was no argument and no gun. I was at the
school, that’s Upperman High, to pick up Joe Fernandez, Amber’s
cousin. The charge of stalking for which I was convicted is also totally
false. I have no version of this charge because it just plain never
happened.
Although the appellant argues the trial court did not consider his diagnosis of
bipolar disorder and voluntary admission for treatment, the record reflects otherwise.
Moreover, the trial court considered the appellant’s college enrollment in
4
This conv iction aros e fro m th e app ellant ’s rela tions hip w ith the juven ile fem ale vic tim in
this case.
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determining his sentence. In denying total probation, the trial court stated, “[U]nder
the circumstances of your condition, I’d give you some credit for that and maybe a
split confinement is more appropriate than Department of Corrections time, so one
year split confinement. We haven’t gotten the message to [the appellant].”
Upon our de novo review of the record, we agree that the record reflects a
prior history of criminal convictions and that measures less restrictive than
confinement have recently been applied unsuccessfully. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-35-103(1)(A) and (C). See generally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d)(1997).
When the record reflects that the trial court considered the relevant principles of
sentencing, the trial court’s determination is afforded the presumption of
correctness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d); see also State v. Bingham, 910
S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1995). Moreover,
the appellant bears the burden of showing that the sentence imposed by the trial
court is improper and that of establishing his suitability for probation. See Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 40-35-210(b)(3), -303(b). The appellant has failed to carry his
burden. This appellant continues to demonstrate behavior evincing a lack of
rehabilitative potential. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b)(4). Additionally, the
appellant cannot demonstrate that probation will “subserve the ends of justice and
the best interest of both the public and the defendant.” Bingham, 910 S.W.2d at
456. Accordingly, he has failed to establish the impropriety of the trial court’s denial
of total probation.5
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
5
The appellant frame s his issue of error within the context of denial of an alternative
sentence, specifically the denial of total probation. We further note that a community corrections
sen tenc e con stitute s neit her a prob ated nor s usp end ed se nten ce. T he ap pellan t is sta tutor ily
ineligible for community corrections for the following reasons: (1) he was convicted of aggravated
assault, a crime against the person; (2) he used a weapon in the commission of the aggravated
assault; and (3) he failed to demonstrate that the relevant offenses were causally connected to a
chronic of history alco hol abus e, drug a buse, o r men tal health pro blem s. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 40-36-106(a)(2), (4), and -106(c).
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____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
_______________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
_______________________________________
NORMA MCGEE OGLE, Judge
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