State v. Courtney Price/Robertson ( 1999 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    DECEMBER 1998 SESSION
    FILED
    March 30, 1999
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                  *       C.C.A. # 02C01-9804-CC-00115
    Appellee,               *       GIBSON COUNTY
    VS.                                  *       Honorable Dick Jerman, Jr., Judge
    COURTNEY PRICE, a.k.a.               *       (Two counts of sale of less than .5 gram
    cocaine)
    COURTNEY ROBERTSON,                  *
    Appellant.              *
    For Appellant:                               For Appellee:
    J. Diane Stoots                              John Knox Walkup
    Assistant District Public Defender           Attorney General & Reporter
    107 South Court Square
    Trenton, TN 38382                            Elizabeth T. Ryan
    Assistant Attorney General
    Criminal Justice Division
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Clayburn Peeples
    District Attorney General
    110 College Street, Suite 200
    Trenton, TN 38382
    OPINION FILED: _____________________
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
    GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
    OPINION
    The defendant, Courtney Price, a.k.a. Courtney Robertson, pled guilty
    to two counts of the illegal sale of a controlled substance. He appeals his five-year
    sentence to TDOC, claiming the trial court made no findings of fact to support the
    enhanced sentence. We affirm the judgment but modify the sentence to four years.
    The defendant entered his guilty pleas in 1994. The trial court
    originally imposed Range I, concurrent, four-year terms to be served on community
    corrections. Later, however, the trial court revoked the community corrections
    sentence and ordered the defendant to serve a six-year term in TDOC. The
    defendant appealed, arguing that while the revocation was appropriate, the trial
    court did not provide any reasons for increasing the sentence from four to six years.
    This court concluded that the trial court "summarily sentenced the appellant to six
    years, without indicating ... any legal basis for the increased sentence" and
    remanded for a new sentencing hearing conducted in conformity with the 1989
    Sentencing Reform Act. State v. Courtney Price, a.k.a. Courtney Robertson, No.
    02C01-9606-CC-00203, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 16, 1997).
    A new sentencing hearing was held on February 17, 1998. At that
    time, the defendant was on parole. Defense counsel advised the trial court that the
    defendant "did not wish to pursue this appeal any further." The trial court ruled,
    however, that "I don't think you can waive it once you've appealed it." Although a
    presentence report had not been requested, the trial court concluded that one was
    not necessary. At that point, Marcus Jones, an officer with the Corrections
    Management Corporation, was called as a witness for the state. Jones testified that
    he sought the revocation because the defendant had not maintained employment
    and had failed drug screening tests.
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    The trial court imposed sentence as follows:
    As I understand the law ... the Court has got the right to
    resentence you to any reasonable sentence including
    and up to incarceration up to the maximum amount of the
    range which is six years. For whatever reason the Court
    of Criminal Appeals did not think a six year sentence was
    appropriate so I'm going to reduce that to five years. The
    thing they didn't seem to like was the reasons that I did
    not give for resentencing you and increasing the amount
    of time that I gave you. It should have been fairly
    obvious to them. What I think they're trying to do, they're
    trying to say that you've got to use these enhancement
    and mitigating factors and I'm not sure that's what the law
    says. They need to reread the law when they look at this
    again. The law says that you can do it for any reason if
    they don't comply with the terms of the community
    corrections program. Mr. Price, I gave you two terms that
    you violated. One was to get a job, which you didn't do,
    and the other was to not use dope, which you did, and
    that's the reason that I increased the sentence. That's
    the reason that I took you from the program. I do not
    understand why the Court of Criminal Appeals couldn't
    understand it. It seemed fairly obvious, but for, the
    record, that's why I'm doing it. This doesn't have
    anything to do with enhancing and mitigating factors set
    out in 40-35-114. They may be trying to say that those
    are the only way you can enhance. That's not what the
    law says. The law is very plain and if that's what they
    think the law says they need to reread the law.
    I sentence you to serve five years in the
    State Penitentiary.
    When there is a challenge to the length, range, or manner of service of
    a sentence, it is the duty of this court to conduct a de novo review with a
    presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This presumption is "conditioned upon the affirmative showing
    in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant
    facts and circumstances." State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 169 (Tenn. 1991). The
    Sentencing Commission Comments provide that the burden is on the defendant to
    show the impropriety of the sentence.
    Our review requires an analysis of (1) the evidence, if any, received at
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    the trial and sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of
    sentencing and the arguments of counsel relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the
    nature and characteristics of the offense; (5) any mitigating or enhancing factors; (6)
    any statements made by the defendant in his own behalf; and (7) the defendant's
    potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, and
    -210; State v. Smith, 
    735 S.W.2d 859
    , 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
    The purpose of the Community Corrections Act of 1985 was to provide
    an alternative means of punishment for "selected, nonviolent felony offenders in
    front-end community based alternatives to incarceration." Tenn. Code Ann. §
    40-36-103. The community corrections sentence provides a desired degree of
    flexibility that may be both beneficial to the defendant yet serve legitimate societal
    aims. State v. Griffith, 
    787 S.W.2d 340
    , 342 (Tenn. 1990). That the defendant
    meets the minimum requirements of the Community Corrections Act of 1985,
    however, does not mean that he is entitled to be sentenced under the Act as a
    matter of law or right. State v. Taylor, 
    744 S.W.2d 919
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
    The following offenders are eligible for community corrections:
    (1) Persons who, without this option, would be
    incarcerated in a correctional institution;
    (2) Persons who are convicted of property-related, or
    drug/alcohol-related felony offenses or other felony
    offenses not involving crimes against the person as
    provided in title 39, chapter 2 [repealed], parts 1-3 and
    5-7 or title 39, chapter 13, parts 1-5;
    (3) Persons who are convicted of nonviolent felony
    offenses;
    (4) Persons who are convicted of felony offenses in
    which the use or possession of a weapon was not
    involved;
    (5) Persons who do not demonstrate a present or past
    pattern of behavior indicating violence;
    (6) Persons who do not demonstrate a pattern of
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    committing violent offenses; and
    (7) Persons who are sentenced to incarceration or on
    escape at the time of consideration will not be eligible.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106(a).
    Once a defendant violates the terms of his community corrections
    sentence, the trial court may revoke the sentence and impose a new sentence:
    The court shall also possess the power to revoke the
    sentence imposed at any time due to the conduct of the
    defendant or the termination or modification of the
    program to which the defendant has been sentenced,
    and the court may resentence the defendant to any
    appropriate sentencing alternative, including
    incarceration, for any period of time up to the maximum
    sentence provided for the offense committed, less any
    time actually served in any community-based alternative
    to incarceration.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106(e)(3).
    Courts of this state have consistently held that when a trial judge
    imposes a sentence which exceeds the length of the initial sentence, the trial court
    must conduct a sentencing hearing pursuant to the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing
    Reform Act of 1989. See, e.g., State v. Patty, 
    922 S.W.2d 102
    (Tenn. 1995) (the
    supreme court applied the 1989 Act to review an increased sentence after
    revocation of community corrections); State v. Cooper, 
    977 S.W.2d 130
    (Tenn.
    Crim. App. 1998); State v. Ervin, 
    939 S.W.2d 581
    , 583 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996);
    State v. Danny Walker, No. 02C01-9706-CC-00218 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson,
    Apr. 22, 1998); State v. James Dantes, No. 02C01-9705-CC-00184 (Tenn. Crim.
    App., at Jackson, Dec. 15, 1997); State v. Robert Moore, No. 01C01-9608-CC-
    00335 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 30, 1997); State v. Twika Teague, No.
    03C01-9601-CC-00027 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, May 19, 1997). In Ervin, the
    late Judge Joe B. Jones explained that the "Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform
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    Act of 1989 and the Community Corrections Act of 1985 are in pari 
    materia." 939 S.W.2d at 583
    (citing State v. Taylor, 
    744 S.W.2d 25
    919, 920 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1987)). If, therefore, the trial court chooses to increase the term of the sentence
    after revoking a community corrections sentence, a sentencing hearing must be
    conducted in accordance with the mandates of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act.
    See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-209(a) and -210(a) through (e). Before the trial
    court increases the sentence, it must consider the application of the enhancement
    factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114. 
    Id. The provision
    of the
    Community Corrections Act allowing for an increased sentence "should not be used
    by the trial courts for the sole and exclusive purpose of punishing an accused for
    violating provisions of a community corrections sentence." 
    Ervin, 939 S.W.2d at 583
    .
    Here, the record demonstrates the trial court erred by increasing the
    sentence because the defendant violated the terms of his community corrections
    contract. That is not a lawful basis for increasing the sentence. In consequence,
    our review of this case must be de novo without the presumption of correctness.
    
    Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169
    .
    To summarize, the defendant pled guilty to two Class C felonies. A
    Range I sentence may be from three to six years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
    112(a)(3). The trial court originally imposed four-year terms. The defendant did not
    appeal. The record does not contain a presentence report. There was no proof
    offered by the state at the sentencing hearing of the existence of any enhancement
    factors. Because the record does not include any basis for the increase of the
    sentence from four to five years other than that the defendant violated the terms of
    his community corrections contract, the sentence for each conviction must be
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    modified from five years to four years.
    The judgment of the trial court is so modified.
    __________________________________
    Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
    CONCUR:
    ________________________________
    Thomas T. W oodall, Judge
    ________________________________
    John Everett W illiams, Judge
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