State v. Delivetrick Blocker ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
NOVEMB ER SESSION, 1998 March 10, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9803-CR-00120
)
Appellee, )
)
) HAMILTON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. GARY D. GERBITZ,
DELIVETRICK D. BLOCKER, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (Felon y Murd er, Esp ecially
) Aggravated Robbery)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF HAMILTON COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
PHILIP L. DUVAL JOHN KNOX WALKUP
537 Market Street, Suite 204 Attorney General and Reporter
Chattanooga, TN 37402
R. STEPHEN JOBE
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
BILL COX
District Attorney General
RODNEY STRONG
Assistant District Attorney General
Suite 300, Courts Building
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED IN PART; MODIFIED IN PART; REMANDED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defen dant, Delivetrick D. Blocker, appeals as of right his convictions
and sentences for especially aggravated robbery and first degree murder
committed during the pe rpetra tion of e spec ially aggravated robbery. Following
sentencing hearings, the jury sen tenced Defen dant to life imprisonment without
the possibility of p arole for his murder conviction; and the trial court sentenced
him to twenty-two years for especially aggravated robbery, to be served
consecutive to his life sentence. We affirm Defendant’s conviction for felony
murder and m odify his conviction for especially aggravated robbery to attempted
especially aggra vated robbe ry.
In this appe al, Defen dant pre sents seven issues for review: (1) whether the
trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement to police,
(2) wheth er the tr ial cou rt erred by allow ing a witnes s to tes tify that th e victim
carried a wallet, (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for
judgment of acquittal and whether the evidence was sufficient to s ustain his
convictions, (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the
sentence for especially aggra vated robbe ry to be served co nsec utive to h is
sentence of life imprisonment without parole, (5) whether a juvenile may be
senten ced to life w ithout the p ossibility of parole, and (6) whether the trial cou rt
erred by permitting the jury to sente nce h im to life withou t the po ssibility o f parole
based up on the single ag gravating factor of felon y murder.
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In this case, the proof at trial showed that Defendant and his severed co-
defendants, cous in Rob ert Blo cker a nd Ca lvin Tra mm ell, who w ere all juveniles
at the time of this crime,1 called for a taxicab from a Hamilton County
convenience store. When it arrived, they instructed the driver to take them
appro ximate ly one-ha lf mile, to a location that the State characterized as wooded
and secluded, along a street with several vaca nt homes . As the perpe trators
exited the car, Defen dant heard Robert Bloc ker dema nd mon ey from the driver,
who reache d over be tween th e seats. Defendant told police that he believed the
driver was reaching for a gun, so he pulled a saw ed-off s hotgu n from his pants
and po inted it at the d river. He the n shot the driver at a range between six and
twelve inches fro m his he ad. All three perpetrators fled the scene, and an area
home owner d iscovere d the victim when th e taxicab c rashed into her pa tio.
I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the
statement he made to police on the night he was arrested. He argues (1) that
officers did not advise him of his Miranda rights u ntil after he m ade his s tateme nt,
and (2) that waiver of his rights was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, but
rather the product of coercion and intimidation. Both the juvenile court, prior to
Defe ndan t’s transfer, and the Hamilton County Criminal Court held hearings on
this matter, and b oth denied the motion to sup press. W e affirm this decision,
concluding that the evid ence d oes no t prepon derate against finding that officers
did not que stion De fendan t prior to informing him of his Miranda rights and that
his waiver was volu ntary, kno wing, an d intelligent.
1
Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of this crime.
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Juvenile Court Hearing
At Defendant’s suppression hearing in the Juvenile Court for Hamilton
County, the judge hea rd testimony for the State from D etective Tim Carroll, who
stated that he read D efend ant his Miranda rights in the presence of Def enda nt’s
mother prior to any questioning about the murder. Carroll denied having any
discussions regarding the outcome of the case, and he denied making any
promises in exchange for a statement. Carroll also denied threatening Defendant
to induce him to provide a statement. The detective testified that Defendant and
his mother signed the waiver of rights form, and that Detective Tommy W oods
and Ke n McC rary, a juven ile officer, also witnesse d Defe ndant’s s ignature .
On cross -exam ination at the ju venile cou rt hear ing, De tective C arroll
acknowledged that four o r five oth er office rs acc omp anied him to Defe ndan t’s
home at the time of the arrest, that Defe ndan t was ta ken s epara tely from his
mother to the police service ce nter, and that Defe ndant d id not have an
opportu nity to confer in private with his mother prior to his interview.
Furthermore, the detective stated that he had a conversation with Defendant
before he turned on the tape recorder to record the statement, but not before he
read Defendant his Miranda rights.
Defe ndan t’s mother testified that on the day of his a rrest, her son opened
the door, s aw the officers , and s aid he would get his m other. Ac cording to Ms.
Blocker, officers followed Defendant back into the house and told Defendant that
they were ta king h im in for questioning a bout a mu rder. They told Ms . Blocker,
while in her son’s presence, that she needed to come to the police service center
because she “knew about” the crim e and “cou ld also be arreste d.”
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When asked “at what point [Defendant] was read his Miranda rights in the
interview ro om,” Ms. Blocker replied, “After Tim Carroll told him if he bullshitted
him, he’d make sure he’d g et the g __d_ __ ch air and my so n said , okay, I’ll te ll
you what you want to kn ow.” Ms. Blocker also testified, “In my presence the man
just kept saying that he know [sic] what happened and that I knew what
happened and if he kept—if he kept—if my son bullshitted him, he’d m ake sure
he got the chair a nd he k ept cursin g my so n.” She stated that the Miranda rights
waiver form “was read as the man was signing it, as the man was writing out the
thing,” and she affirmed that Defendant acknowledged on tape that he had
signed the waiver. When asked on tape whether they had been threatened,
neither Defendant nor his mother stated that threats had been made.
Defendant also testified at the juvenile suppression hearing. He stated,
When we came ou t of the house [on the night of arrest], Dete ctive
Tim Carroll pu lled me a way from a fe male officer and took me
across the street and he said what do you know about the cab driver
murder. I said I d on’t kn ow no thing. H e said before this nig ht is
over your g__d___ ass is going to know something and he took me
back o ver there to her, to the fe male o fficer.
He affirmed that officers told his mother “she could be arrested for knowing
something about the mu rder.” De fendan t stated tha t he signe d the rights waiver
“[a]fter Tim C arroll kept like makin g his little threa ts abou t the electric c hair.” He
stated that no one read the form to him, that the threats scared him, and that he
would not have made a statement to police had he not been threatened with the
electric ch air.
Defendant testified , “First, [C arroll] asked me, asked me my story. After
he wrote a ll of that d own, h e told me— had m e to sig n it and he did n’t read it off
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to me or nothing, asked m e to sign it.” He claimed that his Miranda rights were
read to him for the first time on the tape recording, after he had given his version
of events and signed the waiver. He admitted that he had an opportunity to read
the waiver be fore he s igned it, bu t stated tha t he did no t because he was “too
busy” and “thinking about the threats [Carroll] made and thinking about [his]
mama and [his] sisters.” Finally, Defendant acknowledged that he stated on the
tape recording that he understood his rights, waived his right to a lawyer, and
waived h is right to rem ain silent.
The juvenile court judge ruled in favor of the State, denying D efend ant’s
motion to suppress. She stated that she did not find evidence of coercion and
force so as to render the waiver of rights involuntary. Furthermore, she stated,
I think there is a logical time frame laid out in this that supports the
testimony of the offic er and [is] also supportive of the testimony of
these paren ts over here. . . . I d on’t find anythin g inconsistent with
the State’s testimony and I find nothing offered by the defen dants on
this through their witnesses to believe that these were anything
other than voluntarily obtained by the o fficers in the co urse o f this
investigatio n that nigh t.
Criminal Court Hearing
After Defendant was tran sferred to the Ham ilton Cou nty Crimina l Court to
be tried as an adult, that court held another suppression hearing, in which the
juvenile hearing transcript was entered into evidence. Detective Carroll and
Defendant testified consistently with the prior hearing. Defendant’s mother, Ms.
Blocker, reiterated her previous testim ony bu t adde d that D etective Carro ll told
her at least three times tha t “they were going to try to have [D efenda nt]
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electrocu ted.” At the same time, she testified that Carroll told Defendant, “[I]f you
tell me what I want to know, I’ll go to the Judge and I’ll talk to the Judge and te ll
him that you coope rated and I’ll do . . . what I can for you.” In addition, she
testified that her son could read only at a third-grade level—not well enough to
understand the Miranda waiver form— and th at he h ad alre ady told officers his
story twice before ever being read those rights (during the tape recorded portion
of the state ment).
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, making several findings: (1)
the defendants were properly arrested; (2) the requests made of the parents and
guardians to be present were proper; (3) statements made to Ms. Blocker
regarding her possible knowledge of the facts were not coercive in nature; (4) the
procedure in the interview room and police se rvice center hallways was extre mely
reasonable, timely, and no t coercive; (5 ) no que stioning to ok place prior to proper
admonitions under Miranda; (6) the time s equen ce betw een the rights offerings
and the actual taping of the statements was extremely reasonable; (7) the
interviewing between individuals was rea sonable an d very understandable; and
(8) the officers were not required to inform the parents of their function to advise
their children during the interviewing process.
Our supreme court very recently discussed the manner of analysis for
waiver of constitution al rights by ju venile crim inal defen dants. See State v.
Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1998). In Callahan, the court h eld,
[J]uven ile waivers shall be analyzed under a totality-of-the-
circumstances test that requires consideration of the following
factors:
(1) consideration of all circumstances surrounding the interrogation
including the juve nile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence;
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(2) the juvenile’s capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and
the consequences of the waiver;
(3) the juvenile’s familiarity with Miranda warning s or the ab ility to
read and write in the langua ge use d to give the warning s;
(4) any intoxica tion;
(5) any mental disease, disorder, or retardation; and
(6) the pre sence of a pare nt, guard ian, or intere sted ad ult.
Id. at 583.
Regarding appellate review of a trial court’s denial of motions to suppress
evidence, our supreme court advised,
Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the
evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters
entruste d to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party prevailing
in the trial c ourt is e ntitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence addu ced a t the su ppres sion h earing as we ll as all
reaso nable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence. So long as the greater weight of the evide nce su pports
the trial cou rt's findin gs, tho se find ings shall be upheld. In other
words, a trial court's findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be
uphe ld unless th e eviden ce prep ondera tes other wise. . . .
Hereafter, the prop er standard to be applied in reviewing
suppression issues is the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard.
State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn . 1996). F rom the above re citation of
the facts, we find that the trial court properly considered the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation when making the decision to deny
Defe ndan t’s motion to suppr ess. Fur thermo re, we co nclude that the evidence
does not preponderate against the trial court’s denial. Where the trial judge
found c onflicts among the statements by Detective Carroll, Defendant, and Ms.
Blocker, he appeared to resolve them in favor of Detective Carroll, which was
reaso nable and n ot imp roper in his role as the trier of fact. This issue lack s merit.
II. HABIT TESTIMONY
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Defe ndan t’s second assignment of error involves the testimony at trial by
the victim’s niece, Terry Smith . Smith , a sub stitute w itness who a ppare ntly
provided substantially the same testimony as the anticipated witness, another
member of the victim’s family, responded to direct examination as follows:
Q. How well did you know your uncle?
A. Very w ell.
Q. Prior to Octobe r 8, 1995, how often would you see your
uncle?
A. Everyday.
Q. Are you familiar with items that he may have c arried on his
person?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Wo uld he ev er carry a w allet?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you often see that wallet?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Wh at type of w allet was it?
A. It was a brown trifold.
Q. Wh at did he h ave in tha t wallet?
A. He would carry picture s and large— his larg e bills he would
keep in h is wallet.
Smith also testified that, to her knowledge, members of her family had not
received this wallet from the hospital, the police, or the Mercury Cab Co mpany,
the victim’s emplo yer. Upo n cross- exam ination, Sm ith testified that sh e hers elf
had not been the recipient of her uncle’s personal items returned from the
hosp ital, police, and cab company. In addition, she confirmed that some other
items, such as a shoe and sock, were never recovered.
Defendant charge s, in esse nce, that S mith’s sta temen ts should have been
excluded because the testimony is so speculative that it lacks relevance to the
issue of whether the victim carried the wallet on the day of his death. The issue
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is significant because no other evidence of theft exists in the reco rd to sup port a
conviction for espe cially aggravated rob bery. 2
The State responds by arguing that Smith’s testimony was admissible as
evidence that the victim h ad a h abit of carry ing a wallet, introduced for the
purpose of inferring conduct in conformity therewith on the day at issue—in other
words, that because the victim had been seen carrying a wallet in the p ast, and
because no wallet had been returned to the victim’s family, Defendant or one of
his co-pe rpetrators must h ave take n the wa llet.
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 406 states:
(a) Evidence of the habit of a person, an animal, or of the
routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and
regardless of the presence of eye-witnes ses, is relevant to prove
that the conduct of the person, animal, or organization on a
particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine
practice.
(b) A habit is a regular respo nse to a repe ated s pecific
situation. A routine practice is a regular course of conduct of an
organization.
Hab it evidence must be distinguished from character evidence governed by
Tennessee Rule of Eviden ce 404. W hereas un der Rule 40 4(b), evidence of prior
acts may not be introdu ced “to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity with the c haracter trait,” there is no such limitation on
evidence not introduced to prove a trait of character. One commentator has
remarked, “Since Rule 406 adm its evidence that would probably be admitted
anyway unde r the ge neral re levanc e princ iples e mbra ced in Rule 4 01, it is
2
See supra Part III.
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argua ble that Rule 406 adds little new to modern evidence law.” Neil P. Cohen
et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence 200 (3d ed. 199 5).
W e agree with Defendant that the State did not demonstrate through
witness Terry Smith that the victim habitu ally carried a wallet, as a regular
response to a repe ated specific situa tion. How ever, bec ause th e tende ncy to
carry a wallet daily cannot be construed as proof of the “character of a person in
order to show action in conformity with a ch aracter trait,” there are no limitations
placed by Rule 404(b) on the admissibility of the evidence. Therefore, so long
as the testimony was “relevant” within the meaning of Rule 401,3 it need not rise
to the level of habit evidence under R ule 406 —to be evid ence of hab it would only
supple ment its a dmiss ibility.
Accord ing to Te nness ee Ru le of Evide nce 10 3,
[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and . . .
[i]n case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection if the specific ground was not apparent from the context. 4
Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). Furthermore, the general “standard of review where the
decis ion of the trial judge is based on the relevanc e of the proffered e vidence
under Rules 401 a nd 40 2 is abuse of disc retion.” State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d
649, 652 (Tenn . 1997); State v. West, 737 S.W.2d 790, 793-94 (Tenn. Crim. App.
3
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable than it would
be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401.
4
This matter was addressed by counsel for Defendant in a jury-out hearing prior to the
witness’s testimony.
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1987) (citing Strickland v. City of Lawrence burg, 611 S.W .2d 832 , 835 (T enn. C t.
App. 19 80)).
In this case, we find both (1) that no substantial right has been affected
within the meaning of Rule 103, and (2) that the trial court did not abuse
discretion by adm itting the testim ony of T erry Sm ith. This issu e lacks m erit.
III. MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL/SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
At the conclusion of the State’s proof, Defendant moved for judgment of
acquittal on the basis of the sufficiency of the proo f, and his motion was denied.
He argues now be fore this C ourt that the evidenc e was ins ufficient to susta in his
convictions. We conclud e that the e vidence was insu fficient to supp ort his
conviction for especially aggravated robbery and that this conviction should be
modified to attempted especially aggra vated robbe ry. However, despite this lack
of eviden ce, De fenda nt’s felo ny mu rder co nviction is well supported by proof that
he committed an attempted especially aggra vated robbe ry. We the refore affirm
his conviction for first degree felony murde r.
Tennessee Rule of App ellate Procedu re 13(e) presc ribes that “[f]indings
of guilt in criminal actions wh ether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the
evidence is insufficient to support the finding by the trier of fact beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). In addition, because conviction by
a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption
of guilt, a convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the
evidence was insu fficient. McBee v. State, 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963);
see also State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992) (citing State v.
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Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1976), and State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329,
331 (T enn. 19 77)); State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W .2d 913 , 914 (T enn. 19 82); Holt v.
State, 357 S.W .2d 57, 61 (T enn. 1962 ).
In its review of the eviden ce, an appe llate court must afford the State “the
strongest legitim ate view of the e videnc e as w ell as all reasonable and legitimate
inferences that may be drawn the refrom.” Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d at 914 (citing
State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)). The court may not “re-
weigh or re-evaluate the evidence” in the reco rd below . Evans, 838 S.W.2d at
191 (citing Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d at 836). Likew ise, should the review ing court
find particular conflicts in the trial testimony, the court must resolve them in favor
of the jury ve rdict or trial cou rt judgm ent. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d at 914.
The offens e of es pecia lly aggrava ted robbery is “robbery as defined in §
39-13-4 01 . . . [a]ccomplished with a deadly weapon . . . [and w ]here th e victim
suffers serious bodily injury.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-403. Tennessee Code
Annotated § 39-13-401 defines robbery as “the intentional or knowing theft of
property from the person of ano ther by violenc e or pu tting the perso n in fear.” Id.
§ 39-13-4 01. Fina lly, “[a] person com mits theft o f property if, with intent to
deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control
over the prope rty without the owne r’s effective consent.” Id. § 39-14-103.
As noted above in Part II, the on ly evidenc e in the rec ord tend ing to show
that the victim carried a wallet a t the tim e of his death cons isted o f Terry Smith ’s
one-word affirmations in response to “Would he ever carry a wallet?” and “D id
you often see that wallet?” In addition, the only proof that the victim carried
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money on the night of his death was Smith’s statement that he sometimes carried
large bills in his wallet. 5 No other p roof of a theft of p roper ty is con tained in this
record.
W e find Sm ith’s testimony, and the statements by Smith and an
investigative officer that no wallet was recovered during the investigation, to be
insufficient to permit the jury to find a theft had occurred. To hold otherwise, this
Court would have to determine that the jury properly inferred one of two
scenarios. First, because the victim drove a taxicab, he must have possessed
more money at the time of his death than was returned to his fa mily, an d this
money must have been taken by the p erpetr ators. S econ d, bec ause the victim ’s
niece had often seen him carry a wallet, he must have carried one that night
(even though Smith never stated ho w often sh e had s een the wallet, nor did she
testify to a time frame prior to the murder during which she saw it); and because
no wallet was recove red, the perpe trators must have taken the wallet. We reject
both scenarios as impermissible leaps of faith for the jury. Therefore, we must
modify Defen dant’s co nviction for especially aggravated robbery to one for
attemp ted esp ecially agg ravated ro bbery.
Conviction by a jury for the greate r offens e nec essa rily includes a finding
of guilt on eac h elem ent of a les ser includ ed offen se. Even though we mo dify
Defe ndan t’s conviction for especially aggravated robbe ry to atte mpte d esp ecially
aggravated robbery, we nevertheless uphold his conviction for first degree felony
murder by finding that the evidence was more than sufficient to find that the
5
Although the State introduced proof that the victim had been paid approximately two
dollars for his last fare before his death, the record reflects that the hospital returned “small
bills” to the deceased’s family.
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murder was com mitted during the pe rpetra tion of a ttemp ted es pecia lly
aggrava ted robb ery.
For the indicted count of felony murder, the jury was charged in part as
follows:
For you to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree under this count of the indictmen t, the State mus t have
proven beyond a reasonable doubt the following:
1. Th e defe ndan t unlaw fully killed the victim ;
2. The de fendant acted recklessly; 6
3. The killing was committed in the perpetration of or the
attempted [sic] to perpetrate the allegedly especially aggravated
robbery. That is that the killing was closely connected to the alleged
espe cially aggravated robbery and was not a separate, distinct and
indepe ndent e vent;
And
4. That the defendant intended to commit the alleged
especially aggra vated robbe ry.
Furtherm ore, Te nness ee Co de Ann otated § 39-12-1 01 states :
A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of
culpab ility otherwise required for the offense . . . [a]cts with inte nt to
comp lete a course of action o r cause a result tha t would co nstitute
the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as
the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a
substa ntial step tow ard the c omm ission of the offense.
Tenn. C ode Ann . § 39-12-101 (a)(3).
Defe ndan t’s own statement to police contains sufficient evidence to convict
him of felony murder based upon attempted especially aggravated robbery. The
group of men, who had been out walking throughout the evening, called a taxicab
and requested to b e taken a distan ce of appro ximately one-half mile. As
Defendant told police, “I get [sic] out of the car to go and knock on the door cause
6
Although this jury instruction was erroneous—a reckless mental state was no longer
required for the offense of felony murder at the time this crime occurred—we find that such
error was harmless because it heightened rather than lowered the level of proof necessary for
the jury to convict Defendant. Furthermore, the error was not preserved for review.
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I was going over to a friend [sic] house and by th at time I he ard Ca lvin, I turned
around and heard Calvin asking the cab driver for money, say did he have any
mone y.” Then , “Cab driver s tarted d igging in the side of his seat then I ran over
there, put the gun to his he ad.” D efend ant’s s tatem ent late r reflects this
exchange:
Carroll: And what did you tell him.
D. Blocker: Told him to start reaching.
Carro ll: Get his hands up.
D. Blocker: No. Just . . He was reaching through his head and I
say start reaching between, you know what I’m saying, I was saying
just start reaching.
Defendant then admitted that he shot the vic tim and ran from the scen e. W e
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find Defendant
guilty of first degree murder committed during the attempt to perpetrate an
especially aggra vated robbe ry.
Because the jury con victed De fendan t of killing the victim during an
espe cially aggravated robbery (though no t supported by th e proof), we be lieve
its verdict c learly inc orpor ated a ll the ele men ts of a killing during an attempted
especially aggravated robbery, which the proof supports.
IV. MODIFICATION OF SENTENCE
Following Defenda nt’s sentencing for first degree felony m urder, the trial
court held a sentencing hearing for Defendant’s conviction for especially
aggravated robbery and sentenced him to twenty-two years as a Range I
offender, to be served cons ecutive to his sentence of life imprisonment without
the pos sibility of parole .
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When an accused challenges the length, range, o r mann er of service of a
sentence, this Court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the sen tence w ith
a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This presumption is “conditioned upon the affirm ative
showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and
all relevant facts and circumstanc es.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169
(Tenn . 1991).
When conducting a de novo review of a sentence, this Court must
consider: (a) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and sentencing hearing; (b)
the presentence report; (c) the principles of sentencing and arg umen ts as to
sentencing alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct
involved; (e) any statutory mitigating or enhancement factors; (f) any statement
made by the defendant regarding sentencing; and (g) the potential or lack of
potential for rehab ilitation or treatm ent. State v. S mith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863
(Tenn. Crim. A pp. 198 7); Ten n. Cod e Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210. We use the
same criteria to determine the appropriate modification of Defendant’s sentence
in conjunction with our modification of his conviction from especially aggravated
robbery to attem pted espec ially aggravated rob bery.
In this case, the trial court found that the range for especially aggravated
robbery was fifteen to twenty-five years, and that sentencing considerations for
this offense should begin at the mid-po int of the ran ge, twen ty years. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c). In addition, the trial judge first found that
enhancement factor one—that “[t]he defendant has a previous history of criminal
convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the
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approp riate range”— was ap plicable. See Tenn. C ode Ann . § 40-35-114 (1).
Although he did not consider Defendant’s prior crimes to be “major offenses,” he
found that the crimes were concentrated in a very short period of time—between
the ages of fourteen and eighteen. He therefore increased Defendant’s sentence
from the twenty-yea r mid-po int to twenty-tw o years.
Next, the trial judge rejected enhancement factors two and eight—that
“[t]he defendant was a leader in the commission of an offense involving two (2)
or more criminal actors” and that “[t]he defendant has a previous history of
unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release in the
comm unity,” respectively. See id. § 40-35-114(2), (8). The judge noted that he
did not find “any significant basis” to support a determination that Defendant was
the leader in commission of the robbery, despite the fact that Defendant shot the
victim. Furthermore, he declined to find any significant history of unwillingness
to comply with conditions of release because Defendant committed the offense
as a juvenile, and all previous criminal conviction s were fro m the juv enile cou rt.
The trial judge then considered and rejected the three mitigating factors
presented by Defe ndant. First, the judge found mitigating factor two—that “[t]he
defendant acted unde r strong provo cation ”—in applic able b ecau se this case did
not “involve a theft case where an individual is stealing food for his family,” and
because he found no other proof of pr ovocatio n in the rec ord. See id. § 40-35-
113(2). Next, he rejected mitigating factor eight, that “[t]he defendant was
suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced the
defendant’s culpability for the offens e.” In supp ort, the trial judge noted that he
found nothing in the expert testimony presented to indicate a disability within the
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meaning of this mitigating factor. Finally, although he noted that Defendant was
seventeen years old at the time of the offense, he also found that the Defendant
was “streetw ise,” an d there fore “co nside rably older” than seventeen. Thus, he
rejected mitigating factor six, which states, “The defendant, because of youth or
old age, lacked substantial judgment in committing the offense.” See id. 40-35-
113(6).
The range fo r a stand ard offen der con victed of atte mpted e spec ially
aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, is betw een eig ht and tw elve years . See
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-107; 39-13-403. According to sentencing guidelines,
consideration shou ld begin at th e minim um for th e range . See id. § 40-35-21 0(c),
(d). W e therefore enhance Defendant’s sentence in accordance with the findings
of the trial cour t, and we sentence Defendant to nine years as a standard range
I offender for attem pted espec ially aggravated rob bery.
V. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING
After concluding that Defendant was a dangerous offender due to the
number and in creas ing se verity of h is prior convictions, the type of offenses in the
convictions at bar, the lack of indication that rehabilitation would be succe ssful,
and the nee d for the pu blic to be protected from these type of offenses; the trial
judge approved consecutive sentencing, with Defendant’s twenty-two year
senten ce to be s erved co nsecu tive to his sentence of life without th e poss ibility
of parole . See id. § 40-35 -115(a)( 4).
Defendant contends in this appeal that consecutive sentencing is improper
because the proof does not support the trial court’s finding that he is a dangerous
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offender. We conclude that the trial court fulfilled its role in the sentencing
process such that its findings concerning consecutive sentencing should be
reviewed de novo with a pres umption of correctne ss. Afte r cond ucting this
review, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding Defendant to be a
dange rous offe nder an d orderin g his sen tences served c onsec utively.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-115 pro vides that if the trial court
finds a defendan t to be “a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or
no regard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the
risk to huma n life is high,” it may order m ultiple sentences served cons ecutively.
Id. § 40-35 -115( a)(4). O ur sup reme court h as exp lained , “‘Lack of hes itation’ is
sem antica lly close to ‘reckless indifference’ and signifies a conscious lack of
concern for foreseeable c onseque nces.” State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933,
937 (Ten n. 199 5). In ad dition, “[t]h e proo f mus t also esta blish that the terms
imposed are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses comm itted and are
necessa ry in order to protect the public from furth er crimina l acts by the offende r.”
Id. at 938. Finally, the trial court must consider the general sentencing principles
contained in Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 40-35-102(1), 40-35-103(1), and 40-
35-103 (2). Id.
The transcript o f Defend ant’s sen tencing h earing re flects that the trial court
considered these general sentencing principles as well as the other factors
enumerated above. Furthermore, we have reviewed the record and conclude
that it supports the trial court’s decision. W ith regard to the factor of protecting
society from further criminal acts by the offender, it has bee n posited that there
can be no n ecessity to further protect so ciety from an offend er sente nced to life
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imprisonment without parole, and that consecutive sentencing would therefore
never satisfy th is criteria in such a case . Wh ile this argume nt certainly bears
logic,7 we note that our supreme court has d eclined to give the claim merit,
denying permission to appeal in several cases in which an additional sentence
has been ordered served consecutive to a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 930 S.W.2d 78, 75 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1995), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn . 1996); State v. Leon Barnett Collier, No.
03C01-9602-CR-00072, 1997 WL 9722 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jan. 13,
1997), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn . 1997); State v. Sammie Lee Taylor, No.
02C01-9501-CR-00029, 1996 WL 580997 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Oct. 10,
1996), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1997). Furthe rmore, the su preme co urt
has upheld running a sentence consecutive to a sentence of death. State v.
Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 191 (Tenn. 1991). Rather than attempting further
analysis, we defer to the guidance of our supreme court and to the discretion of
the trial judge and order the modified sentence of nine years for attempted
espe cially aggrava ted robb ery to be se rved co nsec utive to D efend ant’s sentence
for felony murde r.
VI. LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR JUVENILES
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by permitting the jury to
sentence him to life imprisonment without parole when he committed these
crimes as a juvenile. He argues that our legislature has prohibited sentencing a
juvenile to death in order to g rant juven iles anoth er chan ce at life, see Tenn.
Code Ann. § 37-1-134(a)(1); and he asserts that the same rationa le sho uld ap ply
7
The legislature has provided that a person sentenced to life without parole shall never
be eligible to be released on parole. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(h)(2).
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to a senten ce of life without parole. Furthermore, he suggests that while the
statute authorizing the penalty of life witho ut paro le does not specifically exclude
juvenile de fendan ts, neither d oes the statute de clare them eligible.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-134 provides in part, “The district
attorney general may not seek, nor may any child transferred under the
provisions of this section [from the juvenile court] receive, a sentence of death for
the offense fo r which the child was transferre d.” Id. § 37-1-134(a)(1). We find
that the more appropriate rule of statutory construction would be to assume the
legislature would have also prohibited the penalty of life without parole in the
same code section, had it so intended. Therefore, we decline to depart from our
decision in State v. Antonio M . Byrd, No. 02C01-9508-CR-00232, 1997 WL 1235,
at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Dec. 30, 199 6), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn.
1997), in which this Court ob served,
The legislature has made a specific exception for the death pe nalty.
If a specific exception were als o intende d for the pe nalty of life
without the possibility of parole, the legislature would have made an
exception for that as well. Moreover, the statutes providing for the
sentence of life with out the poss ibility of pa role provide no exception
for juveniles.
Id. This issu e lacks m erit.
VII. FELONY MURDER AGGRAVATING FACTOR
Finally, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by pe rmitting the jury
to sentence him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based upon
the single aggra vating facto r of felony m urder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
204(i)(7) (“The murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by
the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in comm itting or
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attempting to commit , or was fle eing a fter hav ing a s ubsta ntial role in committing
or attemp ting to com mit, any . . . robbery . . . .”). This issue w as sq uarely
resolved by our supreme court in State v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359 (Ten n. 1998),
in which the cou rt stated, “The felon y murder ag gravator (i)(7) can be use d to
enhance a sentence to life without the possibility of parole when the defendant
is convicte d of felony m urder.” T herefore , this issue is w ithout me rit.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Because we conclud e that the evidenc e was insufficient to pe rmit the jury
to conc lude D efend ant co mm itted an espe cially aggravated robbery, w e mod ify
this conviction and re mand to th e trial court for an entry of conviction for
attempted espe cially aggravated robbery. Having found no oth er error, we affirm
Defenda nt’s conviction for first degree murder in perpetration of attempted
especially aggra vated robbe ry.
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
___________________________________
L.T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
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