State v. Billy Harris ( 1999 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    DECEMBER 1998 SESSION             FILED
    March 12, 1999
    BILLY JOE HARRIS,             *      C.C.A. # 02C01-9808-CC-00240
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    Appellant,       *      LAKE COUNTY
    VS.                           *      Hon. R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge
    FRED RANEY, WARDEN,           *      (Habeas Corpus)
    Appellee.        *
    For Appellant:                       For Appellee:
    Billy Harris, Pro Se                 John Knox Walkup
    NWCX Site Two                        Attorney General and Reporter
    Route 1, Box 660
    Tiptonville, TN 38079                Clinton J. Morgan
    Counsel for the State
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Second Floor, Cordell Hull Building
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    C. Phillip Bivens
    District Attorney General
    P.O. Drawer E
    Dyersburg, TN 38024
    OPINION FILED:__________________________
    AFFIRMED
    GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
    OPINION
    The petitioner, Billy Joe Harris, filed a habeas corpus petition alleging
    that his 1989 conviction for aggravated sexual battery was void for lack of
    jurisdiction due to a faulty indictment. He also contended that certain of the
    evidence offered by the state at his trial should have been excluded. The trial court
    concluded the petition as "not [a] proper subject for habeas corpus relief." In this
    appeal of right, the single issue is whether the judgment was void because of the
    defective indictment.
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    The petitioner1 was convicted of aggravated sexual battery in 1989.
    This court affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Billy Harris, No. 4 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
    at Jackson, Aug. 22, 1990). After the grant of an application for permission to
    appeal, our supreme court affirmed. State v. Harris, 
    844 S.W.2d 601
    (Tenn. 1992).
    In his action for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner asserts that the
    indictment is fatally defective because it charged only that he "did unlawfully and
    feloniously have unlawful sexual contact with a child under 13 years of age." He
    claims that no culpable mental state was alleged by the state and that habeas
    corpus relief was warranted by virtue of the holding by a panel of this court in State
    v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June
    20, 1996).
    1
    In 1997, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his conviction
    for aggravated sexual battery was void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea. The trial
    court de nied relief an d this cou rt affirme d pursu ant to Ru le 20. Billy Joe Har ris v. State , No. 02C01-
    9610-CC-00333 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 24, 1997). The supreme court denied
    application for permission to appeal, concurring in results only, on October 12, 1998. The petitioner
    presents the same claim here and it has been previously determined. A petitioner may not "relitigat[e]
    questions previously determined adversely to him in ... separate habeas corpus cases by courts of
    com petent juris diction." Myers v. S tate, 
    462 S.W.2d 265
    , 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (citing Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 40 -3811, -3 812); Young v. State, 539 S.W .2d 850 ( Tenn . Crim. A pp. 1976 ).
    2
    In State v. Hill, 
    954 S.W.2d 725
    (Tenn. 1997), however, the supreme
    court reversed the holding in this court, ruling that "an indictment which fails to
    allege [a] mental state will be sufficient to support ... [a] conviction so long as,
    [among other things], the mental state can be logically inferred from the conduct
    alleged." 
    Id. at 726-27.
    In Ruff v. State, 
    978 S.W.2d 95
    , 96-97 (Tenn. 1998), our
    supreme court applied the Hill analysis to determine whether a post 1989 Act
    indictment for aggravated sexual battery was sufficient. The court held that "the
    intentional nature of aggravated sexual battery may be inferred from the conduct
    alleged in the indictment--unlawful sexual contact." 
    Id. at 97.
    This Hill analysis is
    applicable to pre-1989 Act indictments. Dykes v. Compton, 
    978 S.W.2d 528
    (Tenn.
    1998). The language of the indictment challenged here is the same as that in Ruff.
    (More recently, our supreme court ruled that mere reference to the statute allegedly
    violated will serve satisfactory notice. State v. Carter, ____ S.W.2d ____ (Tenn.
    1999). Here there was no statutory reference.) These holdings by our high court in
    Hill, Ruff, and Dykes control the disposition in this case. In our view, the indictment
    satisfies the standard established by the supreme court.
    Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
    ________________________________
    Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
    CONCUR:
    _____________________________
    Thomas T. W oodall, Judge
    _____________________________
    John Everett Williams, Judge
    3