State v. Melvin Boyd ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MAY 1998 SESSION
FILED
July 21, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9708-CC-00301
Appellee, )
) LAKE COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. J. STEVEN STAFFORD,
MELVIN BOYD, JR., ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
G. STEPHEN DAVIS JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
P. O. Box 742
Dyersburg, TN 38025-0742 GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER
Asst. Attorney General
John Sevier Bldg.
425 Fifth Ave., North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. PHILLIP BIVENS
District Attorney General
P. O. Drawer E
Dyersburg, TN 38024
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY,
Judge
OPINION
Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of driving after having
been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender pursuant to T.C.A. § 55-10-616. The trial
court sentenced him to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now
appeals as of right, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction
and arguing that the trial court erred in failing to consider and order an alternative
sentence. Finding no merit in the defendant’s arguments, we affirm his conviction and
sentence.
Ms. Brenda Pruitt testified that on June 3, 1996, she was involved in a traffic
accident with the defendant in Lake County, Tennessee. The defendant offered her one
hundred dollars ($100) if she would not call the police since he did not have a valid
driver’s license. Ms. Pruitt refused the money and told the defendant she was going to
call the police. The defendant immediately left the scene of the accident, claiming he
needed to go to his mother’s house. As he left, Ms. Pruitt copied the defendant’s license
plate number. When the police arrived at the scene of the accident, Ms. Pruitt told the
officer what happened and gave him a description of the defendant, a description of the
red truck he was driving, and the defendant’s license plate number. An investigation into
the license plate number revealed that the truck was registered to the defendant. Both
the truck and the defendant matched Ms. Pruitt’s descriptions. Moreover, Ms. Pruitt
positively identified the defendant at trial.
One of the defendant’s sons, Eddie, testified that the defendant had sold
the truck in question to him prior to June 3, although he was unsure of the date.
According to Eddie’s testimony, when he bought the truck from the defendant, he
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replaced the defendant’s license plate with a temporary tag, but he could not explain how
the license plate number Ms. Pruitt copied traced ownership of the truck that hit her to the
defendant. The defendant, his wife, and another of his sons, Shane, also testified at trial
that the defendant had sold his truck to his son prior to June 3, but none of them could
agree upon the date the defendant supposedly sold the truck, nor could they produce any
documentation evidencing the sale or transfer of title. Moreover, Shane and Eddie
testified that on June 3, the defendant had been in Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, helping
them roof a house. Eddie testified that the truck in question was with them in
Lawrenceburg, but Shane testified that the truck was not at the work site on June 3.
The defendant first argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient
to find him guilty of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle
habitual offender and having his driver’s license revoked. This Court will not disturb a
verdict of guilt for lack of sufficient evidence unless the defendant illustrates how the facts
contained in the record and any inferences which may be drawn from the facts are
insufficient, as a matter of law, for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). A
guilty verdict rendered by the jury and approved by the trial judge accredits the testimony
of the State’s witnesses, and a presumption of guilt replaces the presumption of
innocence. State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973).
“Any person found to be an habitual offender under the provisions of this
part who thereafter is convicted of operating a motor vehicle in this state while the
judgment or order of the court prohibiting such operation is in effect commits a Class E
felony.” T.C.A. § 55-10-616(b). The State and the defendant agreed to introduce into
evidence a copy of a 1990 order declaring the defendant to be a motor vehicle habitual
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offender and revoking his driver’s license as a result. Thus, the only issue at trial was
whether the defendant operated a motor vehicle in Tennessee on June 3, 1996. See id.
Here, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the
defendant drove a motor vehicle in Tennessee on June 3. Ms. Pruitt positively identified
the defendant as the man who was driving the red truck that hit her car in Lake County,
Tennessee, on June 3. The license plate number she reported to the police was traced
to the defendant. Although the defendant’s and his family’s testimony was, for the most
part, contradictory to the finding of guilt, it was also quite inconsistent. The jury obviously
discredited their testimony, which is its prerogative. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832,
835 (Tenn. 1978). This issue lacks merit.
The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative
sentencing. The burden of showing that the sentence is improper is upon the appealing
party. T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d) Sentencing Commission Comments. When a defendant
complains of his or her sentence, we must conduct a de novo review with a presumption
of correctness. T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d). This presumption, however, “is conditioned upon
the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing
principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166,
169 (Tenn. 1991).
Because the defendant does not fall within the parameters of T.C.A.
§ 40-35-102(5) and is a standard offender convicted of a Class E felony, he “is presumed
to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options in the absence of evidence
to the contrary.” T.C.A. § 40-35-102(6). In this case, even though the trial judge did not
expressly state that he began with the presumption that the defendant was a favorable
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candidate for alternative sentencing, his findings make it clear that the State overcame
the presumption by presenting ample evidence of the defendant’s long criminal history,
which includes prior convictions for driving with a revoked license and driving under the
influence; the defendant’s unwillingness to comply with the conditions of his prior release
in the community; and the defendant’s lack of potential for rehabilitation. Thus, we
conclude that a sentence of two years’ confinement was appropriate for the defendant.
See State v. Toney L. Moore, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9609-CC-00392, Williamson County
(Tenn. Crim. App. filed October 16, 1997, at Nashville).
In sum, the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the defendant’s
conviction and sentence. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
_______________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
______________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
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