State v. Carl Saine ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
CARL E. SAINE, )
)
Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9710-CC-00399
)
vs. ) LAUDERDALE COUNTY
)
ALTON HESSON, WARDEN,
Respondent.
) No. 4983
)
)
FILED
December 15, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
ORDER
Appellate C ourt Clerk
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the
judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. It appears the petitioner was originally convicted of rape in September 1977,
and sentenced to ninety-five years imprisonment. On July 21, 1997, the petitioner filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the sufficiency of the indictment
entered against him. The trial court denied relief.
Although the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the indictment,
thereby preventing this Court from conducting an adequate review of the issue
presented, the petitioner argues in his appellate brief that the indictment is invalid
because it failed to assert an essential element of the offense, i.e., the mens rea, and
that his conviction, therefore, cannot stand.1
At the time of the offense in this case, rape was defined as the “the
unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and against her will.” T.C.A. § 39-3701
(1975). The indictment at issue before us allegedly charged that the petitioner did
“unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Patricia McEntee, a female over
the age of twelve (12) years forcibly and against her will.” This language was sufficient
1
The petitioner also claims that the trial judge erred in finding that the sufficiency of an indictment
cannot be challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding. Because we resolve this matter on other grounds,
we n eed not a ddre ss th at cla im.
under the law as it existed at the time. The statutory requirements for an indictment
were found in § 40-1802 (now § 40-13-202 (1997)), which provided simply that:
The indictment must state the facts constituting the offense in
ordinary and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such a
manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended, and with that degree of certainty which will enable the court, on
conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment.
Furthermore, in Campbell v. State, 491 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tenn. 1973)
(emphasis supplied), while addressing the sufficiency of an indictment charging the
offense of murder, our Supreme Court stated the following:
While it seems clear that the indictment in Witt was insufficient in
that it failed to charge an element, that the murder was committed
unlawfully, in either the language of the statute or common law or words
of equivalent import, the decision is confusing because of the language,
‘fatally defective in omitting the charge that the offense was committed
feloniously, or with malice aforethought; and containing no words of
equivalent import.’ It is clear, however, that had the indictment used the
words ‘feloniously’ or ‘unlawfully’, it would have been sufficient.
We agree with this proposition. By containing the words found in the language of the
statute, the indictment at issue here sufficiently apprised the appellant of the offense
charged under the law at the time, and is therefore valid.
Although not controlling in the present case,2 the Supreme Court’s recent
opinion in State v. Hill, No. 01S01-9701-CC-00005 (Tenn., Nov. 3, 1997) supports our
conclusion. The Court stated that “an indictment need not conform to traditionally strict
pleading requirements” and that “in modern practice, it is unnecessary to charge guilty
knowledge unless it is included in the statutory definition of the offense.” Moreover,
having reviewed the alleged language of the indictment in this case, we find that it
would suffice under the Supreme Court’s analysis of the current statutory requirements
of notice and form.
2
The decision in Hill is based upon the Court’s interpretation of T.C.A. § 39-11-301, which was
ena cted in 198 9. Th at sta tute p rovid es, in pertin ent p art, th at “[a] culpa ble m enta l state is req uired within
this title unless the definition of the offense plainly dispenses with a mental element.” Prior to 1989,
however, the Criminal Code did not contain a comparable provision.
2
Accordingly, we find that the indictment at issue meets constitutional and
the then-existing statutory requirements, and is therefore valid. It is therefore
ORDERED that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20,
Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Enter, this the ___ day of December, 1997.
______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
______________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
______________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
3