State v. William R. Begley, III ( 1999 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    FILED
    AT KNOXVILLE
    October 20, 1999
    AUGUST 1999 SESSION                   Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,            )
    )
    Appellee,         )    No. 03C01-9810-CR-00359
    )
    )    Sullivan County
    v.                             )
    )    Honorable Phyllis H. Miller, Judge
    )
    WILLIAM R. BEGLEY, III,        )    (One count of possession of marijuana;
    )    eight counts of theft of property less than
    )    $500; fifteen counts of vandalism of property
    )    valued over $500)
    )
    Appellant.        )
    For the Appellant:                  For the Appellee:
    Leslie Hale                         Paul G. Summers
    Assistant Public Defender           Attorney General of Tennessee
    Post Office Box 889                        and
    Blountville, TN 37617               Marvin S. Blair, Jr.
    (AT TRIAL)                          Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243
    Larry S. Weddington
    200 Seventh Street
    Bristol, TN 37620
    (ON APPEAL)
    OPINION FILED:____________________
    AFFIRMED
    Joseph M. Tipton
    Judge
    OPINION
    The defendant, William R. Begley, III, was convicted in the Sullivan
    County Criminal Court upon his no contest pleas to one count of possession of
    marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; eight counts of theft of property less than five
    hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor; and fifteen counts of vandalism of property
    valued over five hundred dollars, a Class E felony. He received an effective sentence
    of six years in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. In this
    appeal as of right, the defendant contends that he should have received a community
    corrections sentence. We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.
    The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence and subsequently
    held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service. At the hearing, Burton
    Smith, the defendant’s great-grandfather, testified that the defendant had been living
    with him and helping him following Mr. Smith’s eye surgery.
    The defendant testified that following his release on bond for the present
    offenses, he was convicted for speeding and having an improper exhaust system. He
    said he was also convicted of the assault and battery of his pregnant girlfriend, for
    which he had attended four abuse alternative classes. He testified that he had been
    expelled from high school and had not obtained his GED. He stated that during the
    time in which his probation report was being prepared for the hearing, he used
    marijuana. He testified that he did not think he could pass a drug screen at the time of
    the hearing and that he has a problem turning down marijuana. He said that he had
    received alcohol counseling and was willing to undergo drug counseling.
    The defendant testified that he was involved in an earlier assault that
    occurred because his father forced him into a fight. He testified that he has a child by
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    his wife, from whom he is separated, and was expecting another child by his girlfriend.
    He stated that he had not paid child support because he could not locate his wife or the
    child. He testified that he performed concrete work for three weeks through a
    temporary agency. He said he was fired because his probation appointments made
    him late for work. He testified that he had not worked in one and one-half months
    because he had been taking care of his grandfather. He stated that he had been
    offered a job the weekend before the hearing. Upon the foregoing proof, the trial court
    ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in the custody of the Department of
    Correction.
    The defendant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing him to
    serve his sentence in community corrections. He argues that he is a good candidate for
    rehabilitation and that the trial court essentially punished him for having a drug problem.
    The state contends that the trial court properly ordered the defendant to serve his
    sentence in confinement. We agree.
    Appellate review of sentencing is de novo on the record with a
    presumption that the trial court's determinations are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
    401(d). As the Sentencing Commission Comments to this section note, the burden is
    now on the defendant to show that the sentence is improper. This means that if the
    trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, made findings of fact that are
    adequately supported in the record, and gave due consideration and proper weight to
    the factors and principles that are relevant to sentencing under the 1989 Sentencing
    Act, we may not disturb the sentence even if a different result were preferred. State v.
    Fletcher, 
    805 S.W.2d 785
    , 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
    However, “the presumption of correctness which accompanies the trial
    court's action is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial
    3
    court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.”
    State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 169 (Tenn. 1991). In this respect, for the purpose of
    meaningful appellate review,
    the trial court must place on the record its reasons for arriving
    at the final sentencing decision, identify the mitigating and
    enhancement factors found, state the specific facts supporting
    each enhancement factor found, and articulate how the
    mitigating and enhancement factors have been evaluated and
    balanced in determining the sentence. T.C.A. § 40-35-210(f)
    (1990).
    State v. Jones, 
    883 S.W.2d 597
    , 599 (Tenn. 1995).
    Also, in conducting a de novo review, we must consider (1) the evidence,
    if any, received at the trial and sentencing hearing, (2) the presentence report, (3) the
    principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives, (4) the nature
    and characteristics of the criminal conduct, (5) any mitigating or statutory enhancement
    factors, (6) any statement that the defendant made on his own behalf and (7) the
    potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210;
    see Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168; State v. Moss, 
    727 S.W.2d 229
     (Tenn. 1986).
    The defendant is presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative
    sentencing options. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6). However, eligibility for
    alternative sentencing options does not equate to entitlement. See State v. Taylor, 
    744 S.W.2d 919
    , 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). In the present case, the trial court stated
    that the defendant
    has a criminal history demonstrating a clear disregard for the
    laws, and morals of society. [He has] a social history
    demonstrating a clear disregard for the laws and morals of
    society. [He has] a criminal history demonstrating a failure of
    past efforts at rehabilitation.
    The trial court also stated that the defendant had received treatment, had been
    previously sentenced to split confinement, and had been given full probation numerous
    times, all without success. We believe that the trial court’s findings justify its denial of
    4
    community corrections and its imposition of a sentence of confinement under Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1), (5).
    In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the
    judgment of conviction.
    ________________________________
    Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ________________________
    John Everett W illiams, Judge
    ________________________
    Alan E. Glenn, Judge
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Document Info

Docket Number: 03C01-9810-CR-00359

Filed Date: 10/20/1999

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014