William Jones v. State ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
NOVEMBER 1998 SESSION
December 11, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
WILLIAM JONES, )
) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9711-CR-00548
Appellant, )
) Davidson County
v. )
) Honorable J. Randall Wyatt, Jr., Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Habeas Corpus)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Smith John Knox Walkup
One Public Square Attorney General & Reporter
Suite 321 425 Fifth Avenue, North
Clarksville, TN 37040 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Kim R. Helper
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue, North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
OPINION FILED: ______________________________________
AFFIRMED
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, William Jones, appeals as of right from the summary dismissal of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Davidson County Criminal Court. The petitioner
alleges in his petition that his sentence of thirty years is illegal and void in that the jury
sentenced the appellant to confinement without the possibility of parole for the offense of
kidnapping, not kidnapping for robbery. After a review of the entire record, the history of
this petition, the briefs of all parties, and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.
HISTORY
This petition for habeas corpus relief reflects the appellant’s ongoing battle with the
State of Tennessee since 1978, when he was found guilty of simple robbery and
kidnapping by a Haywood County jury. The jury imposed sentences of ten to fifteen years
for simple robbery and thirty years for kidnapping, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2603, without the
possibility of parole. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the appellant’s convictions.
William Jones v. State, Haywood County No. 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, April 26,
1979). In this case, one issue for appeal was the trial judge’s refusal to charge the jury on
the lesser offense of simple kidnapping, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2601. This Court stated:
“The evidence was unrefuted that a kidnapping was committed in connection with Mrs.
Curlin’s robbery. It does not suggest that a simple kidnapping occurred. We find no error
in the instructions.” Id., slip op. at 5. The record also reflects that the appellant is serving
concurrent sentences of sixty-two years for his convictions in Shelby County of murder
second degree and six offenses of robbery with a deadly weapon. These sentences were
ordered to run concurrently with the Haywood County sentences for simple robbery and
kidnapping.
The present petition was filed in July, 1992 in the Davidson County Criminal Court.
In his complaint, the petitioner alleges that his sentence for kidnapping is void in that courts
and juries did not have jurisdiction to exercise authority, control, or command over the
Board of Paroles. Upon the state’s motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the petition
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for habeas corpus relief. This Court, in William Jones v. State, No. 01C01-9308-CR-00272
(Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 14, 1995), affirmed the dismissal. 1 In its opinion, this
Court stated:
The petitioner alleges that his sentence for kidnapping is void
because he claims that the courts and juries did not have jurisdiction
to exercise authority or control or command over the Board of
Paroles. We do not need to decide this, it was previously raised by
the petitioner and decided by this Court. State v. William Jones, No.
02C01-9406-CC-00134 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, March 22,
1995).
Upon remand, the state filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus relief
on the basis the petitioner’s sentence had expired and he was no longer in custody for the
offense of kidnapping. As part of its motion to dismiss, the state filed an affidavit of Faye
Claud, Manager of Sentence Information Services, Tennessee Department of Correction.
The affidavit stated the sentence of thirty years without parole imposed on May 1, 1978 for
the offense of kidnapping in Haywood County Case No. 7099 had expired. In granting the
state’s motion to dismiss, the trial court held:
[A]s a result of the expiration of the petitioner’s kidnapping
sentence, the Court is of the opinion that the issue remanded for
determination is now moot, as the case no longer presents a live
controversy for the Court to resolve and from which the petitioner
can obtain relief. (citation omitted).
The trial court also noted that the petitioner’s convictions out of Shelby County had not
expired and the petitioner was still subject to confinement.
In his brief, the petitioner takes issue with the trial court’s order in dismissing the
petition in lieu of a remand hearing as ordered by the Supreme Court, citing State v.
Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d 1, 21 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1996); State v.
Pendergrass, 795 S.W.2d 150, 155-56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989), per. app. denied (Tenn.
1990). We agree with the holdings in these two cases as to the duty of intermediate
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The Supreme Court granted the petitioner’s application for permission to appeal.
In State v. Jones, No. 01C01-9308-CR-00272 (Tenn., Nashville, February 12, 1996), the
Supreme Court, in a per curiam order, remanded the cause “for a hearing to determine
whether the petitioner was convicted of kidnapping or kidnapping for ransom so as to
determine whether the sentence imposed was void.”
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appellate courts and trial courts in remand orders imposed by the Supreme Court.
However, in this cause, we do not believe the trial court’s failure to conduct a remand
hearing would create chaos as urged by the petitioner.
Habeas corpus relief is available in Tennessee only “when it appears upon the face
of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that
a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a
defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Archer v.
State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) (emphasis added). We believe the trial court
was correct in dismissing the petition in this cause. Since the petitioner was no longer in
custody for the offense of kidnapping, the question as to whether the conviction is void is
moot. The Court of Appeals addressed a similar question in McIntyre v. Traughber, 884
S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. App. 1994). That Court held “an appeal concerning the legality
of a prisoner’s incarceration becomes moot upon the prisoner’s unconditional release,”
citing State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. 534, 538, 347 S.W.2d 47, 49 (1961).
Tennessee courts recognize exceptions to the mootness rule. The two most
common exceptions are: (1) issues of great public interest and importance to the
administration of justice, and (2) issues capable of repetition yet evading review. We do
not believe the petitioner’s claim falls within these two exceptions. McIntyre v. Traughber,
884 S.W.2d at 137. We recognize that the petitioner has not been unconditionally
released from custody due to his Shelby County convictions. The only issue remanded by
the Tennessee Supreme Court was for the trial court to determine the nature of the
petitioner’s kidnapping conviction in order to determine if the petitioner was serving a
proper sentence. Whatever sentence the petitioner was serving, that sentence has expired
and there is no longer a justiciable issue to be determined.
In conclusion, we find the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas
corpus relief and affirm the judgment.
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________________________________________
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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