State v. Maria Maclin ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MARCH 1998 SESSION
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * No. 02C01-9710-CR-00383
Appellee, * Shelby County
vs. * Hon. James C. Beasley, Jr., Judge
MARIA MACLIN, * (Second Degree Murder)
Appellant. *
FILED
August 21, 1998
For Appellant: For Appellee: Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
C. Michael Robbins John Knox Walkup
Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter
3074 East Street
Memphis, TN 38128 Peter M. Coughlan
(on appeal) Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Gary W. Ball Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor
and Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Jane E. Sturdivant
Attorneys at Law Janet S. Shipman
242 Poplar Avenue and
Memphis, TN 38103 Johnny R. McFarland
(at trial) Assistant District Attorneys General
Criminal Justice Complex
201 Poplar Street, Suite 301
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:___________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Maria Maclin, was convicted of second degree murder.
The trial court sentenced the defendant, who qualified as a violent offender, to
twenty-two years imprisonment. A fine of ten thousand dollars was imposed. In this
appeal of right, the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but
does present the following issues for our review:
(1) whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury
by defining "reasonable" and by providing a "dynamite
charge"; and
(2) whether the sentence is excessive.
We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant and her family had been feuding with the victim, Glenn
Taylor, and his family for many years. On the evening of January 26, 1996, the
defendant, the victim, and members of each of their families, attended a basketball
game at East High School in Memphis. The families sat on opposite sides of the
arena and gestured to each other throughout the game. At its conclusion, the
defendant stood in the crowded school parking lot with her sister, Latrice W oods,
who accused Kena "Shea" Blakney, the older sister of the victim, of having stolen
$100.00 from her. In response, Ms. Blakney accused Ms. Woods of slashing her
tires. A fist fight followed. When the victim saw his sister fighting, he intervened,
striking either Ms. Woods or the defendant in the process. The defendant then drew
her gun and, as the victim attempted to flee, she shot him twice, killing him.
The defense theory was that the victim and his sister were armed and
had struck the defendant and her sister with their weapons. Witnesses for the state
testified that neither the victim nor his sister were armed and that the victim had
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turned to run away when he was shot. No weapon was recovered from the victim.
The autopsy indicated that the victim had been shot twice in the back.
I
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in its response to two
questions from the jury, thereby depriving her of the constitutional right to a trial by
jury. The state maintains that the trial court acted properly.
(A)
After the trial court charged the jury on second degree murder, it
provided the following instructions on voluntary manslaughter:
For you to find the defendant guilty of [voluntary
manslaughter], the state must have proven beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of the following
elements:
(1) that the defendant unlawfully killed the
alleged victim; and
(2) that the killing was intentional or
knowing; and
(3) that the killing resulted from a state of
passion produced by adequate provocation
sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act
in an irrational manner.
(Emphasis added).
During its deliberations the jury asked the trial court to "[d]efine
reasonable as pertains to 'reasonable person.'" The state argued for a dictionary
definition to be provided, "[J]ust, proper, ordinary, usual, fit and appropriate to the
end in view...." The trial court determined that the terms usual, ordinary and rational
fit the connotation of reasonable person. Neither defense counsel nor the state
objected to the supplemental instruction:
There is no set definition for reasonable as set forth in
your question. Some terms such as ordinary, usual, or
rational may apply, but the ultimate issue is for you to
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determine what a reasonable person is.
The trial court, of course, has a duty to give a complete charge of the
law applicable to the facts of the case. State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 319
(Tenn. 1986). It is presumed that the jury follows the instructions of the trial court.
State v. Blackmon, 701 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); Klaver v. State,
503 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). A jury instruction can be found
"prejudicially erroneous" only if "it fails to fairly submit the legal issues or if it
misleads the jury as to the applicable law." State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 352
(Tenn. 1997). In Hodges, our supreme court warned that the instructions should be
"read ... as a whole":
[J]urors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing
instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same
way that lawyers might. Differences among them in
interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in the
deliberative process, with common sense understanding
of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place
at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting.
Id., 944 S.W.2d at 352 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1990)).
Trial courts may provide supplemental instructions in response to jury
questions. State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 451 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Trial
courts are not required to define or explain words or terms in common use which are
understood by persons of ordinary intelligence. State v. Summers, 692 S.W.2d 439,
445 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional or knowing killing committed
while under a "state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead
a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211.
The Sentencing Commission Comments to this section suggest that the basic
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common law principles of voluntary manslaughter remain intact. Neither the
statutory law nor the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions provide a definition for the
term "reasonable person." See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211; T.P.I. § 7.06,
Instruction on Voluntary Manslaughter.
Under common law, an objective rather than a subjective standard is
used to determine whether adequate provocation reduces the offense of first or
second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. See State v. Freddo, 155 S.W.
170 (Tenn. 1912). In Seals v. State, our supreme court referred to an "ordinary
[person], of fair average disposition ...." in the context of provocation. 62 Tenn. 459,
462 (1874) (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, in Whitsett v. State, the supreme
court held that the person provoked must be "laboring under an adequately aroused
passion so great as to obscure his reason." 299 S.W.2d 2, 6 (Tenn. 1957).
In our view, the instruction on "reasonable person," in the context of
the entire charge, is not erroneous. That "ordinary, usual, or rational may apply," as
indicated in the supplemental charge, is a correct statement of law. Other words
such as moderate, fair and sensible would also serve as adequate definitions.
American Heritage Dictionary 573 (Office Ed. 1983); Webster's New World
Dictionary 399 (Modern Desk Ed. 1976).
(B)
After four and one-half hours of deliberation, the jury asked of the trial
court, "What happens if we agree that she is guilty but cannot [agree] on 2nd degree
vs. voluntary manslaughter?" In response, the trial judge reread the following
sections of the original charge:
The verdict must represent the considered
judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is
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necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your verdict
must be unanimous.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one
another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an
agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for
yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of
the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of
your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own
views and change your opinion if convinced it is
erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction
as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of
the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose
of returning a verdict.
When you retire to consider your verdict ... you will
first inquire, is the defendant guilty of Murder Second
Degree as charged in the indictment? ...
If you find the defendant not guilty of this offense,
or if you have a reasonable doubt of her guilt of this
offense, you will acquit her thereof and then proceed to
inquire whether or not she is guilty of Voluntary
Manslaughter as included in the indictment.
***
Take the case, consider all the facts and
circumstances fairly and impartially and report to the
Court such verdict as truth dictates and justice demands.
The defendant contends that the trial court should have inquired
whether the jury was, in fact, deadlocked and that the trial court erred by directing
the jury to consider second degree murder before voluntary manslaughter.
In State v. Kersey, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975), our supreme court
adopted Sec. 5.4 of the ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury, and directed its
use by the trial courts faced with deadlocked juries; the court disapproved of the
Allen or "dynamite" charge. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896);
Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1 (1851). In Kersey, our supreme court ruled that
the "dynamite" charge constituted an impermissible, judicially mandated majority
verdict and concluded that the only proper inquiry of the jury "as to its progress [is]
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... whether it believes it might reach a verdict after further deliberations." Kersey,
525 S.W.2d at 141.
The charge under challenge by the defendant is identical to the Kersey
instruction. Unlike the Allen case, this jury was not instructed to surrender individual
judgment. In the event of an inability to agree on the part of the jury, trial judges
may require the jury to continue deliberating and may give or repeat this instruction.
Kersey, 525 S.W.2d at 145. In our view, this instruction was not erroneous.
The instruction that the jury should render a verdict for second degree
murder before considering voluntary manslaughter is not erroneous. This type of
"acquittal first" instruction has been repeatedly upheld. See Harris v. State, 947
S.W.2d 156, 175-76 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). This issue has no merit.
II
Next, the defendant challenges the length of her sentence. When
there is a challenge to the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence, it is the
duty of this court to conduct a de novo review with a presumption that the
determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
401(d). This presumption is "conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record
that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and
circumstances." State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991); see State v.
Jones, 883 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. 1994). The Sentencing Commission Comments
provide that the burden is on the defendant to show the impropriety of the sentence.
Our review requires an analysis of (1) the evidence, if any, received at
the trial and sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of
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sentencing and the arguments of counsel relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the
nature and characteristics of the offense; (5) any mitigating or enhancing factors; (6)
any statements made by the defendant in her own behalf; and (7) the defendant's
potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, and
-210; State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
At the time of this offense, the presumptive sentence for a Class A
felony was the midpoint in the range if there were no enhancement and mitigating
factors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c). Should the trial court find mitigating and
enhancement factors, it must start at the minimum sentence in the range and
enhance the sentence based upon any applicable enhancement factors and then
reduce the sentence based upon any appropriate mitigating factors. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-210(e). While there must be compliance with the 1989 Act
documented by the record, the weight given to each factor is discretionary with the
trial court. See Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-209 and
-210.
At the sentencing hearing, Icymae Franklin, mother of the victim,
testified that her son was a good student and athlete. She suffered deep anguish
after his death, has had difficulty working, and had lost seventy pounds. The
medical bills for life-saving efforts amounted to $16,000.00. Ms. Franklin asked the
trial court to impose the maximum sentence possible.
Patricia Garrett, principal of Lester School where the victim had
attended elementary school, testified that she had known the victim since he was
five years old. She described the victim as motivated, conscientious, and popular
among his classmates. She characterized his death as a devastating event in the
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community.
Leutissue Elliott, mother of the twenty-four-year-old defendant, testified
favorably for her daughter, asserting that she had worked hard to support her two
children. She asked the trial court to extend mercy. Reverend Joe Hayes, the
pastor at Greater Lakeview Baptist Church, testified that the defendant came from a
good family and deserved another chance. Latrice Woods, sister of the defendant,
testified that the victim hit her in the head with a gun on the night of the shooting.
She contended that the defendant had saved her life by shooting the victim.
The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i)(1), (2) (No release eligibility for a defendant who
commits second degree murder after July 1, 1995; sentence credits shall not
exceed fifteen percent). It found that the defendant possessed or employed a
firearm during the commission of the offense, had no hesitation in committing an
offense when the risk to human life was high, and had committed the offense on
school property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(9), (10), & (17). The trial court
determined that the circumstances were especially serious because the defendant
had chosen to arm herself at a school function, had fired the shot in a high school
parking lot, and, due to the crowd in attendance at the game, had endangered
others. The trial court placed great weight on these factors and enhanced the
sentence to twenty-five years, the maximum possible. Because, however, the trial
court found in mitigation that the defendant acted under strong provocation and that
substantial grounds existed tending to excuse or justify the conduct but which did
not amount to a defense, the sentence was reduced to twenty-two years. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-113 (2), (3).
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The defendant maintains that the use of a firearm and the commission
of the offense on school property should be consolidated into one enhancement
factor. We disagree. In our view, the trial court followed the dictates of Ashby,
made adequate findings of fact, and adhered to the purposes and principles of the
1989 Act. The enhancement factors and mitigating factors applied by the trial court
were appropriate and the sentence, while lengthy, is not unduly harsh given the
circumstances of the offense. When the sentence has been administered within the
statutory guidelines, the presumption of correctness prevails. See State v. Fletcher,
805 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
__________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Judge
CONCUR:
_________________________________
Joe B. Jones, Presiding Judge 1
_________________________________
Jerry L. Smith, Judge
1
Honorable Joe B. Jones died May 1, 1998, and did not participate in this
opinion. We acknowledge his faithful service to this Court, both as a member of the
Court and as its Presiding Judge.
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