James Thomas v. Randy Lee, Warden ( 2016 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs March 22, 2016
    JAMES THOMAS v. RANDY LEE, WARDEN
    Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Johnson County
    No. CC-15-CR-151 Stacy L. Street, Judge
    No. E2015-02427-CCA-R3-HC – Filed July 21, 2016
    The Petitioner, James Thomas, filed a petition in the Johnson County Criminal Court
    seeking habeas corpus relief from his aggravated assault conviction, alleging that his
    conviction was void because the affidavit of complaint attached to his arrest warrant was
    not signed. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing, and the Petitioner
    appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.
    NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT
    WILLIAMS and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.
    James Thomas, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro se.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Senior Counsel; and
    Anthony Wade Clark, District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. Factual Background
    A jury in the Johnson County Criminal Court convicted the Petitioner of
    aggravated assault, a Class C felony. State v. James Craig Thomas, No. E2013-02196-
    CCA-R3-CD, 
    2014 WL 2021952
    , at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, May 15, 2014).
    The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years.
    
    Id. Thereafter, the
    Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, citing State v.
    Ferrante, 
    269 S.W.3d 908
    (Tenn. 2008), in support of his contention that the affidavit of
    complaint underlying his arrest warrant was not signed by a neutral and detached
    magistrate or judge; therefore, the arrest warrant was void ab initio and invalidated all
    subsequent proceedings. In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss, maintaining that
    the affidavit of complaint was not the charging document because the Johnson County
    Grand Jury returned an indictment against the Petitioner. The State contended, therefore,
    that the Petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
    The habeas corpus court summarily granted the State‟s motion to dismiss, ruling
    that the Petitioner‟s “argument that he [was] entitled to habeas corpus relief due to a void
    affidavit of complaint [was] without merit” because a grand jury issued a valid
    indictment against him on July 8, 2011. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the
    habeas corpus court erred by denying relief without a hearing.
    II. Analysis
    Initially, we note that the determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is
    a question of law. Summers v. State, 
    212 S.W.3d 251
    , 255 (Tenn. 2007). As such, we
    will review the trial court‟s findings de novo without a presumption of correctness. 
    Id. Moreover, it
    is the petitioner‟s burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, “that the sentence is void or that the confinement is illegal.” Wyatt v. State, 
    24 S.W.3d 319
    , 322 (Tenn. 2000).
    Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees an accused the right
    to seek habeas corpus relief. See Taylor v. State, 
    995 S.W.2d 78
    , 83 (Tenn. 1999).
    However, “[s]uch relief is available only when it appears from the face of the judgment
    or the record of the proceedings that a trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence a
    defendant or that a defendant‟s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.”
    
    Wyatt, 24 S.W.3d at 322
    ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. ' 29-21-101. In other words, habeas
    corpus relief may be sought only when the judgment is void, not merely voidable.
    
    Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83
    . “A void judgment „is one in which the judgment is facially
    invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment or
    because the defendant‟s sentence has expired.‟ We have recognized that a sentence
    imposed in direct contravention of a statute, for example, is void and illegal.”
    Stephenson v. Carlton, 
    28 S.W.3d 910
    , 911 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting 
    Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83
    ).
    The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by denying his petition
    without a hearing. The State contends that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed
    the petition without a hearing.
    -2-
    The Petitioner‟s reliance on Ferrante is misguided. In Ferrante, an indictment
    charging the defendant was never 
    issued. 269 S.W.3d at 909
    . The only charging
    instrument issued prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation was the invalid
    affidavit of complaint. 
    Id. at 914-15.
    In the instant case, the Petitioner was charged with
    and convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Tenn. Code Ann. ' 39-13-
    102(a)(1)(A)(iii); (e)(1)(A)(ii). Prosecution for a Class C felony must be commenced
    within four years of the offense. Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-2-101(b)(3). The Petitioner‟s
    offenses were committed on May 3, 2011, and a grand jury returned an indictment on
    July 8, 2011, well within the statute of limitation.1 Thus, the charging instrument is the
    indictment. Eric D. Wallace v. Stephen Dotson, Warden, No. W2006-00908-CCA-R3-
    HC, 
    2007 WL 852173
    , at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 22, 2007). A valid
    indictment confers jurisdiction on a trial court. Hart v. State, 
    21 S.W.3d 901
    , 903 (Tenn.
    2000). Accordingly, the habeas corpus court did not err by denying relief.
    III. Conclusion
    Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
    _________________________________
    NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE
    1
    We take judicial notice of the indictment, which was part of the direct appeal record. See State v.
    Lawson, 
    291 S.W.3d 864
    , 869 (Tenn. 2009).
    -3-