Montez Deontay Ridley v. State of Tennessee ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                                         01/16/2020
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs September 17, 2019
    MONTEZ DEONTAY RIDLEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
    No. 2014-A-258     Cheryl A. Blackburn, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. M2018-01773-CCA-R3-PC
    ___________________________________
    The Petitioner, Montez Deontay Ridley, was convicted by Davidson County jury of
    aggravated robbery and received a sentence of nine years’ imprisonment.1 State v.
    Montez Deontay Ridley, No. M2015-01607-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2017 WL 359091
    , at *1
    (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017)(no perm. app filed). He appeals from the denial of his
    petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on
    the failure to cross-examine the victim concerning his inconsistent description of the gun
    used in the robbery. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
    court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT
    WILLIAMS, P.J., and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., joined.
    Ryan C. Caldwell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Petitioner, Montez Deontay Ridley.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Assistant
    Attorney General, Glenn Funk, District Attorney General; and Megan King, Assistant
    District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    In August 2013, the Petitioner, along with his cohort, shoved a gun into the side of
    the victim and robbed him of several pairs of Air Jordan athletic shoes. The Petitioner
    eventually provided a statement to police admitting his involvement in the robbery;
    however, he claimed that the shoes were given to him in exchange for drugs, that the
    victim was angry because the Petitioner sold him fake drugs, and that he was not the
    1
    This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to another, unrelated matter as reflected in
    the judgment form.
    individual who held the gun on the victim. At trial, the victim testified that he had placed
    an advertisement on Craigslist for the sale of athletic shoes and communicated by phone
    with a buyer, later identified as the Petitioner, to purchase the shoes. On the day of the
    exchange, the victim, accompanied by his cousin, arranged to meet the Petitioner at a
    restaurant in Nashville at one o’clock in the afternoon. The Petitioner did not come to the
    prearranged location, but he called later that night and arranged to meet the victim at an
    alley behind a retail store. When the victim arrived, the Petitioner and another man
    approached the victim’s car.
    The victim got out of his car and his cousin remained in the front passenger seat.
    The victim walked to the back of his car to show the Petitioner the shoes, and they talked
    for a few seconds about the shoes. The Petitioner then pulled a gun out of his pocket and
    pointed it at the victim’s side. As the Petitioner held the gun on the victim, another man
    searched the victim’s pockets and took his wallet. The two men also took four pairs of
    shoes from the trunk of the Petitioner’s car. The victim denied that he bought drugs from
    or sold drugs to the Petitioner. The victim called the police and described the robbers as
    follows:
    Two men, African American, ... both of them were close to
    6'3" or 6'4" one guy had dreads, the other guy had short hair. .
    . . I described the clothes, what kind of shirts they had on. . . .
    [T]he one that stuck the gun into my side had gold teeth, he
    had gold fronts.
    Although the victim was unable to identify the Petitioner from a photographic
    array, he positively identified the Petitioner in the courtroom as the person who robbed
    him.     The victim also recognized the Petitioner’s voice from their telephone
    conversations regarding the shoes. The victim gave the police the telephone number he
    used to communicate with the Petitioner, which was traced to Brittany Lee Hunter, the
    mother of the Petitioner’s child. Hunter testified that the Petitioner was using her phone
    at the time of the robbery and that they lived together in a housing development near the
    location of the robbery. The Petitioner’s cousin also testified consistently with the
    testimony of the victim. She also observed the Petitioner “point what appeared to be a
    silver gun at [the victim’s] side.”
    The Petitioner provided a statement to law enforcement, which was video recorded
    and played for the jury at trial. The Petitioner initially denied knowing anything about
    the robbery and denied any involvement in the crime. However, he eventually
    maintained that he had set up a transaction with the victim to exchange “fake drugs made
    up of baking soda” for the shoes. There was no evidence discovered by law enforcement
    that the victim was buying or selling drugs. As the Petitioner continued to deny
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    involvement in the crime, the interviewing detective suggested that perhaps the victim
    accused the Petitioner of robbery because the victim was unsatisfied with a drug deal.
    The Petitioner eventually acknowledged that he needed new shoes and that he found
    someone willing to exchange shoes for cocaine. When the Petitioner met with the victim,
    he gave the victim some baking soda that was “rocked up” to resemble cocaine. The
    Petitioner admitted that he took possession of two pairs of new shoes, but he denied that a
    gun was involved. Neither the shoes taken during the robbery or the gun used in the
    robbery were found. State v. Montez Deontay Ridley, No. M2015-01607-CCA-R3-CD,
    
    2017 WL 359091
    , at *1-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2017).
    On September 18, 2017, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
    relief. Following the appointment of counsel, on May 17, 2018, an amended petition for
    post-conviction relief was filed, alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective in
    failing to adequately cross-examine the victim concerning inconsistencies in his
    description of the gun used in the robbery.2 At the July 11, 2018 post-conviction hearing,
    the Petitioner testified, in relevant part, that there was no gun involved in the robbery of
    the victim. The Petitioner admitted that he “played a part of meeting up with [the
    victim], but when it come to a weapon, [he] don’t know nothing about that.” In support
    of his claim, the Petitioner pointed out that in the victim’s statement to the police the
    victim said that the Petitioner “placed a silver gun to his back, but in the preliminary
    hearing [the victim] can’t describe the color or nothing.” The Petitioner was aggrieved
    because he advised trial counsel of this discrepancy and trial counsel failed to “bring it
    up.” The Petitioner believed that the charges should have been reduced to simple robbery
    or theft of property based upon the victim’s inability to identify the gun used in the
    robbery and the contradictory statements provided by the victim.
    In regard to this issue, trial counsel testified that he believed the case “was going
    to come down to the credibility of the victim.” As part of his defense strategy, trial
    counsel attempted to cross-examine the victim, a college basketball coach, concerning
    two NCAA rule infractions, where the victim was alleged to have taken money from
    boosters. Although the trial court limited trial counsel’s line of questioning, trial counsel
    was able to question the victim in part about these infractions. Trial counsel
    acknowledged that he noticed the discrepancy in the victim’s statement between “a silver
    gun versus a black gun” prior to trial, and he admitted that the victim gave “two kind of
    separate descriptions” of the gun. However, trial counsel said that the victim maintained
    that there was a gun involved in the robbery. Accordingly, trial counsel did not focus on
    the discrepancy and explained his reasoning as follows:
    2
    The Petitioner raised several other issues in his petition for post-conviction relief and at the
    post-conviction hearing. As these claims are not addressed in his brief before this court, they are deemed
    waived.
    -3-
    My fear being that, you know, it would kind of come down to was the car
    red or the car blue. You know, and then the state could very simply say
    well, it doesn’t matter, I just remember them shooting at me. You know,
    and so that was a detail that yes, I could’ve pointed out, but I felt really
    could have taken away from our defense in that it would’ve set up a
    response that I would not have had an answer to. I did not think it was
    relevant.
    Trial counsel also testified that he was focused on discrediting the victim based on
    (1) the victim’s failure to identify the Petitioner in the photographic array and (2) the
    victim’s voice identification of the Petitioner based solely on the phone calls that were
    made to arrange the sale of the shoes.
    By written order on August 28, 2018, the post-conviction court denied relief,
    providing, in relevant part, as follows:
    Trial counsel testified . . . and the Court credits his testimony.
    [Trial counsel] stated he was aware the victim initially described the gun as
    silver but then testified it was black; however, [trial counsel] did not
    believe it advantageous to focus on the color of the weapon when the
    defense’s position is no weapon was involved in the crime. He stated
    cross-examining the victim about the gun would have emphasized the
    issues about a weapon. Instead, [trial counsel] testified he attempted to
    challenge the victim’s credibility by (1) emphasizing he could not make a
    positive identification when shown a photographic line up and (2)
    introducing bad acts. [footnote omitted].
    The Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, and this case is now properly before
    this court for review.
    ANALYSIS
    In this appeal, the Petitioner’s sole contention is that trial counsel was deficient in
    failing “to adequately subject the State’s case to adversarial testing.” He specifically
    argues that the jury would have acquitted him of aggravated robbery had trial counsel
    questioned the victim regarding his contradictory statements concerning the color of the
    gun. In response, the State contends that the evidence does not preponderate against the
    findings of the post-conviction court accrediting the testimony of trial counsel. Upon our
    review, we agree with the State.
    -4-
    In resolving this issue, we rely on the following well established legal rubric for
    claims of post-conviction relief. Post-conviction relief is only warranted when a
    petitioner establishes that his or her conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of
    an abridgement of a constitutional right. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. The Tennessee
    Supreme Court has held:
    A post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless
    the evidence preponderates otherwise. When reviewing factual issues, the
    appellate court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence; moreover,
    factual questions involving the credibility of witnesses or the weight of
    their testimony are matters for the trial court to resolve. The appellate
    court’s review of a legal issue, or of a mixed question of law or fact such as
    a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, is de novo with no presumption
    of correctness.
    Vaughn v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 106
    , 115 (Tenn. 2006) (internal citations and quotation
    marks omitted); see Felts v. State, 
    354 S.W.3d 266
    , 276 (Tenn. 2011); Frazier v. State,
    
    303 S.W.3d 674
    , 679 (Tenn. 2010). A post-conviction petitioner has the burden of
    proving the factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
    30-110(f); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 8(D)(1); Dellinger v. State, 
    279 S.W.3d 282
    , 293-94
    (Tenn. 2009). Evidence is considered clear and convincing when there is no serious or
    substantial doubt about the accuracy of the conclusions drawn from it. Lane v. State, 
    316 S.W.3d 555
    , 562 (Tenn. 2010); Grindstaff v. State, 
    297 S.W.3d 208
    , 216 (Tenn. 2009);
    Hicks v. State, 
    983 S.W.2d 240
    , 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
    Vaughn further repeated well-settled principles applicable to claims of ineffective
    assistance of counsel:
    The right of a person accused of a crime to representation by counsel is
    guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    and article I, section 9, of the Tennessee Constitution. Both the United
    States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that this right to
    representation encompasses the right to reasonably effective assistance, that
    is, within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
    
    Vaughn, 202 S.W.3d at 116
    (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner
    must establish that (1) his lawyer’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient
    performance prejudiced the defense. 
    Id. (citing Strickland
    v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    ,
    687 (1984); Baxter v. Rose, 
    523 S.W.2d 930
    , 936 (Tenn. 1975)). “[A] failure to prove
    -5-
    either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective
    assistance claim. Indeed, a court need not address the components in any particular order
    or even address both if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing of one component.”
    Goad v. State, 
    938 S.W.2d 363
    , 370 (Tenn. 1996) (citing 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697
    ). A
    petitioner successfully demonstrates deficient performance when the clear and
    convincing evidence proves that his attorney’s conduct fell below “an objective standard
    of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” 
    Id. at 369
    (citing 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688
    ; 
    Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936
    ). Prejudice arising therefrom is demonstrated
    once the petitioner establishes “‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
    reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
    outcome.’” 
    Id. at 370
    (quoting 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
    ).
    This Court has previously noted that “cross-examination is a strategic and tactical
    decision of trial counsel, which is not to be measured by hindsight.” Gregory G. Kilgore
    v. State, No. M2012-01296-CCA-R3-PC, 
    2013 WL 3326663
    , at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    June 27, 2013) (citing State v. Kerley, 
    820 S.W.2d 753
    , 756 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)).
    “Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to matters of trial strategy or
    tactics do not provide a basis for post-conviction relief.” Taylor v. State, 
    814 S.W.2d 374
    ,
    378 (Tenn. Crim. App.1991). Counsel has some discretion in conducting the defense and
    is entitled to use his best judgment in matters of trial strategy or tactics. See McBee v.
    State, 
    655 S.W.2d 191
    , 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
    Applying the above law to this case, we conclude that the post-conviction court
    properly denied relief. The record shows that trial counsel was aware of the victim’s
    different descriptions of the gun prior to trial. Trial counsel agreed with the Petitioner
    that the victim described the gun as silver in his first statement to police and in a later
    statement the victim described the gun as black. However, trial counsel emphasized that
    the victim never said that there was not a gun involved in the robbery; therefore, the color
    of the gun was not relevant. Moreover, trial counsel believed that the better strategy was
    to focus on impeaching the victim based on the victim’s prior bad acts involving NCAA
    rule infractions, the victim’s failure to identify the Petitioner in a photographic array, and
    the victim’s tenuous voice identification of the Petitioner. The post-conviction court
    accredited the testimony of trial counsel, and the record supports this determination.
    Accordingly, the Petitioner has failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice, and
    he is not entitled to relief.
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
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    ____________________________________
    CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE
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