Gary Aldridge v. State of Tennessee ( 2007 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    GARY ALDRIDGE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wayne County
    No. 14183
    No. M2007-01268-CCA-R3-HC - Filed December 3, 2007
    The Appellant, Gary Aldridge, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus
    relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be
    granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed Pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the
    Court of Criminal Appeals
    JERRY L. SMITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which, DAVID H. WELLES, and
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ. joined.
    Gary Aldridge, pro se.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant Attorney
    General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In 1997, the Appellant was convicted of one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of
    aggravated rape, one count of rape, and two counts of assault. The Appellant was sentenced to sixty
    years in prison. See State v. Gary Eugene Aldridge, No. 01C01-9802-CC-00075, 
    1999 WL 632299
    (Tenn. Crim. App., Aug. 19, 1999). On March 7, 2007, the Appellant filed a petition for habeas
    corpus relief alleging that the criminal indictment entered against him was defective and that, as a
    result, he is being unlawfully restrained. The trial court dismissed the petition without a hearing.
    The Appellant appealed, and the State has filed a motion to affirm pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the
    Court of Criminal Appeals.
    Although the Appellant presented a claim below regarding the legality of the indictment, his
    brief on appeal only challenges the trial court’s summary dismissal without appointing counsel.
    Although there is no federal or state constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in habeas
    corpus proceedings, a trial court has the statutory duty to appoint counsel, “if necessary.” See John
    C. Tomlinson v. State, No. M2001-02152-CCA-R3-CO, 
    2002 WL 1400051
     (Tenn. Crim. App. at
    Nashville, June 28, 2002) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 
    501 U.S. 722
    , 755 (1991) and Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 40-14-204)). Appointment of counsel is not necessary merely because a petition is filed,
    rather appointment of counsel is necessary where the petition alleges facts that would justify relief
    and the petitioner is deemed indigent. Id. (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13, § 1(d)(4)). In the instant
    case, the trial court concluded that the Appellant was not entitled to habeas corpus relief on the claim
    presented. Although the Appellant does not challenge the trial court's specific ruling, for the reasons
    stated below, we find that the Appellant is not entitled to relief on his sole claim that appointment
    of counsel was necessary in this case.
    Article I, Section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees the right to seek habeas corpus
    relief, and Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 29-21-101 et seq. codify the applicable procedures
    for seeking such a writ. However, the grounds upon which our law provides relief are very narrow.
    McLaney v. Bell, 
    59 S.W.3d 90
    , 92 (Tenn. 2001). Habeas corpus relief is available in this state only
    when it appears on the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings that the trial court was
    without jurisdiction to convict or sentence the defendant or that the sentence of imprisonment has
    otherwise expired. Archer v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 157
    , 164 (Tenn. 1993). In other words, habeas
    corpus relief may only be sought when the judgment is void, not merely voidable. Taylor v. State,
    
    995 S.W.2d 78
    , 83(Tenn. 1999). "[W]here the allegations in a petition for writ of habeas corpus do
    not demonstrate that the judgment is void, a trial court may correctly dismiss the petition without
    a hearing." McLaney, 59 S.W.3d at 93. A petitioner cannot collaterally attack a facially valid
    conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. Potts v. State, 
    833 S.W.2d 60
    , 62 (Tenn. 1992); State ex
    rel. Holbrook v. Bomar, 
    364 S.W.2d 887
    , 888 (Tenn. 1963). Unlike a post-conviction petition, the
    purpose of a habeas corpus petition is to contest a void, not merely voidable, judgment. State ex rel.
    Newsome v. Henderson, 
    424 S.W.2d 186
    , 189 (Tenn. 1968).
    Although in most instances a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment is not a proper
    claim to raise in a habeas corpus proceeding, see Haggard v. State, 
    475 S.W.2d 186
    , 187-88 (Tenn.
    Crim. App.1971), “the validity of an indictment and the efficacy of the resulting conviction may be
    addressed in a petition for habeas corpus when the indictment is so defective as to deprive the court
    of jurisdiction.” Dykes v. Compton, 
    978 S.W.2d 528
    , 529 (Tenn.1998). An indictment meets
    constitutional requirements if it provides sufficient information: (1) to enable the accused to know
    the accusation to which an answer is required, (2) to furnish the court an adequate basis for the entry
    of a proper judgment; and (3) to protect the accused from double jeopardy. State v. Hill, 
    954 S.W.2d 725
    , 727 (Tenn. 1997). In addition, an indictment must state the facts of the offense in ordinary and
    concise language “in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what
    is intended.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202.
    The trial court determined that indictment is "facially regular, showing no defect, much less
    a jurisdictional one." Having reviewed the indictment contained in the record on appeal, we cannot
    conclude that the trial court erred in its assessment. The Appellant, therefore, is not entitled to relief
    on his claim that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition without appointing
    counsel. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in
    accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
    ____________________________________
    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
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