Burson & Simpson Lodge Developments, Inc. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and the Metropolitan Planning Commission ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
BURSON & SIMPSON LODGE )
DEVELOPMENTS, INC.,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
)
) FILED
) Davidson Chancery No. 97-803-III
) March 5, 1999
VS. ) Appeal No. 01A01-9805-CH-00249
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT ) Appellate Court Clerk
OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON )
COUNTY, and THE METROPOLITAN )
PLANNING COMMISSION, )
)
Defendants/Appellees. )
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE CLAUDIA BONNYMAN, SPECIAL CHANCELLOR
GEORGE A. DEAN
PARKER LAWRENCE CANTRELL & DEAN
Nashville, Tennessee
ROBERT RUTHERFORD
RUTHERFORD, DEMARCO & WHITE
Nashville, Tennessee
Attorneys for Appellant
THOMAS G. CROSS
Metropolitan Attorney
Nashville, Tennessee
Attorney for Appellees
REVERSED AND REMANDED
ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.
CONCUR:
DAVID R. FARMER, J.
HEWITT P. TOMLIN, JR., Sp. J.
Burson & Simpson Lodge Developments, Inc. (“Burson & Simpson”) appeals from
the trial court’s affirmance of a decision rendered by the Nashville and Davidson County
Metropolitan Planning Commission (the “Planning Commission”), whereby the Planning
Commission characterized a proposed amendment to a planned unit development as a
“basic change in development concept,” and whereby the Planning Commission
disapproved the amendment. We find that, based upon the record before this Court, the
Planning Commission’s disapproval of the proposed amendment was illegal, arbitrary, or
capricious and, therefore, we reverse the holding of the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
This case involves an approved and partially developed general commercial planned
unit development, as contemplated by the zoning ordinance for the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County. See Metro. Gov’t Zoning Ordinance §
17.100.020(A) (1997). Prior to the adoption of this planned unit development, the subject
land was zoned as an “RM8" high-density residential district. As required by the
Metropolitan Government’s zoning ordinance, the master development plan that received
preliminary approval by both the Planning Commission and the Metropolitan Council
described “the utilization of structures” and “the land area to be devoted to various uses
and activities.” See id. § 17.108.070(A)(3), (B). The approved preliminary plan designated
the use for each tract of land within the planned unit development as either: (1) retail; (2)
fast food; or (3) fast food/office.1 The particular tract that is the subject of this lawsuit (“tract
5") included 7.3 acres, and was designated for retail use. Moreover, as required by the
zoning ordinance, the approved preliminary plan also set forth the approximate height of
the retail structure that was to be built on tract 5, being under approximately 20 feet.
In October 1996, Burson & Simpson filed an application with the Planning
Commission, seeking to amend the master development plan in order to construct a three-
story suburban lodge (motel) on tract 5 in lieu of the retail structure that was set forth in the
plan. The height of the proposed motel was to be 39 feet (nearly double the height of the
1. Sinc e the appr oval o f the p lanne d unit development, a Kroger store and a Krystal’s have been constructed
within the de velopm ent.
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building that was set forth in the approved preliminary plan). The Planning Commission
heard the matter on December 12, 1996, at which time it adopted a resolution stating that
Burson & Simpson’s proposed amendment “is given DISAPPROVAL AND REMANDED
TO COUNCIL AS AN ‘AMENDMENT’ . . . .” The resolution further stated, “The Planning
Commission determined that the proposed changes in use and building height were not
appropriate in this location, and remanded such changes back to the Council as a basic
change in development concept for this planned unit development.”
No further action was taken on an administrative level. Subsequently, however,
Burson & Simpson filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Davidson County Chancery
Court. After the writ was issued, the administrative record was transmitted, and the matter
was heard, the trial court entered an order that stated that Burson & Simpson was “not
entitled to relief under the writ of certiorari.” Accordingly, the trial court’s order affirmed the
decision of the Planning Commission.
On appeal, Burson & Simpson contends that its proposed amendment amounted
to no more than a minor modification of the development plan, and that its proposed
amendment should have been approved by the Planning Commission. It presents this
Court with the following issue:
I. Whether there is any basis upon which the Metropolitan Planning
Commission could validly deny the application submitted by Burson &
Simpson for an amendment to an existing planned unit development?
The Metropolitan Government and the Planning Commission further present this Court the
following additional issue:
II. Should the trial court have dismissed [Burson & Simpson’s] claims for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies?”
Analysis
As stated earlier, this case was brought before the trial court by writ of certiorari.
The writ of certiorari may be granted whenever authorized by law, and
also in all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally, when,
in the judgment of the court, there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate
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remedy.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 (Supp. 1998). Our supreme court has stated the following
regarding judicial review pursuant to such writs:
The courts must determine whether the action of the [administrative body] in
the exercise of its administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial function was illegal
or in excess of jurisdiction. Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 27-8-101. If the exercise
of authority by the governmental body can be classified as arbitrary or
capricious, courts have routinely provided relief.
McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 640 (Tenn. 1990). Accordingly, if the
Planning Commission’s determinations in the instant case were either arbitrary or
capricious, Burson & Simpson would be entitled to relief. Our supreme court has also
provided the following guidance in reviewing cases such as the instant one:
[T]he court’s primary resolve is to refrain from substituting its judgment for
that of the local governmental body. An action will be invalidated only if it
constitutes an abuse of discretion. If “any possible reason” exists justifying
the action, it will be upheld. . . . [A]dministrative decisions are presumed to
be valid and a heavy burden of proof rests upon the shoulders of the party
who challenges the action.
....
[T]he court should refrain from substituting its judgment for the broad
discretionary authority of the local governmental body. An invalidation of the
action should take place only when the decision is clearly illegal, arbitrary, or
capricious.
Id. at 641-42. Therefore, we must affirm if there exists material evidence in the record to
support the Planning Commission’s determinations. See Davis Group, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, 912 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tenn. App. 1995).
This case involves two administrative determinations, which were judicial or quasi-
judicial in nature, that were made by the Planning Commission. First, the Planning
Commission determined that Burson & Simpson’s proposed amendment amounted to a
basic change in concept or general development policy. 2 Second, the Planning
Commission disapproved the proposed amendment, instead of recommending adoption
of the amendment which required concurring approval from both the Planning Commission
2. One section of the Metropolitan Government’s zoning ordinance that governs amendments and changes
to adopted preliminary master development plans for planned unit developments provides the following:
Any proposed amendment which involves a basic change in concept or general
development policy in the judg men t of the p lanning commission shall be deemed as an
amendment to the preliminary master development plan and the planning com mis sion shall
make its recommendation to the metropolitan county council for concurrence.
Metro. Gov’t Zoning Ordinance § 17.108.230.
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and the Metropolitan Council.
We find that the Planning Commission’s first determination, that Burson &
Simpson’s proposed amendment amounted to a basic change in concept or general
development policy, was supported by material evidence and was not illegal, arbitrary, or
capricious. It is clear from the record that Burson & Simpson’s proposed amendment
sought to introduce into the planned unit development a use classification that was not
contemplated by the approved preliminary plan. As this Court previously implicitly
recognized in the unreported case Evans v. Metropolitan Planning Comm’n of Nashville
and Davidson County, No. 01A01-9303-CH-00115, 1993 WL 350132 (Tenn. App. Sept.
15, 1993), “substantive amendments impacting such items as the PUD’s . . . activity types”
require approval from both the Planning Commission and the Metropolitan Council under
section 17.108.230 because such amendments involve a basic change in concept or
general development policy.
Furthermore, the Planning Commission’s first determination, that the proposed
amendment amounted to a basic change in concept or general development policy,
amounted to a determination under a “catch-all” provision that the proposed amendment
would require concurrence by the Metropolitan Council in order to be adopted.3 Section
17.108.215 of the zoning regulation also sets forth a list of specific instances where
proposed amendments require concurrence by the Metropolitan Council for adoption. As
explained in the following paragraph, one of these instances is applicable to the instant
case and, therefore, we find no error in the Planning Commission’s first determination.
In this case, Burson & Simpson sought to introduce a suburban lodge, or motel, into
the previously approved general commercial planned unit development. While such a use
might, in most instances, be characterized as “transient habitation commercial activities,”4
3. See supra note 2.
4. “Transient habitation commercial activities include the provision of lodging se rvices to tra nsient gu ests.”
Metro. Gov’t Zoning Ordinance § 17.12.080(25).
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Burson & Simpson expressly described its intended use as “semitransient.”5 In fact, it
specifically represented to the Planning Commission that its proposed lodge was not
intended for transient guests, and that its activities would satisfy the definition of
“semitransient” under the zoning ordinance. It represented to the Planning Commission,
among other things, the following:
The typical Suburban Lodge does not cater or attract a transient
person. The typical site is not located directly adjacent to an exit ramp from
the adjacent interstate highway but away from the transient traveler passing
through who would hop off the interstate highway just to spend the night and
leave the next day.
Under the Metropolitan Government’s zoning ordinance, however, such “semitransient”
activities are classified as a residential use, and not as a commercial use. Metro. Gov’t
Zoning Ordinance § 17.12.060. As presently adopted, the planned unit development at
issue in this case is limited as being a commercial planned unit development. The uses
that are permitted within a commercial planned unit development, which are specifically
listed in the zoning ordinance, do not include “semitransient residential activities.”6 See id.
§ 17.100.060, table 17.100.060. However, “the metopolitan planning commission and the
metropolitan county council may consider separate types of planned unit developments,
such as residential and commercial planned unit development, general, within a
consolidated master development plan as a single administrative procedure.” Id. §
17.92.080. Moreover, planned unit developments may be amended and changed from one
type to another, i.e., from commercial to residential. Id. § 17.108.215(A)(1). Accordingly,
Burson & Simpson’s proposed amendment essentially seeks the creation of two separate
types of planned unit developments within the master development plan that was
previously given approval in this case. Such a change, from commercial to residential,
requires concurrence by the Metropolitan Council under section 17.108.215 of the zoning
ordinance, and, therefore, the Planning Commission’s first determination did not amount
5. “Semitransient residential activities” is a class of residential activities whereunder “[t]he occupancy of living
accommodations [is] pa rtly on a mo nthly o r long er ba sis an d par tly for a sho rter time period, bu t with less than
thirty percent of the living units . . . being occupied on a less-than-monthly basis.” Id. § 17.12.060(C).
6. We find it relevant to note that semitransient residential activities are permitted by right in only three types
of comm ercial districts: multiple residential and office (MRO); office and service park ing (OP); and core
commercial frame (CF ). Metro. Gov’t Zoning Ordinance § 17.60 .020(A)(2). See also id. §§ 17.56.020, .040,
.110. They are not perm itted b y right in other commercial districts, including, for example, limited commercial
service (CSL) districts, commercial service (CS) districts, and general commercial (CG) districts. Id. §
17.60.02 0(A)(2). See also id. §§ 17.56.070, .080, .090.
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to reversible error. Because the Planning Commission’s first determination was proper,
we turn to its second determination, that Burson & Simpson’s Amendment should be
disapproved.
Regarless of whether a planned unit development is commercial or residential, each
activity that is permissible within the development is permitted “only when such activities
are deemed appropriate” by the Planning Commission and the Metropolitan Council.
Metro. Gov’t Zoning Ordinance §§ 17.96.050, 17.100.060. Unlike zoned districts, where
specified use classifications and activities are deemed “permitted by right” under the zoning
ordinance, the Planning Commission and the Metropolitan Council are afforded discretion
in determining whether particular activities are appropriate for a particular planned unit
development. As explained earlier, however, the Planning Commission’s determination
must not be illegal, arbitrary, or capricious. Otherwise, the commission’s determination will
amount to an abuse of discretion.
In Burson & Simpson’s brief, it argues that its amendment should have been
approved because its proposed motel for semitransient residential activities satisfies the
RM8 zoning that underlies the planned unit development.7 We find this argument
unpersuasive, however. As long as the planned unit development remains approved and
is not canceled by the Planning Commission, along with concurrence from the Metropolitan
Council, and as long as the subject land area (tract 5) remains within the development,8
the planned unit development overlays the RM8 zoning on the county’s official zoning map.
See id. § 17.108.180. Therefore, the underlying RM8 zoning is replaced by the planned
unit development, and the Planning Commission was not required to approve the proposed
7. Sem itrans ient re side ntial a ctivitie s are perm itted b y right in RM8 districts. Metro. Gov’t Zoning Ordinance
§ 17.24.020(A)(3).
8. Land area may be added to or removed from the planned unit development by approval from the Planning
Comm ission, along with concurrence from the Metropolitan Cou ncil . Metro. Gov’t Zoning Ordinance §
17.108.215(A)(2). In this case, however, Burson & Simpson has not sought the removal of tract 5 from the
planned unit development. Leaving tract 5 within a planned unit develop men t while reclas sifying it to
“sem itransient residential activities” provides at least one apparent advantage to Burson & Simpson over
outright removal from the planned unit development. While “semitransient residential activities” are ordin arily
limited as described in footnote 5 above (“partly on a m onth ly or lon ger b asis and p artly for a shorter period
. . . .”), “th e pro portio nal lim itation of les s-tha n-m onth ly occ upa ncy may be wa ived” in res ident ial plan ned unit
develop men ts as deemed appropriate by the Planning Commission and the Metropolitan Council, provided
that no un its are less than one -week occup ancy. Id. §§ 17.12.060(C), 17.96.110.
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amendment based simply upon compliance with RM8 zoning requirements.
During the course of the Planning Commission’s hearing, certain concerns were
raised relating to how the proposed change would affect neighboring residents. Among
those concerns was, “what happens if this business fails and this becomes a transient
motel or worse, a place for homeless to congregate.” No material evidence, however, was
introduced to demonstrate any likelihood that the proposed motel would fail, and “mere
beliefs, opinions and fears of neighborhood residents do not constitute material evidence.”
See Sexton v. Anderson County, 587 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tenn. App. 1979). Therefore,
based upon the record in this case, any expressed fear of business failure did not amount
to material evidence sufficient to support the Planning Commission’s disapproval.
Review of the transcript from the Planning Commission’s hearing reveals that the
Planning Commission’s disapproval was based primarily upon the proposed height of the
motel,9 which was nearly double the height of the previously approved retail building.
Under the specific facts of this case, however, disapproval based upon height was
improper. Regardless of whether tract 5 remained a part of a general commercial planned
unit development, or whether it was changed, either back to its underlying RM8
classification or to a residential planned unit development tract, the proposed building
height was governed by express guidelines already set forth in the zoning ordinance.
Among other restrictions, buildings within a general commercial planned unit development
cannot exceed a height of 45 feet above the street line. Metro. Gov’t Zoning Ordinance
§§ 17.64.210, 17.100.080, table 17.64.210. Buildings within the underlying RM8 district
cannot exceed three stories in height. Id. § 17.28.370(A). Last, buildings that are part of
a residential planned unit development cannot exceed three stories in height. Id. §§
17.28.370(A), 17.96.180. Burson & Simpson’s proposed motel satisfies any of these
height requirements. Accordingly, because Burson & Simpson’s proposed motel complied
with the preestablished guidelines governing height that are set forth in the zoning
ordinance, and based upon the unique facts of this case, disapproval based upon height
9. Disc uss ion als o rela ted to the “u nique ” topo grap hy of th e are a, bu t this, a gain, perta ined to how the
prop ose d heig ht rela ted to this “u nique ” topo grap hy.
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was illegal, arbitrary, or capricious.
We also note that the Planning Commission’s disapproval was based, albeit to a
lesser degree than height, upon a misapprehension of the procedures governing the
“approval” process of Burson & Simpson’s proposed amendment. The transcript from the
Planning Commission’s hearing clearly demonstrates that the Commission believed that,
regardless of whether it approved or disapproved Burson & Simpson’s proposed
amendment, the Metropolitan Council would have the “final say” on whether the
amendment was approved and adopted. In fact, the record suggests that it wanted the
Metropolitan Council again to review the matter and to have the “final say” on the matter.
While the Planning Commission’s belief would have been true if the Planning Commission
had recommended approval of the amendment, the Planning Commission’s belief did not
apply in this case because the proposed amendment could only have been adopted
through concurring approval between both the Planning Commission and the Metropolitan
Council. Id. §§ 17.108.215, 17.108.220. Therefore, the Planning Commission’s reliance
upon further action by the Metropolitan Council was arbitrary, since its reliance was
premised upon an incorrect conclusion of law.
Last, the Metropolitan Government and the Planning Commission asserted in the
trial court that this case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Moreover, they have presented this issue to this Court for review. The trial court’s
memorandum opinion reviewed this issue by stating the following:
The defendants assert that the plaintiff must secure a decision from
the Council in order to exhaust its remedies. Consequently, this Court
should dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court finds that the plaintiff has exhausted its administrative
remedies: the code provision regulating amendments to PUDs requires that
the MPC send its recommendation regarding the amendment to the Council
for “concurrence.” COMZO § 17.108.230. Since the MPC recommended
against the change applied for by the plaintiff, concurrence here means the
plaintiff loses and must file its lawsuit. If there is denial of concurrence, there
is no remedy mentioned. The law does not require pursuit of an
administrative remedy if it would by a useless effort, as here. Bigger v. Allen,
192 Tenn. 426, 241 S.W .2d 516 (Tenn. 1951).
We concur with the trial court’s reasoning and result. Because the Planning Commission
9
did not approve the proposed amendment, the amendment could not have been adopted,
regardless of whether they brought the matter before the Metropolitan Council.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed against the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County and the Metropolitan Planning
Commission, for which execution may issue if necessary.
HIGHERS, J.
CONCUR:
FARMER, J.
TOMLIN, Sp. J.
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