Randy Hensley v. Dept of Correction ( 2002 )


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  •                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs July 30, 2002
    RANDY HENSLEY v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
    No. 01-1965-III   Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor
    No. M2001-02343-COA-R3-CV - Filed March 4, 2003
    WILLIAM C. KOCH , JR., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    I concur in affirming the dismissal of Mr. Hensley’s certiorari petition in this case. I
    disagree, however, with the court’s footnoted conclusion that Mr. Hensley has not raised the issue
    of whether he was deprived of property without due process of law.
    I.
    The trial court resolved this case by granting the Department of Correction’s Tenn. R. Civ.
    P. 12.02(6) motion. This motion tests the legal sufficiency of the petitioner’s complaint. Doe v.
    Sundquist, 
    2 S.W.3d 919
    , 922 (Tenn. 1999). It requires the courts to look at a complaint’s substance
    rather than its form, Kaylor v. Bradley, 
    912 S.W.2d 728
    , 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), and to
    determine whether the complaint contains a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is
    entitled to relief. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. We particularly look past matters of form when reviewing
    the pleadings of pro se litigants. Winchester v. Little, 
    996 S.W.2d 818
    , 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
    Mr. Hensley alleges that the prison disciplinary board failed to accord him due process of
    law. Specifically, he alleges that he was convicted of testing positive for marijuana use based on a
    faulty drug screening procedure. According to Mr. Hensley, the corrections officer who took his
    urine sample mishandled it and allowed it to become confused with another prisoner’s urine sample.
    He also alleges that the board (1) placed him in punitive segregation, (2) ordered him to pay a $22.00
    drug test fee, and (3) fined him $4.00. The drug testing fee and the fine implicated a property
    interest sufficient to sustain a due process challenge to the disciplinary procedure. Jeffries v.
    Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., No. M2001-02300-COA-R3-CV, 
    2002 WL 31890879
    , at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
    App. Dec. 31, 2002) perm. app. filed (Tenn. Jan. 30, 2003).
    Prisoners state a due process claim by alleging that a prison disciplinary board imposed
    monetary sanctions on them as the result of a proceeding that failed “to proceed according to the
    essential requirements of the law.” Hedges v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., No. M2002-00140-COA-
    R3-CV, 
    2002 WL 31890869
    , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002) (Cottrell, J., concurring).
    Convicting a prisoner for drug use based on another prisoner’s blood or urine sample would clearly
    amount to a failure to proceed according to the essential requirements of the law. Because this is
    exactly what Mr. Hensley alleged happened, I find that he has stated a claim for deprivation of
    property without due process of law.
    II.
    Concluding that Mr. Henley’s petition states a claim for which relief can be granted does not
    end the matter. When the Department moved to dismiss his petition, Mr. Hensley responded by
    filing selected portions of the record of the disciplinary hearing, along with copies of the
    Department’s procedural rules and regulations governing inmate testing for drugs and alcohol. The
    record fails to reflect whether the trial court considered or disregarded these materials. Had the trial
    court considered these materials, the Department’s motion to dismiss should have been converted
    to a motion for summary judgment. Wilson v. Sentence Info. Servs., No. M1998-00939-COA-R3-
    CV, 
    2001 WL 422966
    , *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2001) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).
    The Department’s internal policies contain detailed instructions regarding the collection and
    handling of urine samples. They state that the failure of the Department or an affiliated private
    contractor to follow these procedures “shall not constitute a reason for the dismissal of test results.”
    Tenn. Dep’t Corr. Policy No. 506.21(VI)(D)(14) (2000). Thus, while prisoners may challenge the
    evidentiary weight of the test results of a mishandled urine sample, the disciplinary board ultimately
    has the prerogative to consider the test results for whatever they may be worth.
    The materials Mr. Hensley submitted to the trial court show that the disciplinary board
    allowed Mr. Hensley, through his inmate advisor, to challenge the result of his urinalysis by
    questioning the corrections officers who conducted the test and handled the sample. The board
    evidently decided to put confidence in the lab report. Thus, Mr. Hensley’s argument, reduced to its
    essence, is that the board erred by accrediting the officer’s testimony regarding the urine sample.
    This argument is nothing more than a challenge to the intrinsic correctness of the board’s decision
    which is not the sort of relief a common-law writ of certiorari can provide. Arnold v. Tennessee Bd.
    of Paroles, 
    956 S.W.2d 478
    , 480 (Tenn. 1997); Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Bd., 
    879 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
    I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Hensley’s petition on this basis.
    _____________________________
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2001-02343-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge Ben H. Cantrell

Filed Date: 7/30/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014