Christopher Johnson v.Tennessee Department of Correction - Concurring ( 1996 )


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  • CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON,                  )
    )
    Petitioner/Appellant,           )
    )   Appeal No.
    )   01-A-01-9602-CH-00064
    VS.                                   )
    )   Davidson Chancery
    )   No. 95-2065-II
    TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF               )
    CORRECTION,                           )
    )
    FILED
    Respondent/Appellee.            )
    August 7, 1996
    COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE         Cecil W. Crowson
    MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE        Appellate Court Clerk
    APPEALED FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
    AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
    THE HONORABLE ELLEN HOBBS LYLE, CHANCELLOR
    CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON
    2514 Dodson Avenue
    Chattanooga, Tennessee 37406
    Pro Se/Petitioner/Appellant
    CHARLES W. BURSON
    Attorney General and Reporter
    PATRICIA C. KUSSMANN
    Assistant Attorney General
    404 James Robertson Parkway
    Suite 2000
    Nashville, Tennessee 37243
    Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
    AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    TODD, P.J., M.S.
    KOCH, J.
    OPINION
    A convicted burglar in the custody of the Department of Correction filed
    a petition with the Chancery Court of Davidson County for an order directing the
    Department to award him additional credits against his sentence for time spent in jail
    before and after trial, and for sentence reduction credits he allegedly earned during
    the same period of incarceration. The Chancellor found that Mr. Johnson had already
    received all the credits to which he was entitled. We affirm.
    I.
    Christopher Johnson was arrested for burglary on September 21, 1984.
    He was tried and convicted of first degree burglary in the court of Judge Joseph
    DiRisio, and was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on October 15, 1986.
    Following a subsequent trial in the court of Judge Douglas Meyer, the jury found him
    guilty of another charge of second degree burglary, and on May 12, 1987 a ten year
    sentence was imposed on him for that offense, to be served consecutively to his
    fifteen year sentence, resulting in a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. Mr.
    Johnson was unable to post bond, and he remained in the Hamilton County Jail
    throughout his two trials and convictions, until he was transferred to the penitentiary
    on May 3, 1988.
    Judge Meyers’ judgment recited that the appellant would be allowed jail
    credit “from and after September 22, 1984.” When Mr. Johnson began serving his
    time in the penitentiary, he received 1,321 days of pretrial jail credits, which the
    Department of Correction applied towards his initial fifteen year sentence.
    -2-
    Mr. Johnson argues that he was entitled to receive credit against both
    sentences for the time he spent in jail, on the ground that he was entitled to receive
    such credits on his first sentence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-101(b), and that
    additionally the provision for jail credit on Mr. Johnson’s second sentence became
    binding on the Department of Correction once Judge Meyers’ judgment became final,
    whether any part of that judgment was erroneous or not.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-101(b) reads in relevant part:
    The trial court shall, at the time the sentence is imposed and
    the defendant committed to jail, the workhouse, or the state
    penitentiary for imprisonment, render the judgment of the
    court so as to allow the defendant credit on his sentence for
    any period of time for which he was committed and held in
    the city jail . . . pending his arraignment and trial. The
    defendant shall also receive credit on his sentence for the
    time he served in the jail, workhouse or penitentiary
    subsequent to any conviction arising out of the original
    offense for which he was tried.
    If we were to accept Mr. Johnson’s ingenious argument, he would
    receive two days of penitentiary credit for each day spent in the Hamilton County Jail.
    However, the above-quoted statute was not enacted to create a greater benefit for
    those who face multiple trials than for those who are only subject to a single trial. As
    the Court of Criminal Appeals has stated:
    The purpose of the statute was to provide jail time credit prior
    and subsequently to conviction for indigents unable to make
    bond. The legislature in its wisdom recognized an injustice
    between the person of means who could make bond and the
    person who could not and had to languish in jail.” State v.
    Abernathy, 
    649 S.W.2d 285
    , 286 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1983).
    We therefore find that Mr. Johnson received all the benefit the statute
    entitled him to when his penitentiary time was reduced day for day by his time in jail.
    If the judgment in the second trial could be interpreted to allow Mr.
    Johnson to apply the same jail time twice to reduce two consecutive sentences (and
    -3-
    we are not convinced that it does), then Judge Meyers is entitled to correct the
    judgment for illegality, even though it has become final, because it has contravened
    the terms of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-101(b). See State v. Burkhart, 
    566 S.W.2d 871
    (Tenn. 1978).
    II.
    The appellant also argues that he did not receive sentence reduction
    credits that he was entitled to for the time he spent in jail after his conviction, prior to
    his transfer to State custody. While Mr. Johnson notes that the chancellor incorrectly
    stated that he was seeking sentence reduction credits for “pretrial jail time,” when he
    was actually seeking such credits for post-conviction jail time, this error does not affect
    the correctness of the chancery court’s determination that he was not entitled to the
    relief he sought.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236 enables inmates committed to the
    custody of the Department of Correction to receive sentence reduction credits for
    good institutional behavior. An amendment to that statute added a section that
    extended the same sentence reduction privileges for the time that a convicted felon
    was incarcerated prior to sentencing (Acts 1989, Ch. 42, § 2).
    However that section was enacted after Mr. Johnson was transferred to
    the penitentiary, and the amended section contains no suggestion that sentence
    reduction credits for pre-sentencing jail time was to be awarded retroactively. As our
    Supreme Court has said, “A law will not be given a retrospective operation, unless that
    intention has been manifested by the most clear and unequivocal expression.”
    Henderson v. Ford, 
    488 S.W.2d 720
    , 721 (Tenn. 1972), quoting Jennings v. Jennings,
    
    165 Tenn. 295
    , 
    54 S.W.2d 961
     (1932).
    -4-
    III.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Remand this cause to the
    Chancery Court of Davidson County for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellant.
    _________________________________
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ________________________________
    HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE
    MIDDLE SECTION
    ________________________________
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-A-01-9602-CH-00064

Judges: Judge Ben H. Cantrell

Filed Date: 8/7/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/31/2014