Linda Janiece Wright-Miller v. Harvey Granville Miller - Concurring/Dissenting ( 1998 )


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  •                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    ______________________________________________              FILED
    LINDA JANIECE WRIGHT-MILLER,
    August 5, 1998
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appe llate Court C lerk
    Vs.                                                    Dyer Circuit No. 96-234
    C.A. No. 02A01-9708-CV-00196
    HARVEY GRANVILLE MILLER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    CONCURRENCE IN PART, DISSENT IN PART
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the judgment of the trial
    court. However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which reverses the trial
    court’s decision concerning the division of the increase in value of the Heartland stock.
    The trial court accredited the testimony of Husband’s CPA that without the consolidation
    of Miller’s assets with those of Heartland there was a small loss in Heartland’s book value. The
    proof showed that the Heartland increase in book value resulted from the consolidation of
    Miller’s assets with those of Heartland. While, as the majority opinion states, the parties agree
    that Wife contributed during the marriage to the increase in the value of the Heartland stock, I
    construe this to mean normal increases in value to which Wife could have been said to have lent
    her assistance in preserving and appreciating the stock. It does not appear that the parties
    contemplated the agreement to apply to an unexpected or fortuitous event, with which the Wife
    had nothing to do and did not in any manner participate. In Harrison v. Harrison, 
    912 S.W.2d 124
     (Tenn. 1995), our Supreme Court stated on this point:
    The statute does not permit the conclusion that any increase in
    value during marriage constitutes marital property. The increase
    in value constitutes marital property only when the spouse has
    substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.
    Id. at 127 (emphasis in original).
    I do not believe that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that any
    increase in value was not marital property and, therefore, would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    _________________________________
    W. FRANK CRAWFORD,
    PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A01-9708-CV-00196

Judges: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford

Filed Date: 8/5/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/31/2014