mid-south-bank-trust-co-vr-williams-co-and-franklin-county-bank ( 1995 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT NASHVILLE
MID-SOUTH BANK & TRUST CO., )
V.R. WILLIAMS & CO., and )
FRANKLIN COUNTY BANK, )
)
Plaintiffs/Appellees, ) Franklin Chancery No. 11,666
)
VS. ) Appeal No. 01A01-9403-CH-00107
)
PAUL MAX QUANDT ESTATE,
NELLE S. QUANDT, JESSICA
QUANDT, PAUL QUANDT, JR., and
)
)
)
FILED
PAUL MAX QUANDT, III, )
October 20,
) 1995
Defendants/Appellants. )
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
AT WINCHESTER, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE THOMAS A. GREER, JR., JUDGE
PAUL MAX QUANDT, JR., PRO SE
Wnchester, Tennessee
JAMES C. THOMAS
Winchester, Tennessee
Attorney for Appellant, Jessica Quandt
CLINTON H. SWAFFORD
SWAFFORD, PETERS & PRIEST
Winchester, Tennessee
Attorney for Appellees Mid-South Bank &
Trust Co. and V.R. Williams & Co.
J. MARK STEWART
Winchester, Tennessee
Attorney for Appellee Franklin County Bank
REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART
& REMANDED
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
CONCUR:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD, JUDGE
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
This appeal represents a consolidation of three actions. The first case, styled V.R.
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Will. & Company v. Paul M. Quandt and Nelle Quandt, is an appeal to Circuit Court
from a judgment in the General Sessions Court of Franklin County finding Paul Quandt
indebted to V.R. Williams & Co. in the amount of $3664.69 for past due insurance
premiums. The second case, styled In Re: Estate of Paul Max Quandt, Deceased, is a
probate proceeding filed in the Chancery Court of Franklin County to administer the estate
of Paul Max Quandt. The only issues in the probate proceeding heard on consolidation
concern creditors' claims filed against Paul Quandt's estate and the exceptions filed
thereto. The third case, styled Mid-South Bank & Company, V.R. Williams & Company and
Franklin County Bank v. Paul Max Quandt Estate, Nelle S. Quandt, Jessica Quandt, Paul
Quandt, Jr. and Paul Max Quandt, III., is a Chancery Court action to set aside fraudulent
conveyances of property owned by Paul M. Quandt.
The pertinent facts relevant to all three cases are as follows: Paul M. Quandt died
without a will on September 3, 1986. At the time of his death, Paul Quandt's estate
consisted of six promissory notes with a face value of $135,650 and a checking account
with a balance of $427.75. On April 28, 1987, Nelle Quandt, wife of Paul Quandt, and
Phillis Quandt Gallagher, daughter of Paul Quandt, filed a petition for letters of
administration in the Chancery Court of Franklin County seeking to be appointed
administratrixes of Paul Quandt's estate. By order dated June 19, 1987, Nelle Quandt and
Phillis Gallagher were appointed co-administratrixes of the estate.
Thereafter, the creditors of Paul Quandt filed the following claims with the estate
pursuant to T.C.A. § 30-2-307:
1) Mid-South Bank & Trust (MSBT) filed a claim for payment of a matured note in
the amount of $80,853.46 executed by Paul Quandt and Nelle Quandt on January
24, 1986.
2) MSBT filed a claim for payment of a matured note in the amount of $11,500
executed by Paul Quandt and Nelle Quandt on April 8, 1986.
3) V.R. Williams & Company (V.R. Williams) filed a claim for payment of $4,911.38
in earned premiums and accrued interest on insurance policies providing property
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and casualty insurance to Paul Quandt. At the time of Paul Quandt's death, an
appeal was pending in Circuit Court from a judgment in the General Sessions Court
finding Paul Quandt liable to V.R. Williams in the amount of $3664.69.
4) Franklin County Bank (FCB) filed a claim for payment of a note in the amount of
$23,000 executed by Paul Quandt and Nelle Quandt on March 21, 1984.
The Administratrixes of the estate filed exceptions to the claims of MSBT and the claim
of V.R. Williams.
On November 3, 1987, MSBT and V.R. Williams filed suit in Chancery Court against
the estate of Paul Quandt, Nelle Quandt, Paul Quandt, Jr., Paul Quandt, III and Jessica
Quandt alleging that certain conveyances by Paul Quandt were fraudulent within the
meaning of T.C.A. § 66-3-101 et. seq.. The plaintiffs requested that the conveyances be
set aside and declared null and void and that all real estate owned by the estate of Paul
Quandt be sold for the satisfaction of debts. FCB intervened in the fraudulent conveyance
action on August 25, 1989. On March 5, 1991, Circuit Court Judge Thomas Greer, sitting
by interchange in the Chancery Court, consolidated all three cases to resolve the
exceptions to the claims in the administration of Paul Quandt's estate, the appeal of the
judgment in favor of V.R. Williams, and the claim to set aside the alleged fraudulent
conveyances.
The proof adduced at trial concerning the creditors' claims is as follows: Paul
Quandt and Nelle Quandt executed two promissory notes to MSBT in the amount of
$80,853.46 and $11,500 respectively. The first note, signed on January 24, 1986, had
an 11.25 percent annual interest rate and was due on May 24, 1986. Interest accrued
daily at a rate of $24.92. The second note, signed on April 8, 1986, had an 11 percent
annual interest rate and was due August 6, 1986. The daily accrual was calculated to be
$3.46. Both notes were renewals of pre-existing loans and were unsecured. At the time
of Paul Quandt's death, both notes were due and unpaid. Both notes provided for
attorney's fees for costs of collection.
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On March 21, 1984, Paul Quandt and Nelle Quandt executed a promissory note in
favor of FCB in the principal amount of $30,000, with interest at a rate of 13.5 percent and
a maturity date of April 1, 1989. At the time of the filing of FCB's claim, the outstanding
balance on the note was $23,000 with accrued interest in the amount of $2,037.86.
Interest accrued on the note at the rate of $6.93 per day. The note provided for attorney's
fees for costs of collection.
James Cunningham, an insurance agent and partner in V.R. Williams, testified that
through the years his company had procured property and casualty insurance for Paul
Quandt. In 1985 and 1986, Cunningham testified that the premiums charged by the
company were unpaid. According to Cunningham, V.R. Williams paid the insurer who
would provide coverage to Quandt and then would collect the premiums from Quandt at
a later date. After Quandt repeatedly failed to pay the premiums, V.R. Williams filed suit
in General Sessions Court and received a judgment in the amount of $3,664.69. At the
time of Paul Quandt's death there had been no payment in satisfaction of the judgment.
With regard to the fraudulent conveyances, the proof showed that on June 26, 1986,
three months prior to his death, Paul Quandt conveyed all of his land, cattle and farm
equipment to his son and grandchildren in exchange for six promissory notes. The
breakdown of the conveyances is as follows: Paul Quandt, Jr. received two tracts of land
each consisting of approximately 90 acres in exchange for a promissory note and a deed
of trust in the amount of $65,400. He also received all of Paul Quandt's farm machinery
in exchange for a promissory note in the amount of $8,200. Paul Quandt, III received a
one-half interest in a tract of land consisting of 141 acres in exchange for a promissory
note and a deed of trust in the amount of $27,800. Jessica Quandt received a one-half
interest in two tracts of land consisting of 95 acres and 40.21 acres in exchange for a
promissory note and a deed of trust in the amount of $20,250. Both Paul Quandt, III and
Jessica Quandt received all of Paul Quandt's cattle in exchange for a promissory note from
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each in the amount of $7,000.1 The six promissory notes, with a total face value of
$135,650, were payable over a twelve year period with a stated interest rate of seven
percent. As stipulated by the parties, these six notes plus a checking account with a
balance of $427.75 represented the total value of Paul Quandt's estate at the time of his
death. A financial statement, signed by Paul Quandt and filed with MSBT on December
23, 1985, showed Paul Quandt's net worth, six months before the conveyances, to be
$1,247,559.09.
Thomas Hampton, a real estate appraiser, testified that he appraised the four tracts
of property conveyed by Paul Quandt using the direct sales comparison approach to value
the property. According to Hampton, as of June 26, 1986, the total appraised value of the
property conveyed by Paul Quandt to his son and grandchildren was $383,850.
Davis Mason, a former vice-president in charge of loans at MSBT and a banker for
20 years, testified as to the fair market value of the six promissory notes given to Paul
Quandt by his son and grandchildren. Mason testified that he evaluated the notes
according to their stated interest rate and payment schedule. Based on this evaluation,
Mason testified, that in his opinion, the fair present market value of the notes was
$110,000. According to Mason, the notes were not worth their face value because of the
difference between the stated interest rate on the notes and the current market interest
rate at the time of the conveyances.
Paul Quandt, Jr. testified that part of the consideration for the transfer of the land
was past services rendered by him and his children in running Paul Quandt's farm. Paul
Quandt, Jr. testified that he worked on his father's farm from the time he was five years old
and was never compensated. According to Paul Quandt, Jr., he and his father had an
understanding that all of the land they farmed together would be his when his father died.
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Paul Quandt, Jr. signed as surety on the notes executed by Paul Quandt, III and
Jessica Quandt as they were both minors at the time of the conveyances. A guardian ad
litem has represented the interests of Jessica Quandt at trial and on appeal. Paul Quandt,
III has reached the age of majority.
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Both grandchildren also testified that they worked on the farm. All three transferees,
however, signed an oath on the warranty deed affirming that the face value of the notes
equalled the fair market value of the property.
Following testimony regarding the fraudulent conveyances, the trial judge submitted
five questions to the jury. The questions and the jury's answers are as follows:
1) What was the fair cash market value of the three [sic] [four] tracts of land
conveyed by Paul Quandt, Sr. on June 26, 1986?
Answer: $280,000
2) On June 26, 1986, before the sale of the land, cattle, and equipment, what was
the net worth of Paul Quandt, Sr.?
Answer: 1.2 million
3) What was the fair cash market value of the six notes payable to Paul Quandt, Sr.,
dated June 26, 1986?
Answer: $110,000
4) Did the transactions described herein on June 26, 1986, hinder and delay the
creditors in the collection of their debts as they matured?
Answer: Yes
5) Did Paul Quandt, Sr., intend to defraud his creditors by the conveyance of land,
cattle, and farm equipment on June 26, 1986?
Answer: No
A final decree was issued by the trial court on December 2, 1993. The trial court,
taking into consideration the issues determined by the jury, found as follows:
1. Based on claims filed for principal and interest calculated
through March 5, 1991, the Estate of Paul Max Quandt, Sr.,
and Nelle S. Quandt were indebted to Mid South [sic] Bank &
Trust Company in the amount of $124,401.50 and an
additional sum of $17,000.07 plus reasonable attorneys' fees.
2. Based on the claim filed for principal and interest calculated
through March 5, 1991, the Estate of Paul Max Quandt, Sr.,
and Nelle S. Quandt were indebted to Franklin County Bank in
the amount of $35,667.84 plus reasonable attorneys' fees.
3. Based on the claim filed, the Estate of Paul Max Quandt,
Sr., and Nelle S. Quandt were indebted to V.R. Williams &
Company in the amount of $2,876.00 plus interest at ten
percent per annum since March 3, 1986.
4. The notes to both banks provide for reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs of collection, and the same are allowed in the
amounts hereinafter provided.
5. The jury, by its verdict, found that on June 26, 1986, before
the sale of the land, cattle and equipment, the net worth of
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Paul Max Quandt, Sr., was $1,200,000.00. The jury further
found that the fair cash market value of the six notes made
payable to Paul Max Quandt, Sr., dated June 26, 1986, in
consideration for the transfer of all his assets amounted to
$110,000. Consistent with the above findings, the jury then
found that the transactions of June 26, 1986, did hinder and
delay the creditors in the collection of their debts as they
matured.
6. The court then found that the parties had stipulated at the
beginning of the trial that the total value of the assets of Paul
Max Quandt, Sr., consisted of six notes valued at $110,000
representing the total purchase price for three farms,
machinery and cattle plus $427.75 in a checking account.
These six notes, plus the amount of $427.75 in a checking
account, represented the total value of his estate at the time of
his death.
7. The voluntary conveyance of the farms, cattle and
equipment valued at $1,200,000.00 for six notes valued at
$110,000 was a conveyance without a fair consideration.
8. After the aforesaid transaction, Paul Max Quandt, Sr., was
insolvent because the present salable value of his assets was
then less than the amount required to pay his existing debts as
they matured.
9. The conveyances by Paul Max Quandt, Sr., on June 26,
1986, rendered him insolvent, and such conveyances were
fraudulent as to the creditors named herein without regard to
his actual intent since said conveyances were made without a
fair consideration.
After setting forth the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court declared the
conveyances null and void and ordered all of the real and personal property returned to the
estate of Paul Quandt. The court then ordered the property sold at public auction with the
proceeds of the sale going to satisfy the costs of the action and the debts of the estate.
Nelle Quandt, Paul Quandt, Jr., and Paul Quandt, III, without the assistance of
counsel, and Jessica Quandt, with the assistance of the guardian ad litem, have appealed.
For purposes of clarity, the three cases consolidated at trial will be discussed separately.
I. In Re: Estate of Paul Max Quandt, Deceased
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Appellants have raised numerous issues on appeal concerning the trial court's order
allowing the claims against the estate of Paul Quandt. We are unable to review the trial
court's decision, however, as the Chancery Court did not have jurisdiction over the probate
of Quandt's estate. Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised in any court at any time.
Inasmuch as a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity, it is the duty of any court
to determine the question of its jurisdiction on its own motion if the issue is not raised by
the parties. Scales v. Winston, 760 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. App. 1988).
T.C.A. § 16-16-20(a) provides:
In all counties where not otherwise specifically provided by
public, private, special or local acts, all jurisdiction relating to
the probate of wills and the administration of estates of every
nature...is hereby vested in the chancery court of the
respective counties. (emphasis added)
Chapter 302 of the Private Acts of 1982 states:
Effective September 1, 1982, the Probate Court of Franklin
County, Tennessee, including all judicial jurisdiction now
exercised by the Franklin County judge, including, but not
limited to, wills; administration of decedents' estates, including
the sale of decedents' land for the payment of debts;
qualification of guardians; partition of land cases, both by sale
and in kind; the affairs of minors, incompetents, and others
laboring under a disability, shall not be separate from the
current jurisdiction of the General Sessions Court of Franklin
County, nor shall there be separate terms for Probate Court;
it being the intent of this section to merge the Probate Court
and General Sessions Court of Franklin County into one (1)
court having jurisdiction over such matters.
In the present case, Nelle Quandt and Phillis Gallagher filed a petition for letters of
administration in the Chancery Court of Franklin County. The estate of Paul Quandt was
thereafter administered by the Chancery Court. As set out by Private Act above,
jurisdiction over probate actions in Franklin County is vested with the General Sessions
Court. Paul Max Quandt died as a resident and property owner in Franklin County.
Therefore, pursuant to chapter 302 of the 1982 Private Acts, the Chancery Court did not
have jurisdiction to administer the estate. Jurisdiction over the administration of the estate
is vested in the General Sessions Court of Franklin County.
While the chancery court has special and limited jurisdiction in counties where
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another court exercises probate jurisdiction by public or private act,2 no special
circumstances were alleged in the petition nor do we find any present in the case.
Therefore, the judgment of the chancery court in In Re: Estate of Paul Max Quandt,
Deceased, which allowed the creditors' claims against the estate of Paul Quandt, is
reversed and dismissed.
II. V.R. Williams & Company v. Paul M. Quandt and Nelle Quandt
Appellants raise two issues on appeal concerning the claim of V.R. Williams. First,
the appellant, Jessica Quandt, argues that the court erred in allowing V.R. Williams to
charge time differential interest on the outstanding balance owed by Paul Quandt.
According to appellant, the proper amount of the claim is $2,876, the principal amount due
on the policy. This issue is without merit. The final order in this cause provided that the
estate of Paul Quandt was indebted to V.R. Williams in the amount of $2,876 plus post
judgment interest. Time differential charges were not allowed. Second, appellants argue
that the claim of V.R. Williams should have been dismissed because V.R. Williams did not
take part in the trial. This issue is likewise without merit. V.R. Williams presented proof
and was represented at trial.
III. Mid-South Bank & Trust, et. al. v. Paul Max Quandt Estate, et. al.
Appellants raise numerous issues on appeal with regard to the trial court's ruling
finding the conveyances by Paul Quandt fraudulent. We will address each issue as we
perceive them to be stated.
A. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in using the decision of the jury as
2
The special and limited jurisdiction has been held to extend to three cases: 1)
where six months have elapsed from the time of the intestate's death and no person will
apply or can be procured to administer on his estate; 2) where a suit involving the estate
of the decedent is pending in the chancery court, the court can appoint an administrator
ad litem if one has not previously been appointed; and 3) where an executor or
administrator desires to resign or relinquish his trust. Pritchard on Wills and Administration
of Estates § 48 (5th ed. 1994).
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advisory only. This argument is without merit. Under T.C.A. § 21-1-103, a party to a suit
in chancery is entitled to have any material fact decided by a jury. Under this statute, it is
for the jury to determine the facts and the judge to apply the appropriate principles of law
to those facts. The findings of fact by the jury are binding upon the judge. Smith County
Educ. Ass'n. v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328, 337-38 (Tenn. 1984). In the present case, the
trial judge submitted five questions to the jury concerning the value of the property
conveyed, the value of the notes and the intent of the Paul Quandt in making the transfers.
The trial court accepted the jury's findings and applied the applicable law to those findings.
As such, the verdict was not advisory and there was no error.
B. Appellant, Jessica Quandt, next contends that the court erred in holding that
knowledge of fraudulent intent on the part of the grantee is not necessary to set aside a
conveyance as fraudulent. We disagree. Under Tennessee law, a conveyance can be set
aside as fraudulent if (1) the conveyance was made with actual intent to delay, hinder or
defraud creditors; or (2) the conveyance was without a fair consideration and was made
by a person who was insolvent or was thereby rendered insolvent. T.C.A. §§ 66-3-101and
66-3-305. When a conveyance is made without a fair consideration by an insolvent
debtor, the conveyance is fraudulent as a matter of law without regard to either the
grantor's or grantee's intent. Fifth Third Bank v. McCloud, 628 N.E.2d 131, 133 (Ohio App.
1993); Schmitt v. Morgan, 471 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1983); Waukesha County
Dept. of Social Services v. Loper, 193 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Wis. 1972). In the present case,
the trial court found the conveyance by Paul Quandt fraudulent as a matter of law under
T.C.A. § 66-3-305. Therefore, intent of the grantee is irrelevant.
C. Appellants also take issue with the trial court's failure to submit to the jury the
question of whether the conveyances were made without fair consideration. As stated
earlier, the jury found that Paul Quandt's estate was worth $1.2 million before the sale of
land, cattle and equipment to his son and grandchildren; and the fair market value of the
six notes taken in exchange for the property was $110,000. Taking the jury's findings into
consideration, the trial court found, as a matter of law, that the conveyances were without
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a fair consideration. Whether a conveyance has been made for a fair consideration is
generally a question of fact to be decided by the jury. American Investment Bank v. Marine
Midland Bank, 595 N.Y.S.2d 537,538 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1993); Hove v Frazier, 115 N.W.2d
217, 219 (S.D. 1962); Sills v. Morgan, 9 S.E.2d 518 (N.C. 1940). Fair consideration is
defined in T.C.A. § 66-3-304 as follows: "Fair consideration is given for property, or
obligation: (1) [w]hen in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent
therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied...."
In the present case, we find the failure of the trial court to submit the question of fair
consideration to the jury to be harmless error. T.R.A.P. 36(b) provides that a final
judgment shall not be set aside unless the error more probably than not affected the
judgment. Here, it cannot be disputed that six notes worth $110,000 are not a fair
equivalent for property, cattle, and equipment valued at $1.2 million. Therefore, we find
that the outcome of the case would not have been affected by submitting to the jury the
question of fair consideration.
Appellants argue that the financial statement used by the jury to determine Paul
Quandt's net worth included property not conveyed by Quandt and therefore should not
have been used as a basis for determining fair consideration of the conveyance. However,
looking solely to the land conveyed by Quandt which the jury determined to be worth
$280,000 and which was conveyed in exchange for three notes with the face value of
$113,450, we still find that reasonable minds could only have concluded that the
conveyances were made without a fair consideration.
Appellants also argue that past services rendered to Quandt by Paul Quandt, Jr.
and his children should have been considered a part of the consideration for the
conveyances. In support of this theory, appellants cite Gardenhire v. White, 59 S.W.
661(Tenn. Ch. App. 1900), which held that valuable services rendered by a son to his
father in return for an express agreement to be paid by the conveyance of land can be fair
consideration for the conveyance. While acknowledging that satisfaction of an antecedent
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debt can be consideration for a transfer of property, we hold that appellants are estopped
from asserting that the consideration given for the transfers was any more than the actual
face value of the notes. T.C.A. §67-4-409(a)(6)(A) requires a grantee to state under oath
the actual consideration given for the transfer, or the value of the property, whichever is
greater. False statements made respecting the consideration or value of the property
transferred is punishable as perjury. T.C.A. § 67-4-409(a)(6)(B). Here, Paul Quandt, Jr.,
Paul Quandt, III and Jessica Quandt each signed an oath on their respective warranty
deeds affirming that the face value of the notes given for the transfers equalled the fair
market value of the property. If the past services of the three transferees were intended
to be part of the consideration for the transfers, then the oaths should have reflected that
the value of the property was greater than the actual consideration given. Appellants are
bound by their oaths stating that the actual consideration given equalled the fair market
value of the property.
D. Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in refusing to allow a local
realtor testify as to the value of the land conveyed by using the comparable sale of another
parcel of property. In support of this contention, appellants cite the general rule, found in
the law of eminent domain, that proof of sales of similar property made at about the same
time of the taking is admissible on the issue of the value of the property taken. Union Ry.
Co. v. Hunton, 88 S.W. 182, 186 (Tenn. 1905); Memphis Housing Auth. v. Newton, 484
S.W.2d 896, 897 (Tenn. App. 1972). Even assuming that this rule applies outside of
eminent domain cases, we find that the appellants have waived their right to appeal this
issue.
At trial, after ruling that appellants' witness could not testify as to comparable sales
of property to prove value, the trial judge recessed for the day and instructed Jessica
Quandt's lawyer to "cite me authority that specific proof of comparable property introduced
independently is admissible before a jury to attempt to prove the value of the property."
The next day, the appellants did not call the realtor as a witness, did not provide the court
with any law on the admissibility of the evidence, and did not make an offer of proof as to
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the value of the comparable sales. As such, they waived their right challenge the trial
court's initial ruling.
E. Appellant, Jessica Quandt, also takes issue with the trial court's refusal to allow
Robert Baldwin, a former loan officer at MSBT, to testify that he never thought Paul Quandt
was trying to defraud him. We find it unnecessary to discuss the merits of this issue, as
any error made is harmless. As discussed above, the conveyances by Paul Quandt were
declared fraudulent pursuant to T.C.A. § 66-3-305 which provides that a conveyance can
be fraudulent regardless of the intent of the grantor. Therefore, the intent of Paul Quandt
is irrelevant to the ultimate outcome of the case.
F. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial when there
were three counts of jury tampering. This issue is without merit. Upon learning of
communications between a party and a witness with the jury, the trial judge questioned the
jurors and witnesses at length concerning the communication. Upon a review of the
questions and responses, we find that no jury tampering occurred.
G. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in not bringing forth a timely decision.
This issue is without merit. The numerous motions filed by appellants, following the four
day trial in 1991, are the primary cause of the trial court's delay in rendering its final
judgment.
H. As their final argument with respect to the fraudulent conveyance action,
appellants contend that the trial court erred in setting aside the conveyances of cattle and
equipment because the complaint only addresses the conveyances of land. While it is true
that the plaintiffs' specific prayer for relief only calls for the conveyances of real estate to
be set aside, we find that the general prayer found in the complaint is sufficient to
encompass the relief granted with respect to the personal property. Under the general
prayer, a plaintiff may be granted such other relief as the pleadings and proof will justify,
as long as it is not such as to take the defendant by surprise. Gibson's Suits in Chancery
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§ 220 (7th ed. 1988). In the present case, the proof showed that Paul Quandt conveyed
cattle and equipment to his son and grandchildren and that these conveyances were
fraudulent within the meaning of T.C.A. § 66-3-305. Therefore, we find no error in the trial
court's decision to set aside the conveyances of the personal property as well as the real
estate.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand. The
probate aspects of the judgment of the court below are vacated. Costs on appeal are
taxed equally to the parties.
HIGHERS, J.
CONCUR:
CRAWFORD, J.
FARMER, J.
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