town-of-huntsville-tennessee-a-municipal-corporation-of-the-state-of ( 1999 )

FILED
October 4, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
E1999-01571-COA-R3-CV
TOWN OF HUNTSVILLE, TENNESSEE, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9901-CH-00024
a Municipal Corporation of the )
State of Tennessee and )
STANLODGE, LLC, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
v. )
)
)
WILLIAM I. DUNCAN, RICHARD SMITH,)
LUKE COFFEY, JAMES R. POTTER, )
all in their official capacity )
as members of the Scott County ) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
Election Commission; ) SCOTT COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
WILMA JEFFERS, HOWARD JEFFERS, )
FRED K. PHILLIPS, ALMA KOGER and )
GERALD FOSTER, all individually; )
THE TOWN OF HELENWOOD; and )
PAUL G. SUMMERS in his official )
capacity as Attorney General of )
the State of Tennessee, pursuant )
to Tennessee Code Annotated )
§ 29-14-107, )
) HONORABLE BILLY JOE WHITE,
Defendants-Appellees. ) CHANCELLOR
For Appellants For Appellees Wilma Jeffers,
et al., Individually, and
ANDREW R. TILLMAN Town of Helenwood
Paine, Tarwater, Bickers
& Tillman DAVID E. RODGERS
Knoxville, Tennessee Kramer, Rayson, Leake,
Rodgers & Morgan
Oak Ridge, Tennessee
For Appellees Scott County
Election Commission and
Attorney General & Reporter
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PAUL G. SUMMERS
Attorney General and Reporter
Nashville, Tennessee
MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General
Nashville, Tennessee
STEVEN A. HART
Special Counsel
Nashville, Tennessee
ANN LOUISE VIX
Senior Counsel
Nashville, Tennessee
OPINION
REVERSED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
This litigation originated when the Town of
Huntsville (“Huntsville”) and Stanlodge, LLC (“Stanlodge”),
filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 1101
of the Public Acts of 1998. The plaintiffs specifically
contest Section 9(f)(3) 1 of Chapter 1101, which permits
certain territories to hold incorporation elections even
though these territories do not satisfy the minimum
requirements for such elections as set forth in the general
law. See T.C.A. § 6-1-201 (1998). On cross motions for
summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to
the defendants, finding that Section 9(f)(3) is
constitutional. Huntsville and Stanlodge appeal, raising five
issues:
1. Does Section 9(f)(3) violate Article
XI, Section 9 of the Tennessee
Constitution by granting Helenwood and
four other communities a special right to
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incorporate?
2. Does Section 9(f)(3) violate Article
XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee
Constitution by (a) creating a class of
territories that can incorporate despite
the general population and distance
requirements applicable to municipalities
statewide, (b) without any rational basis
for the classification?
3. Does Section 9(f)(3) violate the
separation of powers doctrine by
attempting to nullify Tennessee Municipal
League v. Thompson through a clause giving
retroactive effect to a second
incorporation election?
4. Does the subject of incorporation of
tiny towns go beyond the restrictive
caption of Chapter 1101?
5. Did the trial court err in holding as
a matter of law that the legislature is
not constrained by the Public Meetings Act?
I.
In 1997, the General Assembly passed Chapter 98 of
the Public Acts of that year, which Chapter amended the
provisions of T.C.A. § 6-1-201, et seq. Specifically, Section
7 of Chapter 98 lowered the minimum population requirement for
incorporation from 1,500 residents to 225 residents. Section
8 of Chapter 98 deleted § 6-1-201(b)(1), a statute prohibiting
the incorporation of a territory within three miles of any
existing municipality or within five miles of an existing
municipality with a population of 100,000 or more. Pursuant
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to the then newly-enacted Chapter 98, the community of
Helenwood, an area of less than 1,500 residents that adjoins
the incorporated municipality of Huntsville, held an
incorporation election. On November 20, 1997, a majority of
those exercising their franchise voted to incorporate the Town
of Helenwood. The Scott County Election Commission later
certified the election. The city limits of the new town
encompassed a portion of two areas adjoining the old city
limits of Huntsville. In fact, those two areas, which
included the site of a Holiday Inn Hotel owned by the
plaintiff Stanlodge, had been the subject of an annexation
ordinance enacted by Huntsville two months prior to the
Helenwood incorporation election.
In December, 1997, the Supreme Court, in the case of
Tennessee Municipal League v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn.
1997), declared that Chapter 98 was unconstitutional, in that
it violated Article II, § 17, the so-called caption provision
of the Tennessee Constitution. The effect of the ruling was
to reinstate the provisions of T.C.A. § 6-1-201 as they
existed prior to the enactment of Chapter 98. Subsequently,
in May, 1998, the General Assembly passed Chapter 1101 of the
Public Acts of 1998, an act amending various statutes relating
to the growth of municipalities. Section 9(f)(3) of Chapter
1101 provides as follows:
(A) Notwithstanding any other provision
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of law to the contrary, if any territory
with not less than two hundred twenty-five
(225) residents acted pursuant to Chapter
98 of the Public Acts of 1997 or Chapter
666 of the Public Acts of 1996 from
January 1, 1996, through November 25,
1997, and held an incorporation election,
and a majority of the persons voting
supported the incorporation, and results
of such election were certified, then such
territory upon filing a petition as
provided in § 6-1-202, may conduct another
incorporation election.
(B) If such territory votes to
incorporate, the new municipality shall
have priority over any prior or pending
annexation ordinance of an existing
municipality which encroaches upon any
territory of the new municipality. Such
new municipality shall comply with the
requirements of Section 13(c) of this act.
Pursuant to section 9(f)(3), the community of
Helenwood held a second incorporation election. On August 6,
1998, a majority of Helenwood residents voted again in favor
of incorporation. The Scott County Election Commission later
certified the results of that election. Subsequently,
Huntsville and Stanlodge brought suit against the Town of
Helenwood (“Helenwood”), members of the Scott County Election
Commission, the individuals who signed the petition to
incorporate Helenwood, and the State Attorney General seeking
to invalidate the incorporation, a portion of which purports
to take in areas that Huntsville claims were previously
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annexed into its boundaries. The trial court found in favor
of the defendants, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint by
way of summary judgment. This appeal followed.
II.
We review the propriety of the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment under the standard set forth in Rule
56.04, Tenn.R.Civ.P., which provides that summary judgment is
appropriate where
the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Id. All of the material facts necessary to our determination
are undisputed. Since our review involves only a question of
law, no presumption of correctness attaches to the trial court’
s findings. Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 44
(Tenn.App. 1993).
III.
We begin with the presumption that Section 9(f)(3)
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of Chapter 1101 is constitutional. “There is a strong
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of acts passed
by the Legislature and its acts will not be held
unconstitutional merely for reasons of policy.” Bozeman v.
Barker, 571 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tenn. 1978)(citing Dennis v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 446 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Tenn. 1969).
The plaintiffs allege that section 9(f)(3) suspends
a general law in violation of Article XI, Section 8 of the
Tennessee Constitution. Specifically, as pertinent here, the
plaintiffs charge that section 9(f)(3) contravenes T.C.A. §§
6-1-201(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), which provide that territories
seeking to incorporate must have at least 1,500 residents and
be at least three miles from an existing municipality. 2 The
defendants contend that section 9(f)(3) does not contravene a
general law and, in any event, is supported by a rational
basis.
Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution
provides as follows:
The legislature shall have no power to
suspend any general law for the benefit of
any particular individual, nor to pass any
law for the benefit of individuals
inconsistent with the general laws of the
land; nor to pass any law granting to any
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individual or individuals, rights,
privileges, immunitie [immunities], or
exemptions other than such as may be, by
the same law extended to any member of the
community, who may be able to bring
himself within the provisions of such law.
No corporation shall be created or its
powers increased or diminished by special
laws but the General Assembly shall
provide by general laws for the
organization of all corporations,
hereafter created, which laws may, at any
time, be altered or repealed and no such
alteration or repeal shall interfere with
or divest rights which have become vested.
Tennessee courts have long recognized the similarity between
Article XI, Section 8, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Federal Constitution, and have therefore applied an equal
protection analysis to constitutional challenges brought
pursuant to Article XI, Section 8. Motlow v. State, 145 S.W.
177, 180 (Tenn. 1912); King-Bradwall Partnership v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tenn.App. 1993)(“the
Supreme Court of Tennessee ‘has adopted a virtually identical
equal protection standard or analysis under Article XI,
Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution.’”). The plaintiffs
do not argue, nor could they, that infringement of a
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fundamental right is involved here, or that the legislature
has created a classification involving a “suspect” or “
protected” class, such as race or national origin. Therefore,
the standard to be applied is the familiar “rational basis”
standard. State v. Tester, 879 S.W.2d 823, 828 (Tenn. 1994);
City of Memphis v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Union
Local 1288, 545 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tenn. 1976); King-Bradwall,
865 S.W.2d at 21.
IV.
Article XI, Section 8 is implicated in this case
because section 9(f)(3) contravenes the general law pertaining
to the incorporation of municipalities. See Riggs v. Burson,
941 S.W.2d 44, 53 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 444
(1997)(“Article XI, section 8 is implicated when a statute ‘
contravene[s] some general law which has mandatory statewide
application.’”)(quoting Civil Serv. Merit Bd. v. Burson, 816
S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1991)). Section 9(f)(3)(A) enables
certain territories to hold elections even though they do not
have at least 1,500 residents and are within three miles of an
existing municipality. Furthermore, Section 9(f)(3)(B) gives
these territories retroactive priority over any prior or
pending annexation ordinances of adjoining municipalities, a
priority not afforded to other territories seeking
incorporation. Thus, Section 9(f)(3) creates a special
classification of territories that may hold incorporation
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elections while other territories of similar size and location
cannot do so under the applicable general law.
Having determined that Section 9(f)(3) creates a
classification in contravention of a general law, we now must
determine if there is a rational basis for this
classification. A statute does not violate Article XI,
Section 8 unless the statute creates a classification which is
capricious, unreasonable, or arbitrary. Civil Serv. Merit Bd.,
816 S.W.2d at 730. To withstand scrutiny under the rational
basis standard, a classification must “have some basis which
bears a natural and reasonable relation to the object sought
to be accomplished, and there must be some good and valid
reason why the particular individual or class upon whom the
benefit is conferred, or who are subject to the burden
imposed, not given to or imposed upon others, should be so
preferred or discriminated against.” State v. Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co., 135 S.W. 773, 775 (Tenn.
1911); see also Knoxville’s Community Dev. Corp. v. Knox
County, 665 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tenn. 1984)(“Where the provisions
of an act which is either local or local in effect do
contravene such a general law, however, the provisions of
Article XI, § 8, of the state constitution come into play, and
there must be some reasonable basis for the special provision.”
). The reasonableness of a classification depends upon the
particular facts of the case. Estrin v. Moss, 430 S.W.2d 345,
349 (Tenn. 1968).
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The defendants state in their brief that Section
9(f)(3) “allows individuals in certain territories who bore
the expense and the effort of holding an incorporation
election under certain laws subsequently found to be
unconstitutional to vote again.” This obviously was the
motivation behind the enactment of Section 9(f)(3). The
language of that legislative provision applies precisely to
the circumstances of the Helenwood community. The record
suggests that the same language may apply to one or more other
small communities -- but not more than a handful –- who moved
quickly to incorporate under the invalid 1997 legislation.
When we search for the required “rational basis,” we are
unable to discern a rational difference between the community
of Helenwood on the one hand and the hundreds of other small
communities in Tennessee who are prohibited from seeking
incorporation because their communities lack 1,500 or more
citizens and/or are too close to an existing incorporated
municipality. The record does not reflect any intrinsic
difference between the community of Helenwood and these other
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small communities. For this reason, we find and hold that
Section 9(f)(3) does not pass constitutional muster. Equals
must be treated the same. Our Constitution requires it.
We simply do not find a rational basis for the
exemption embodied in section 9(f)(3). The sole basis for
distinguishing Helenwood from other similarly-sized
territories is that Helenwood took certain actions pursuant
to an invalid legislative enactment. The mere fact that
residents of Helenwood expended money and effort to
incorporate cannot justify exemption from a general law
requiring more than six times the number of residents to
qualify for an incorporation election. Nor can a void
election justify the grant of retroactive priority to
Helenwood over the annexation ordinance of Huntsville.
By enacting Chapter 98 in 1997, the Legislature
significantly lowered the population requirement and
eliminated the distance requirement for incorporation.
Shortly after the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in
Tennessee Municipal League v. Thompson, the Legislature
enacted Section 9(f)(3) of Chapter 1101, which permits
territories that had held successful incorporation elections
under Chapter 98 to hold another election. For whatever
reason, the Legislature did not see fit when drafting Chapter
1101 to amend § 6-1-201 to permit all communities with 225 or
more residents, regardless of location, to incorporate, as was
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the case under the earlier-enacted, but later-declared-invalid
Chapter 98. Instead, the Legislature created a special
classification of territories, and the only basis for
distinguishing these territories is that they had held
incorporation elections under a unconstitutional statute. We
find that by creating this exception to the general law, the
Legislature made an arbitrary classification. We can find no
rational basis to justify it.
VI.
We therefore find that section 9(f)(3) of Chapter
1101 of the Public Acts of 1998 is unconstitutional because it
offends Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution.
For this reason, we do not reach the other issues raised by
the appellants. The decision of the trial court is hereby
reversed. The plaintiffs are hereby granted summary judgment
on their motion. All costs on appeal, as well as those at the
trial level, are taxed against the appellees. This case is
remanded for such further proceedings as may be required,
consistent with this opinion.
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
CONCUR:
________________________
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
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________________________
Herschel P. Franks, J.
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