Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales ( 2005 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ROSALINA LOPEZ-UMANZOR,                     
    Petitioner,                   No. 03-72014
    v.
            Agency No.
    A75-011-140
    ALBERTO R. GONZALES,* Attorney
    General,                                              OPINION
    Respondent.
    
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted
    January 13, 2005—Seattle, Washington
    Filed May 6, 2005
    Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, and
    Alfred T. Goodwin and Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Graber
    *Alberto R. Gonzales is substituted for his predecessor, John Ashcroft,
    as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.
    43(c)(2).
    4879
    4882             LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    COUNSEL
    Mara Kimmel, Catholic Social Services, for the petitioner.
    James E. Grimes and Thomas K. Ragland, U.S. Department
    of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation,
    Washington, D.C., for the respondent.
    David R. Fine, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, Harrisburg,
    Pennsylvania, and Gail L. Pendleton, Associate Director,
    National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
    Boston, Massachusetts, for the amici curiae.
    OPINION
    GRABER, Circuit Judge:
    Petitioner Rosalina Lopez-Umanzor petitions for review of
    a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) find-
    ing her ineligible for cancellation of removal and denying her
    request for voluntary departure. An immigration judge (“IJ”)
    had found Petitioner to be ineligible for relief because there
    was “reason to believe” that she had been involved in drug
    trafficking, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C); the IJ disbelieved her
    testimony to the contrary. On appeal of the IJ’s decision, the
    BIA rejected Petitioner’s due process arguments and affirmed
    the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. We grant the peti-
    tion for review and remand for a new hearing because the IJ
    LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES                       4883
    refused to allow Petitioner to present relevant expert testi-
    mony that bore on Petitioner’s credibility, relying instead on
    his own stereotypical assumptions about domestic violence.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras who entered
    the United States without inspection in 1989. Nine years later
    the government sought her removal. Petitioner conceded
    removability, but applied for cancellation of removal under 8
    U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), a provision available to certain victims
    of domestic violence.1 The IJ denied her application because
    he found a “reason to believe” that Petitioner had been
    involved in drug trafficking and, consequently, that she lacked
    good moral character; he also concluded that her testimony
    regarding domestic violence was not credible. The BIA
    affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding and his conclu-
    sion that Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal
    and voluntary departure.
    A.    The course of proceedings before the IJ
    In advance of her removal hearing, Petitioner submitted
    evidence intended to corroborate her allegation that she had
    suffered domestic violence, including medical records from
    an emergency room visit and written statements from social
    service providers and a psychologist who had worked with
    Petitioner. The government submitted a criminal information,
    charging Petitioner with Misconduct Involving a Controlled
    Substance, and a notice that the charge had been dismissed.
    Petitioner was the sole witness at the removal hearing on
    April 1, 1999. The government presented no further evidence
    and no evidence to undermine Petitioner’s testimony regard-
    ing the abuse that she had endured.
    1
    Petitioner was not eligible under the general cancellation of removal
    provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), because she had not been present in the
    United States for ten years.
    4884              LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    After the April 1 removal hearing (and after missing the
    deadline to file a post-hearing brief), the government submit-
    ted a written statement from a detective regarding the circum-
    stances surrounding the dismissed criminal charge. The
    government initially sought, and was granted, a second hear-
    ing to present the detective’s live testimony. Later, however,
    the government twice tried to withdraw its request for a sec-
    ond hearing. The IJ denied the withdrawal motions and sub-
    poenaed the detective. After Petitioner’s interlocutory appeal
    to the BIA was denied, the second hearing went forward, with
    the IJ conducting the direct examination of the detective. Peti-
    tioner did not testify at the second hearing, but made an offer
    of proof and presented one character witness.
    B.     Testimony regarding domestic violence
    Petitioner’s husband, Luis Calzadillas, is a lawful perma-
    nent resident of the United States. Petitioner testified that, on
    the night she first met Calzadillas, he drugged and raped her,
    causing her to become pregnant. He assaulted her during that
    pregnancy and her two others with him, including hitting her
    and kicking her in the stomach. On one occasion, he caused
    a miscarriage. Even when Petitioner was not pregnant, Calza-
    dillas regularly hit and beat her, threw her to the ground, and
    kicked her. He repeatedly threatened to call immigration
    authorities if she revealed the ongoing abuse.
    When Petitioner tried to leave Calzadillas, he twice fol-
    lowed her from Texas, where they had been living, to Califor-
    nia, and then he followed her to Alaska. Calzadillas arrived at
    Petitioner’s apartment in Anchorage. He began drinking and
    attacked Petitioner with a knife, attempting to stab her in the
    back, but instead hitting her hand as she turned around. She
    went to an emergency room for treatment, where she told the
    doctors that she had cut her hand on a broken bottle. Peti-
    tioner testified that she lied about the cause of the injury
    because Calzadillas had threatened to do something worse if
    she did not report it that way.
    LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES                   4885
    After receiving treatment at the emergency room, Petitioner
    returned to her apartment. She returned there because, she tes-
    tified, she thought (incorrectly, as it turns out) that Calzadillas
    had left, and she had nowhere else to go at the time. Later,
    however, Petitioner and her two youngest daughters sought
    refuge at a domestic violence shelter in Anchorage, which
    provided services to her as “a survivor of domestic violence”
    at the hands of Calzadillas.
    The IJ expressed doubt about whether Petitioner was telling
    the truth about the abuse (a subject that we will discuss in
    detail below). Nonetheless, when Petitioner offered the live
    testimony of several expert witnesses who could testify on the
    topic of domestic violence, and perhaps shed light on the IJ’s
    credibility concerns, the IJ refused to allow them to testify.
    C.   Testimony regarding drug trafficking
    While residing in Alaska, Petitioner was arrested and
    charged with Misconduct Involving a Controlled Substance in
    the third degree. At the time of the arrest, Petitioner was a
    passenger in a car belonging to Jose Armando Gomez-
    Mendoza who, she testified, was the boyfriend of her 23-year-
    old daughter. Anchorage police stopped the car and arrested
    both Gomez-Mendoza and Petitioner. The district attorney
    later dropped the charge against Petitioner.
    At the second hearing in this case, Anchorage Detective
    Bruce Edward Bryant testified that a reliable informant had
    identified Petitioner as one of several people involved in the
    distribution of crack cocaine. Detective Bryant had no first-
    hand knowledge of Petitioner’s reported involvement in drug
    transactions, however, nor did any of the other officers on the
    case witness a transaction between the informant and Peti-
    tioner. On the day of the arrest, according to the informant,
    Gomez-Mendoza obtained a small package of cocaine from
    Petitioner, who was holding it in her mouth, and sold the
    package to the informant. When the car was stopped, half the
    4886              LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    marked “buy” money was found in Gomez-Mendoza’s pocket
    and half in Petitioner’s purse. Documents in her purse showed
    her address to be the same as the one listed on the car’s regis-
    tration, and telephone records showed several calls from
    Gomez-Mendoza to Petitioner’s number (which also was her
    daughter’s number). Additionally, a storage locker rented in
    Petitioner’s name contained $934, three pagers, five cellular
    telephones, and identity documents bearing Petitioner’s pho-
    tograph but using other names.
    On the other hand, no cocaine was found on Petitioner
    when she was arrested. Nor, despite a search, were any drugs
    found in her apartment. At the initial hearing, Petitioner testi-
    fied unequivocally that she never was involved in drug traf-
    ficking. She testified that she was in the car because she had
    asked Gomez-Mendoza for a ride to a shopping center. Spe-
    cifically, Petitioner denied having held a package for Gomez-
    Mendoza, denied having put anything in her mouth, and
    denied having taken anything out of her mouth to give to any-
    one.
    Following Detective Bryant’s testimony, the IJ accepted
    Petitioner’s offer of proof with respect to the facts to which
    she had testified at the earlier hearing: she relied on Gomez-
    Mendoza for transportation; she had no involvement in
    Gomez Mendoza’s drug transactions; and Gomez-Mendoza
    gave her half of the “buy” money because he owed her money
    for a radio that he previously had purchased from her. The
    government specifically waived the opportunity to cross-
    examine Petitioner.
    At the conclusion of the second hearing, a character wit-
    ness, who had been Petitioner’s pastor for three years and
    who knew her well, testified on Petitioner’s behalf as to her
    good moral character. In the pastor’s opinion, Petitioner has
    never been involved with drugs. After the pastor’s testimony,
    the hearing was adjourned.
    LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES                       4887
    RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
    [1] To qualify for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229b(b)(2) (“Special rule for battered spouse or child”), a
    provision added as part of the Violence Against Women Act
    of 1994 (“VAWA”),2 Petitioner had to demonstrate that she
    met each of the following five criteria:
    (1) that she had been “battered or subjected to
    extreme cruelty” by a spouse who is or was a United
    States citizen or lawful permanent resident;
    (2) that she had lived continuously in the United
    States for the three years preceding her application;
    (3) that she was a person of “good moral charac-
    ter” during that period;
    (4) that she is not inadmissible or deportable
    under various other specific immigration laws relat-
    ing to criminal activity, including 8 U.S.C.
    § 1182(a)(2); and
    (5) that her removal “would result in extreme
    hardship” to herself, her children, or her parents.
    8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)-(v). If Petitioner failed to estab-
    lish any one of those criteria, she is not eligible for cancella-
    tion of removal under § 1229b(b)(2), even if she is a victim
    of domestic violence.
    [2] The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner met
    the fourth criterion—specifically, whether she demonstrated
    2
    Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
    103-322, Tit. IV (VAWA), subtit. G, § 40703, 108 Stat. 1796. After its
    enactment, the statute was amended to reflect the transition in immigration
    parlance from “suspension of deportation” to “cancellation of removal.”
    4888                 LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    that she is not inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C),
    which relates to involvement in illegal drug trafficking.3
    Under § 1182(a)(2)(C), an alien is inadmissible if
    the . . . Attorney General knows or has reason to
    believe . . . [that the alien] is or has been an illicit
    trafficker in any controlled substance . . . or is or has
    been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator,
    or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any
    such controlled or listed substance or chemical, or
    endeavored to do so[.]
    (Emphasis added.). Section 1182(a)(2)(C) does not require a
    conviction, but only a “reason to believe” that the alien is or
    has been involved in drug trafficking. Lopez-Molina v. Ash-
    croft, 
    368 F.3d 1206
    , 1209 (9th Cir. 2004). If Petitioner is
    inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(C), then she is ineligible for
    cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv).
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction to review due process challenges to
    immigration proceedings. Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 
    342 F.3d 1001
    , 1006 (9th Cir. 2003). Claims of due process violations
    in removal proceedings are reviewed de novo. 
    Id. DISCUSSION Petitioner’s
    eligibility for cancellation of removal focused
    on one question: who was telling the truth about Petitioner’s
    alleged involvement in drug trafficking, Petitioner or Detec-
    tive Bryant? Had the IJ believed Petitioner’s explanation, then
    3
    As the IJ and the BIA properly noted, involvement in drug trafficking,
    and presentation of false testimony regarding such involvement, also
    would preclude Petitioner from establishing “good moral character” as
    required by the third criterion, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iii). The govern-
    ment does not argue that Petitioner fails to meet the remaining three statu-
    tory criteria.
    LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES                       4889
    she would have met the statutory criteria for relief. Instead,
    the IJ believed Detective Bryant, thereby rendering Petitioner
    ineligible for relief.
    To answer that question, the IJ had to weigh Petitioner’s
    credibility against the credibility of the detective and the cred-
    ibility of the absent informant. We rarely disturb the result of
    that kind of balancing. But here, the IJ’s assessment of Peti-
    tioner’s credibility was skewed by prejudgment, personal
    speculation, bias, and conjecture; and his refusal to allow
    Petitioner to challenge those views by presenting expert testi-
    mony violated Petitioner’s right to due process. We cannot
    assume that the IJ would have struck the same balance had the
    weighing begun on an even plane.
    A.     The IJ improperly impugned Petitioner’s credibility and
    prejudged the utility of expert testimony.
    1.    Speculation and bias about Petitioner’s credibility
    The IJ stated, in his written decision, that “[e]ven before
    hearing the testimony of Detective Bryant, the Court had
    doubts about [Petitioner’s] credibility.”4 Specifically, the IJ
    repeatedly expressed doubts about Petitioner’s account of
    domestic violence. The IJ’s skepticism centered around three
    key points: he doubted that Petitioner would stay with, or
    return to, Calzadillas if he were abusive; he doubted that
    Calzadillas would follow Petitioner if she did leave; and he
    doubted that Calzadillas could find Petitioner if he did wish
    to follow her.
    4
    His first doubt was that “[h]er demeanor during testimony often
    sounded more like the recitation of a memorized story than a person actu-
    ally recalling and reliving traumatic events.” We rejected a very similar
    generalized statement, made by the very same immigration judge, as a
    basis for an adverse credibility determination in Arulampalam v. Ashcroft,
    
    353 F.3d 679
    , 686 (9th Cir. 2003).
    4890                LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    The IJ’s most intense skepticism was directed at the third
    point, Calzadillas’ ability to find Petitioner. Before Petitioner
    had even testified to the events in question, the IJ stated:
    “[I]t’s just about impossible, if she didn’t tell him. She must
    have communicated with him, otherwise, how could he have
    possibly figured out where she went?” The IJ observed that
    the Immigration and Naturalization Service5 (“INS”) com-
    monly could not locate people against whom there were
    orders of removal and wondered how, given the INS’s ability
    to lose people, Calzadillas could have tracked Petitioner
    down. In his written decision, the IJ regarded as “implausible”
    the “amazing ability of [Petitioner’s] tormentors to locate her,
    though she traveled to the far corners of this country to
    escape.”
    The IJ also doubted that Calzadillas would have followed
    Petitioner in the first place. During a discussion, early in the
    hearing, of whether Calzadillas, who is originally from Mex-
    ico, would follow Petitioner to Honduras, the IJ said:
    I mean, it’s not very persuasive that he is going to go
    back to a country, because he is so obsessed by her
    that he is going to follow her back to her country
    where . . . a foreign country where he doesn’t even
    have a right to be and probably can’t get a job, just
    so, you know, he can be close to her.
    Finally, the IJ expressed disbelief that Petitioner would stay
    with an abusive partner. Petitioner explained that, during her
    time with Calzadillas in Texas (while she was pregnant, and
    then while she had a newborn daughter), she stayed at home
    while Calzadillas worked. The IJ asked: “Well, why didn’t
    5
    The INS ceased to exist on March 1, 2003, when its functions were
    transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland
    Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. We refer to
    the agency as the INS because the hearings in this case took place before
    the transfer.
    LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES                       4891
    you escape then?” (She did, when her baby reached the age
    of six months.) Petitioner also testified that she, along with
    two of her children, returned to her Anchorage apartment after
    being treated for stab wounds inflicted by Calzadillas because
    she thought he had left and because they had nowhere else to
    go. When she returned, Petitioner asked Calzadillas to leave,
    but he refused. Later in the hearing, the IJ questioned whether
    someone who was afraid to tell hospital personnel about her
    abuse would be likely “to go back to the apartment where this
    drunk is waiting” or would have the gumption to tell the
    abuser to leave when she found him there. In his written deci-
    sion, the IJ found it “implausible” that Petitioner would have
    returned to her apartment “if there truly had been a chance
    that a drunken abusive man with a knife was waiting there.”
    He suggested several other destinations, including a park
    bench, that would have been preferable and concluded that
    Petitioner’s “willingness to return to her apartment so soon
    after the alleged knifing event seriously detracted from her
    credibility as to the actual events of that evening.”
    These areas of skepticism are important for two reasons.
    First, they reveal the kind of speculation and bias that we have
    held to be improper bases for an adverse credibility determina-
    tion.6 Cf. Kaur v. Ashcroft, 
    379 F.3d 876
    , 885-87 (9th Cir.
    6
    Another area in which personal conjecture determined the course of
    this proceeding, and influenced the IJ’s credibility determination, pertains
    to Petitioner’s relationship with Gomez-Mendoza, who was with Peti-
    tioner in the car on the day of her arrest. The IJ doubted that Gomez-
    Mendoza, a man in his forties, could have been the boyfriend of Petition-
    er’s daughter (who was 23 years old at the time of Petitioner’s arrest).
    Indeed, their age difference was the primary reason the IJ gave for calling
    Detective Bryant to testify after the government tried to withdraw its
    request:
    There were aspects of [Petitioner’s] testimony which the Court
    found implausible and unpersuasive regarding the arrest, which
    the detective’s testimony might clarify. . . . Gomez-[Mendoza] is
    apparently a middle-aged man, closer to the age of the respondent
    than her daughter, yet she testified that this man was her daugh-
    4892                 LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    2004) (reversing an adverse credibility determination in part
    because the IJ speculated that India would not have issued a
    passport with the name printed as “Ranjit,” but signed as
    “Ranjeet,” despite the explanation from the petitioner’s coun-
    sel that the spellings were interchangeable); Arulampalam v.
    Ashcroft, 
    353 F.3d 679
    , 687 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
    IJ improperly speculated that experienced soldiers would have
    been able to prevent the petitioner from bypassing check-
    points on his way out of his country, as he testified that he
    did); Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 
    295 F.3d 1047
    , 1052 (9th Cir.
    2002) (rejecting an IJ’s speculation about the petitioner’s
    “real” economic motives for wanting to leave her country);
    see also 
    Reyes-Melendez, 342 F.3d at 1006
    (holding that a
    neutral judge is among the most basic of due process protec-
    tions); Colmenar v. INS, 
    210 F.3d 967
    , 971 (9th Cir. 2000)
    (stating that a due process violation occurs when an IJ pre-
    judges a claim and fails to behave as a neutral fact-finder
    interested in hearing the petitioner’s evidence).
    Second, these areas of skepticism are important because
    they provide a context for the IJ’s refusal to hear expert testi-
    mony, from professionals who had worked with Petitioner,
    regarding the dynamics of abusive relationships. Cf. Zi Lin
    Chen v. Ashcroft, 
    362 F.3d 611
    , 618 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
    that, when the petitioner had been “denied a reasonable
    opportunity to explain what the IJ perceived as an inconsis-
    tency in her testimony,” the “IJ’s doubt about the veracity of
    her story [could not] serve as a basis for the denial of asy-
    lum”).
    ter’s boyfriend. Her testimony did not have the ring of truth on
    this point . . . . If he is actually [Petitioner’s] boyfriend, it would
    indicate that she lacked credibility, and would affect the merits
    of her claim as an allegedly abused person.
    No evidence, including Detective Bryant’s testimony, contradicted Peti-
    tioner’s assertion that Gomez-Mendoza was her daughter’s boyfriend; and
    their 20-year age difference is not so unusual that the IJ properly could
    have discounted the accuracy of Petitioner’s testimony.
    LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES                   4893
    2.     Doubts about the utility of expert testimony
    The IJ was of the preconceived view that expert testimony
    could do no more than repeat, uncritically, the victim’s
    consistent—but potentially fabricated— story. (“You know, I
    mean, she talked to [Petitioner] and believes the story, basi-
    cally, so you know, it’s kind of bootstrapping then.”) Indeed,
    the IJ observed that persons in need of services can be moti-
    vated to fabricate stories of domestic violence:
    But . . . the more she tells these stories, the more
    benefit she accrues from all of these agencies that
    are quite eager to help her in any way they can. And
    the more they hear, the more they [p]ile on the ser-
    vices. So there’s always the possibility of someone
    embellishing in order to gain the kind of support. I’m
    not saying I don’t believe her. Don’t get me wrong.
    Cf. Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 
    255 F.3d 775
    , 779-80 (9th Cir.
    2001) (observing that the IJ had focused with disapproval on
    the fact that the petitioner had received welfare). And, as for
    the experts’ ability to discriminate between actual victims of
    domestic violence and people whose need flows from other
    sources, the IJ opined:
    [T]his type of people, they don’t throw people out on
    the street. If someone comes in and says that they
    have been abused, if — if everything they observe in
    talking to them, hearing their case history is consis-
    tent with their story, they’ll basically believe it.
    Petitioner’s counsel countered that the experts’ live testi-
    mony could provide information relevant to the IJ’s most crit-
    ical areas of doubt, such as Calzadillas’ desire and ability to
    follow Petitioner. Counsel also offered to question the experts
    regarding the intake criteria they use to determine whether
    someone has, in fact, been abused. She pointed out that none
    4894                 LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    of those issues had been addressed in the written materials
    previously provided by way of affidavits.
    The IJ ultimately refused the live testimony, asserting that
    time was short: “I don’t — I don’t believe that I want to hear
    any testimony from the experts, because — mainly because of
    the lateness of the hour. If — you know, if we had more time,
    perhaps, but it is 4:30 and I don’t think we could accomplish
    much in 30 minutes.” The IJ assured Petitioner’s counsel that
    he would consider the experts’ written materials.
    B.     The IJ’s refusal to hear testimony from Petitioner’s
    experts violated due process.
    [3] Due process principles prohibit an IJ from declining to
    hear relevant testimony because of a prejudgment about the
    witness’s “credibility or the probative value of [the] testimo-
    ny.” Kaur v. Ashcroft, 
    388 F.3d 734
    , 737 (9th Cir. 2004). “We
    will grant a petition for review from a BIA decision on due
    process grounds if the proceeding was so fundamentally
    unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting
    [his or her] case.” 
    Reyes-Melendez, 342 F.3d at 1006
    (internal
    quotation marks omitted).7 Whether the IJ’s actions prevented
    the introduction of significant testimony is critical to the ulti-
    mate question whether the alien had a reasonable opportunity
    to present evidence. See, e.g., 
    Sanchez-Cruz, 255 F.3d at 779
    (noting that the IJ “refused to allow the petitioner to introduce
    evidence that specifically contradicted some of his factual
    findings”); 
    Colmenar, 210 F.3d at 971
    (noting that the IJ cut
    off the alien’s testimony regarding the possible political moti-
    vations of the attack against him).
    In Kaur, an asylum seeker attempted to call her son, who
    had been granted asylum a year earlier, as a witness to the
    events that had caused her to leave her native country. The IJ
    7
    As we will discuss in the next section, “[t]he alien must also show prej-
    udice.” 
    Reyes-Melendez, 342 F.3d at 1006
    .
    LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES                        4895
    refused to hear his testimony because the son had been only
    8 or 9 years old at the time of the relevant 
    incidents. 388 F.3d at 736
    . The IJ then denied asylum, in part because of the
    absence of corroborative evidence. 
    Id. We held
    that “[t]he IJ
    was not entitled to prejudge [the son’s] credibility or the pro-
    bative value of his testimony.” 
    Id. at 737.
    The testimony, for
    which there was no substitute, was relevant to corroborate the
    petitioner’s testimony and to bolster her credibility. 
    Id. [4] In
    the circumstances of this proceeding, the IJ’s refusal
    to hear testimony from Petitioner’s experts likewise violated
    due process. In Kaur, of course, there was no substitute for
    the son’s testimony, and the IJ there gave no reason for
    excluding the testimony other than a prejudgment of its value.
    See 
    id. Here, the
    IJ gave two facially neutral reasons—
    efficiency and the superiority of written materials—for refus-
    ing the expert testimony. But the latter reason cannot suffice
    when the proffered testimony was not covered in the written
    materials and when it would have reflected directly on Peti-
    tioner’s credibility, on specific points as to which the IJ
    repeatedly had expressed skepticism. And the IJ’s claimed
    interest in efficiency was belied by the substantial amount of
    time the IJ spent arguing with Petitioner’s counsel about
    whether to hear the testimony and by his willingness (indeed,
    insistence) to call, and to hold an additional hearing to receive
    testimony from, Detective Bryant.8
    8
    The IJ’s statements suggested that less neutral reasons also influenced
    his decision. In his discussion with Petitioner’s counsel, the IJ appeared
    to discount the value of information about typical patterns of domestic
    violence as an aid in resolving inconsistencies and determining credibility
    in general:
    Well, we can figure that out, you know, that someone has to have
    an explanation as to why there is something inconsistent in the
    documentary evidence. . . . I mean, the type of thinking that you
    are projecting here would account for someone who nothing ever
    happened to them being eligible for this kind of relief. Well, it
    doesn’t matter what they told the emergency room[,] they were
    afraid, you know.
    4896                LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    [5] Petitioner was denied an opportunity to challenge the
    IJ’s preconceived views that experts in the patterns of domes-
    tic violence could do no more than repeat, uncritically, the
    victim’s testimony, and that evidence of such patterns was not
    a helpful supplement to the traditional tools for evaluating
    credibility. As we wrote in a slightly different context:
    [I]n enacting VAWA, Congress recognized that lay
    understandings of domestic violence are frequently
    comprised of “myths, misconceptions, and victim
    blaming attitudes,” and that background information
    regarding domestic violence may be crucial in order
    to understand its essential characteristics and mani-
    festations.
    Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 
    345 F.3d 824
    , 836 (9th Cir. 2003)
    (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 24 (1993)).9 In VAWA,
    Congress took steps to provide judges with training on the
    topics of rape and domestic violence. See Pub. L. No. 103-
    322, tit. IV, subtit. D, §§ 40411-40422. In support of that
    measure, Congress noted that “[a] judge who is confident in
    controlling his or her own life and circumstances . . . may find
    it difficult to understand the circumstances and responses of
    a battered woman.” S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 46 (1993).
    Some judges and court personnel approach domestic
    violence cases, whether consciously or uncon-
    sciously, with assumptions based not on personal
    experience or the facts of a particular case but on ste-
    reotypes and biases. Judges and court personnel may
    also lack information about the psychological, eco-
    nomic, and social realities of domestic violence vic-
    tims.
    9
    In Hernandez, we were reviewing the agency’s determination that the
    petitioner had not established the “extreme cruelty” requirement for sus-
    pension of 
    deportation. 345 F.3d at 832-33
    .
    LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES                  4897
    
    Id. Congress, in
    other words, recognized that information
    about the dynamics of abusive relationships could help adju-
    dicators evaluate facts more fairly. This recognition supports
    our conclusion that due process required the IJ to allow Peti-
    tioner to confront his overt skepticism with expert testimony
    on the issue of domestic violence.
    C.   Petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of this due pro-
    cess violation and the IJ’s improper speculation as to her
    credibility.
    [6] For us to grant the petition for review on due process
    grounds, Petitioner must show prejudice, “which means that
    the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the
    alleged violation.” 
    Reyes-Melendez, 342 F.3d at 1006
    (empha-
    sis added). The government argues that there is no prejudice
    because substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that
    Petitioner was involved in drug trafficking, regardless of any
    mistakes the IJ may have made in evaluating the credibility of
    her testimony about domestic violence. That is, even if the
    IJ’s improper assessment of Petitioner’s credibility resulted in
    an incorrect conclusion as to her testimony about domestic
    violence, it did not affect his decision to credit the detective’s
    testimony over Petitioner’s with regard to the alleged drug
    transaction. We do not agree.
    Petitioner and Detective Bryant presented conflicting testi-
    mony with regard to the alleged drug transaction. To review:
    In the initial hearing, Petitioner testified to her version of the
    events leading to her arrest, in which she was an innocent
    bystander. At the second hearing, Detective Bryant presented
    another version, relayed from an informant, in which Peti-
    tioner had held a rock of cocaine in her mouth, passed it to
    Gomez-Mendoza, and received half of the marked “buy”
    money in exchange. After Detective Bryant testified, in rebut-
    tal Petitioner’s counsel gave a detailed offer of proof to sup-
    plement Petitioner’s earlier testimony. The offer of proof
    unequivocally denied any involvement in drug trafficking;
    4898              LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    said that Petitioner needed a ride with her daughter’s boy-
    friend because she lacked other transportation; and explained
    the presence of the money in her purse as payment for a radio,
    sold earlier to the boyfriend. Her previous testimony had
    included denial of specific charges (like holding cocaine in
    her mouth). The IJ accepted the offer of proof in lieu of Peti-
    tioner’s live rebuttal testimony, and the government waived
    the right to cross-examine.
    [7] The IJ’s decision to believe Detective Bryant over Peti-
    tioner controlled the outcome of the proceeding. Our task is
    to determine whether the IJ’s assessment of Petitioner’s credi-
    bility regarding domestic violence, and his refusal to admit
    testimony that would have challenged his preconceived view
    of her credibility on that point, may have affected his resolu-
    tion of the drug-related credibility dispute. On this record, we
    cannot conclude that the two issues were unconnected. The
    IJ’s improper prejudgment on the first issue, which culmi-
    nated in his refusal to hear testimony that might have bol-
    stered Petitioner’s credibility, infected his decision to believe
    Detective Bryant’s testimony over Petitioner’s. Our law has
    long recognized that a person who is deemed unbelievable as
    to one material fact may be disbelieved in all other respects.
    See Hattem v. United States, 
    283 F.2d 339
    , 343 (9th Cir.
    1960) (approving, as a correct statement of the law, a jury
    instruction stating that, “[i]f you find that any witness in this
    trial has wilfully testified falsely as to any material fact in the
    case, then you are at liberty wholly to disregard all of the tes-
    timony of that witness”); Shelton v. United States, 
    169 F.2d 665
    , 667 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (discussing the maxim “falsus in
    uno, falsus in omnibus”). Petitioner’s testimony regarding
    domestic violence came before the testimony regarding her
    arrest, and the IJ expressly stated that his credibility concerns
    began during the former. “Even before hearing the testimony
    of Detective Bryant,” the IJ stated in his decision, he “had
    doubts about [Petitioner’s] credibility.”
    Of course, we cannot be sure that the IJ would have
    reached a different conclusion about the drug transaction had
    LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES                           4899
    he begun with a more neutral view of Petitioner’s credibility.
    But our cases do not require absolute certainty. See, e.g.,
    Agyeman v. INS, 
    296 F.3d 871
    , 884 (9th Cir. 2002)
    (“Prejudice is shown if the violation potentially . . . affects the
    outcome of the proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted)). In this proceeding, everything came down to resolving
    a conflict in testimony; and the IJ’s earlier-developed,
    improperly negative view of Petitioner’s credibility may have
    affected his later conclusion that it was Petitioner, not the
    detective (or the informant), who lied about the drug transac-
    tion. That conclusion, as we have said, controlled the out-
    come.
    [8] Today’s decision by no means refutes the self-evident
    proposition that one can be both a victim of domestic violence
    and a drug trafficker. If the agency properly concludes that
    there is reason to believe an alien is a drug trafficker,10 then
    the alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8
    U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), period. But, before reaching that con-
    clusion, the agency must give the alien a fair hearing in front
    of a neutral decision-maker. Because the IJ’s disbelief of Peti-
    tioner rested on personal speculation, bias, conjecture, and
    prejudgment, and because he refused to hear testimony that
    would have challenged those assumptions, we decline to
    assume that a fair and neutral balancing of the conflicting tes-
    timony occurred or to assume that a fair and neutral balancing
    necessarily would have yielded the same answer. Thus, we
    conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated prejudice.
    [9] We do not suggest that the agency was or is required to
    credit Petitioner’s version of events uncritically. We merely
    hold that the IJ was required to hear testimony from Petition-
    er’s experts in the subject of domestic violence, as to matters
    10
    “The appropriate way of measuring whether the IJ and BIA had ‘rea-
    son to believe’ ” that a petitioner is involved in drug trafficking is to assess
    “whether substantial evidence supports such a conclusion.” Alarcon-
    Serrano v. INS, 
    220 F.3d 1116
    , 1119 (9th Cir. 2000).
    4900                LOPEZ-UMANZOR v. GONZALES
    pertaining to her credibility. Thus, we remand for a new hear-
    ing, to ensure that Petitioner has a full and fair opportunity to
    establish her credibility, 
    Kaur, 388 F.3d at 738
    (remanding for
    a new hearing), and we suggest that the new hearing be held
    before a different immigration judge, Perez-Lastor v. INS,
    
    208 F.3d 773
    , 783 (9th Cir. 2000).11
    PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED with instructions.
    11
    Because we remand for a new hearing on the ground discussed, we
    need not and do not reach Petitioner’s other arguments about the proce-
    dures below.