Department of Revenue, on behalf of Haydie Marquez v. Calixto Manuel Lopez , 252 So. 3d 823 ( 2018 )


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  •          FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-5381
    _____________________________
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, on
    behalf of Haydie Marquez,
    Appellant,
    v.
    CALIXTO MANUEL LOPEZ,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Division of Administrative Hearings.
    Robert L. Kilbride, Administrative Law Judge.
    August 1, 2018
    PER CURIAM.
    The Department of Revenue appeals the administrative law
    judge’s Final Administrative Support Order, in which the father,
    Carlos Lopez, was ordered to pay child support and retroactive
    child support to the mother, Haydie Marquez, on whose behalf the
    Department was acting to establish Lopez’s support obligation to
    their child. See §409.2557(1) & (2), Fla. Stat. (2017).
    We dismiss this appeal for lack of standing. “‘An appeal of a
    wholly favorable judgment must be dismissed.’” Fla. Dep’t of Envtl.
    Prot. v. Fla. Reemployment Assistance Appeals Comm’n, 
    123 So. 3d 1154
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Fresenius
    Med. Care Holdings, Inc., 
    935 So. 2d 636
    , 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006));
    see also Friends of Perdido Bay, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
    44 So. 3d 650
    , 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (dismissing cross-appeal, after
    appellants voluntarily dismissed appeal, because cross-appellants
    were the prevailing parties below and were neither adversely
    affected by any provision of the order under review nor faced any
    consequences by the application of the challenged statutory
    provision); Fla. Comm’n on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology
    v. State, Dep’t of Ins., 
    716 So. 2d 345
    , 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
    (declining to examine an administrative law judge’s rationale for a
    ruling at the behest of the party in whose favor the administrative
    law judge ruled); Gen. Dev. Utils., Inc. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
    Div. of Admin. Hearings, 
    385 So. 2d 1050
    , 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
    (“It is a long standing rule that a judgment or decree wholly in
    favor of a party may not be appealed by him, for he is not aggrieved
    thereby.”).
    DISMISSED.
    BILBREY and JAY, JJ., concur; WINOKUR, J., concurs with opinion.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    WINOKUR, J., concurring.
    I agree with the majority that we should dismiss this appeal
    because the Department of Revenue (DOR) does not have standing
    to challenge the Final Administrative Support Order (Order), on
    the ground that the Order is “wholly favorable” to DOR. See Fla.
    Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Fla. Reemployment Assistance Appeals
    Comm’n, 
    123 So. 3d 1154
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). But even if we did
    not dismiss this appeal for lack of standing, I would reject DOR’s
    argument and affirm the Order.
    Because Marquez, the mother of the child, was receiving
    Medicaid, DOR offered her their services in obtaining child support
    from Lopez, the father. Marquez accepted these services and DOR
    instituted a proceeding to establish an administrative support
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    order on behalf of Marquez. DOR then filed a proposed
    administrative support order, which Lopez disputed and exercised
    his right to a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).
    The caption of the hearing before the ALJ was “DEPARTMENT
    OF REVENUE AND HAYDIE MARQUEZ, Petitioners, vs.
    CALIXTO MANUEL LOPEZ, Respondent.” After the hearing, the
    ALJ filed the Order, which ordered Lopez to pay current and
    retroactive child support and which offered any party “who is
    adversely affected” by the Order the right to appeal to this court.
    See also § 120.68 and 409.2563(10)(a), Fla. Stat. DOR appealed,
    without explaining how it, or Marquez, was “adversely affected” by
    this Order. Lopez did not appeal or cross-appeal.
    On appeal to this court, the only argument DOR makes in its
    initial brief is that the ALJ erred in calculating retroactive support
    because it “charged [Lopez] twice” for his June 2017 income. DOR
    does not describe how this alleged error adversely affects it or
    Marquez. It appears instead that the alleged error adversely
    affects Lopez, who neither objected to the alleged error below, nor
    appealed the Order, nor even filed an answer brief.
    If Lopez appealed this alleged error, this court would have
    rejected the appeal because he failed to preserve the error for
    review. See Alfred v. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    204 So. 3d 583
    , 585 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2016). We should not ignore Lopez’s lack of preservation
    simply because DOR raises the unpreserved error itself. See Davis
    v. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    221 So. 3d 790
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (declining
    to accept DOR’s concession of error due to “Mr. Davis’s failure to
    participate at any point in the proceedings below”). An appellant
    cannot “concede error” on behalf of the appellee when that error
    has never been raised by appellee. I would reject any such
    concession and affirm the order under review.
    _____________________________
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
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