Citizens Tri-County Bank v. Russell R. Goodman ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                                      04/17/2019
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2019
    CITIZENS TRI-COUNTY BANK v. RUSSELL R. GOODMAN ET AL.
    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Grundy County
    No. 6452    Jeffrey F. Stewart, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. M2018-00958-COA-R3-CV
    ___________________________________
    This appeal involves a boundary dispute. Following a trial in the Grundy County
    Chancery Court, the chancellor held that the boundary between the parties would be the
    boundary depicted on a survey introduced by the Defendants. Having reviewed the
    record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
    and Remanded
    ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
    C.J., and FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., joined.
    Jennifer Austin Mitchell, Dunlap, Tennessee, for the appellant, Citizens Tri-County
    Bank.
    J. Harvey Cameron, Sr., Jasper, Tennessee, for the appellees, Russell R. Goodman, James
    Parker Goodman.
    OPINION
    BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On August 26, 2015, Citizens Tri-County Bank (“the Bank”) filed a complaint for
    declaratory judgment in the Grundy County Chancery Court seeking to establish the
    boundary between its property and property owned by Russell and James Goodman (“the
    Goodmans”). According to the Bank, the Goodmans had encroached on its land and
    were wrongfully claiming a portion of it. The Goodmans filed an answer denying the
    Bank’s claims, and the case eventually went to trial in November 2017.
    The area in conflict is wooded and consists of approximately 17 acres.
    Essentially, the dispute centers on competing claims to a mountain bluff located on the
    property. The Bank’s claim to the disputed area arises out of its foreclosure on a
    commercial loan to H.B. Developers, LLC. The Goodmans’ claim to the area arises out
    of a transfer by warranty deed from other family members. The proof showed that the
    Goodmans’ property had been transferred among different family members several times
    over the years, and at the time of trial, both sides were able to trace their respective
    chains of title back over a hundred years. The Goodmans, however, were able to trace
    their title chain back the farthest.
    As was borne out by trial testimony, the land taken in by the respective deeds of
    the parties creates a true overlap. The overlap is generally located in relation to a portion
    of the Bank’s claimed western boundary and a portion of the Goodmans’ claimed eastern
    boundary. Although some testimony about prior use of the disputed land was offered at
    trial, neither side pursued an adverse possession theory in asserting their respective rights
    to the property.
    In an effort to support their claims to the disputed area, each side retained
    surveyors who testified at trial. The first surveyor to testify, Kurt Johnson, was offered
    by the Bank. Mr. Johnson testified that he had prepared a survey for the property
    purchased by H.B. Developers, LLC. According to Mr. Johnson, the deed pursuant to
    which the Bank acquired certain property included the disputed area at issue herein.
    Mr. Johnson claimed that he had reviewed the Goodmans’ deeds as part of his
    work and represented that, had the Goodmans’ deeds caused any concern, it was
    something that he “would have brought . . . to somebody’s attention at the time.”
    However, he also testified that he remembered “having trouble with all of the deed lines
    below the bluff,” and on cross-examination, he acknowledged that there was, in fact, a
    deed overlap involved in this case.
    Another surveyor, Jason Barry, was called to testify at trial by the Goodmans. He
    generally testified as to how he and his father conducted a survey of the Goodmans’
    property by relying on deeds in the Goodmans’ chain of title.1 According to Mr. Barry,
    closure2 with respect to the deed he utilized was “pretty close.” Mr. Barry further
    testified that the property description in the Goodmans’ deed was based on his survey.
    Mr. Barry did not dispute that the Bank’s parent deed also covered the disputed area in
    question, and he specifically acknowledged, as Mr. Johnson had, that there was a deed
    overlap.
    1
    Mr. Barry also testified that he had pulled deeds from the Bank’s chain of title in connection
    with his survey work process.
    2
    As Mr. Barry explained in his testimony, “Closure is where you have a description around a
    piece of property. It starts at a point and theoretically it should come back to the same exact point.”
    2
    The disputed area was the subject of some disagreement between the current
    parties’ predecessors in interest in the late 1950s, but no resolution was forthcoming at
    that time. James Goodman specifically testified to this matter at trial, noting that, when
    he was a child, his father and one of the Bank’s predecessors in interest got into an
    “unfriendly” conversation about the “bluff mountain property.” According to Mr.
    Goodman, neither his father nor the Bank’s predecessor in title backed down from their
    respective positions regarding the disputed property.
    At the conclusion of the trial proceedings, the case was taken under advisement,
    and thereafter, each side submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to
    the chancery court. On March 20, 2018, court was reconvened, and at that time, the
    chancellor orally ruled in favor of the Goodmans and accepted the survey they had
    introduced at trial. This oral ruling was later incorporated into the chancery court’s
    “Final Order” entered on April 23, 2018. In its order, the chancery court found that the
    surveyors for both sides had been able to “locate with good precision the boundaries of
    their respective clients as described in their clients’ chain-of-title deeds” and noted that
    “[p]ossession was not the controlling issue in the case” because neither side had pled
    adverse possession. In explaining its decision to adopt the Goodmans’ proposed
    boundary line, the chancery court stated as follows in its incorporated oral ruling:
    [L]ooking at the age of the deeds [in the Goodmans’ chain of title] and
    referring to the age of the deeds and the description, it goes back such a
    long period of time and, furthermore, not only the period of time, but the
    reference in the descriptions and the survey, how tight it was, how accurate
    it was.
    ....
    . . . [D]ue to the age and length of the registration of the deed and the
    boundary description that was so tight over all these many years, I would
    have to find in favor of the defendants[.]
    Following the chancery court’s adoption of the Goodmans’ survey, the Bank timely
    appealed to this Court.
    DISCUSSION
    The singular issue raised by the Bank on appeal is whether the chancery court
    erred in adopting the Goodmans’ boundary survey. “The review of a decision rendered
    in a boundary dispute is de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness as to
    the trial court’s findings of fact, unless the evidence preponderates against those
    findings.” Wood v. Starko, 
    197 S.W.3d 255
    , 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). The evidence
    3
    does not preponderate against a trial court’s findings of fact unless it supports another
    finding with greater convincing effect. 
    Id.
    In order to resolve a boundary dispute, a trial court must evaluate all of the
    evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. Mix v. Miller, 
    27 S.W.3d 508
    , 514
    (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). As an appellate court, we afford considerable deference to the
    trial court’s credibility findings and the weight to be given to testimony. Jackson v.
    Bownas, No. E2004-01893-COA-R3-CV, 
    2005 WL 1457752
    , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June
    21, 2005). This deference extends to boundary disputes where the trial court is required
    to choose between two competing surveys. 
    Id.
    In this case, the chancery court did not articulate any particular qualms about
    either surveyor who testified at trial. In fact, the chancery court did not question that the
    parties’ surveyors had accurately located the boundaries of their respective clients as
    established in each side’s chain of title. The problem here, of course, lies in the fact that
    each side’s deed encompasses the wooded area in dispute. As acknowledged by both Mr.
    Johnson and Mr. Barry, there is indeed an overlap in claimed land.
    An examination of the chancellor’s ruling indicates that he resolved this conflict
    and adopted the Goodmans’ survey due to the fact that the Goodmans’ chain of title was
    traceable over a longer period of time than the Bank’s and that the boundary description
    had been “so tight over all these many years.” The proof supports the trial court’s finding
    that the Goodmans’ established chain of title goes back farther than that of the Bank’s,3
    and given the acknowledged conflict and overlap presented by the parties’ respective
    deeds, we find no basis to disturb the chancery court’s ruling. See Slack v. Antwine, No.
    W2000-00961-COA-R3-CV, 
    2001 WL 30527
    , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2001)
    (“Where there is a conflict, an older grant or deed will prevail over a younger grant or
    deed.”).
    3
    Although the proof established that the Goodmans’ chain of title was traceable farther back than
    that of the Bank’s, the chancery court also took note of the fact that there was likely a “continuity of
    ownership” within one particular family during an apparent 1869-1905 gap in the chain of title:
    Defendants had established their title chain 1905 through the present through their
    exhibits, establishing also, as Exhibit 10 a deed executed in 1865 and recorded in 1869,
    which older deed is referred to for property description in later deeds in Defendant’s title
    chain; further, said 1865/1869 deed referred to the property granted therein as being the
    old Peter Moran homeplace, and Defendant’s Exhibit 13, 1905 deed in their chain of title
    having as a party Dan Moran, guardian for James Moran, suggesting the likely continuity
    of ownership within the Moran family during 1869-1905 gap in title chain.
    4
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed and the
    case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with
    this Opinion.
    _________________________________
    ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2018-00958-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge Arnold B. Goldin

Filed Date: 4/17/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2019