Alene S. Neal v. The State of Tennessee, Department of Human Services ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    Assigned On Briefs April 26, 2012
    ALENE S. NEAL v. THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, DEPARTMENT OF
    HUMAN SERVICES
    Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County
    No. CH-10-09863      Kenny Armstrong, Chancellor
    No. W2011-01123-COA-R3-CV - Filed May 16, 2012
    The Department of Human Services determined that Plaintiff’s available resources exceeded
    the resource limit for purposes of Medicaid benefits in the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary
    category. The trial court affirmed the Department’s determination. We affirm.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
    and Remanded
    D AVID R. F ARMER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which H OLLY M. K IRBY, J., and
    J. S TEVEN S TAFFORD, J., joined.
    Alene S. Neal, Pro Se.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter and Shayna Abrams, Senior Counsel,
    for the appellee, The State of Tennessee, Department of Human Services.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
    This dispute concerns the denial by the Department of Human Services (“the
    Department”) of Plaintiff Alene S. Neal’s (Ms. Neal) July 29, 2009 recertification application
    1
    Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:
    This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
    or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
    would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall
    be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and shall not be cited
    or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
    for Medicaid benefits in the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (“QMB”) category. The
    Department denied Ms. Neal’s application upon determining that her available resources in
    the amount of $4,039 exceeded the resource limit of $4,000. Ms. Neal’s QMB coverage was
    terminated in August 2009. Ms. Neal appealed the determination.
    The matter was heard before a Department Hearing Officer in January 2010. In
    March 2010, the Hearing Officer issued an initial administrative order upholding the
    Department’s determination and Ms. Neal filed an appeal. The Assistant Commissioner
    upheld the determination and issued a final administrative order in April 2010. Ms. Neal’s
    application for reconsideration was denied, and Ms. Neal filed a petition for review in the
    Chancery Court for Shelby County. Following a hearing in March 2011, the chancery court
    found that, based on the bank statements submitted into evidence, Ms. Neal had resources
    in excess of $4,000. The chancery court found that Ms. Neal’s resources therefore exceeded
    the resource limit of 200 percent of Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), or $4,000. The
    chancery court determined that substantial and material evidence supported the Department’s
    denial of Ms. Neal’s application and entered final judgment in the matter on April 19, 2011.
    Ms. Neal filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
    Issue Presented
    The issue presented by Ms. Neal, as we perceive it, is whether the trial court erred by
    determining that the Department’s determination was supported by substantial and material
    evidence.
    Standard of Review
    We review the trial court’s findings of fact with a presumption of correctness unless
    the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Accordingly, we will not
    reverse the trial court’s factual findings unless they are contrary to the preponderance of the
    evidence. We review the trial court’s conclusions on matters of law de novo, however, with
    no presumption of correctness. Tidwell v. Memphis, 
    193 S.W.3d 555
    , 559 (Tenn. 2006). Our
    review of a trial court’s application of the law to the facts is de novo, with no presumption
    of correctness. State v. Ingram, 
    331 S.W.3d 746
    , 755 (Tenn. 2011).
    Review pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) is
    governed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 4–5–322(h) (2011). Pittman v. City of Memphis,
    
    360 S.W.3d 382
    , 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011)(citing Tidwell v. City of Memphis, 
    193 S.W.3d 555
     (Tenn. 2006)). Pursuant to the UAPA:
    -2-
    The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
    proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the
    petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
    inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
    (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
    (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
    (3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
    (4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
    clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
    (5)(A) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material
    in the light of the entire record.
    (B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take
    into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the
    court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
    of the evidence on questions of fact.
    Tennessee Code Annotated § 4–5–322(h) (2011). We are confined to the same scope of
    review on appeal. Id. at 387.
    Discussion
    It is undisputed in this case that Ms. Neal is not eligible for Medicaid in the QMB
    category if her non-exempt resources exceed $4,000. The trial court found that Ms. Neal’s
    nonexempt resources exceeded this limit based on bank statements for four accounts showing
    balances in the amount of $2,218.83; $57.74; 1,763.12; and $3,457.95. The trial court further
    found that an additional account balance was “not available” and excluded the account from
    the resource calculation. The trial court found that the Department had determined that,
    based on three of the accounts, Ms. Neal’s resources totaled $4,039 and, therefore, exceeded
    the $4,000 limit.
    In her brief to this Court, Ms. Neal does not dispute that the bank statements submitted
    into evidence indicate resources in excess of $7,000. Rather, her argument, as we understand
    it, is that the Department and the trial court erred by including federal stimulus payments
    when determining the amount of resources available to her. Ms. Neal cites no law to support
    her assertion, however. Ms. Neal does not indicate in her brief, moreover, the amount of
    income which the Department and the trial court allegedly erroneously included in the
    calculation of resources available to her. She cites to no facts in the record to support her
    assertions of error.
    The Department, on the other hand, asserts that Ms. Neal applied for Medicaid
    -3-
    benefits on July 29, 2009, more than one year after receiving a stimulus payment on July 5,
    2008. The Department further asserts that Ms. Neal presented no proof concerning a 2009
    stimulus payment other than stating that she received $250 in 2009. The Department
    contends that Ms. Neal, who was represented by an attorney in the proceedings before the
    Department, failed to establish that the alleged $250 payment qualified as an income tax
    refund, rebate, or earned income tax credit for the purpose of calculating her available
    resources for the purpose of determining her QMB eligibility. Upon review of the record,
    we cannot say that the Department’s determination is unsupported by substantial and material
    evidence, that it is characterized by an abuse of discretion, or that it is a clear error.
    Holding
    In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this
    appeal are taxed to the Appellant, Alene S. Neal.
    _________________________________
    DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: W2011-01123-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge David R. Farmer

Filed Date: 5/16/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014