In Re: Robert D. ( 2014 )


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  •                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Submitted on Briefs October 15, 2013
    IN RE ROBERT D. ET AL.
    Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Cumberland County
    No. 2012-JV-2914      Larry M. Warner, Judge
    No. E2013-00740-COA-R3-PT-FILED-JANUARY 17, 2014
    This is a termination of parental rights action focusing on the two minor children (“the
    Children”) of mother, Sandra W. (“Mother”). A termination petition was filed by the
    Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) after the third custody proceeding
    involving the Children. The petition alleges the statutory grounds of abandonment,
    substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and persistent conditions. Following
    a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its findings, by clear and convincing
    evidence, that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children, (2) Mother had failed to substantially
    comply with the permanency plans, and (3) the conditions leading to removal still persisted.
    The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s
    parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court
    Affirmed; Case Remanded
    T HOMAS R. F RIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which C HARLES D.
    S USANO, J R., P.J., and D. M ICHAEL S WINEY, J., joined.
    John R. Williams, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Sandra W.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, and Mary Byrd Ferrara, Assistant
    Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of
    Children’s Services.
    OPINION
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    Mother is a parent of four minor children who were the subject of a series of three
    separate DCS custody proceedings: twin sons Charles and Christopher, now age eighteen;
    Savannah, now age fifteen; and Robert, now age fourteen. The prior custody actions
    occurred in 2000 and from 2005 through 2007. Mother’s drug use, the Children’s truancy
    issues, domestic violence, and environmental issues in the home were the causes of the prior
    proceedings.
    The most recent custody episode began when Robert was charged with vandalism and
    disorderly conduct in December 2010. Robert had previously been charged with truancy,
    vandalism, and unruliness at school. DCS scheduled numerous meetings with Mother
    concerning the matters. She cancelled, however, giving various reasons. DCS then
    petitioned, seeking custody of Robert based upon Mother’s non-compliance and failure to
    cooperate.
    On April 8, 2011, when Mother appeared before the trial court for a permanency plan
    review hearing, the court ordered Mother to submit to both urine and hair follicle drug
    screens. Mother refused and was consequently placed in jail for contempt of court. When
    Mother eventually complied, the drug screens proved positive for amphetamines, marijuana,
    and opiates. A few days later, DCS received a referral regarding Savannah, who was
    scheduled for truancy-related court proceedings due to thirty days of unexcused absences.
    At that point, DCS petitioned for and was granted custody of the remaining children. Three
    permanency plans were developed and ratified by the court during this most recent custody
    proceeding.
    In the months to follow, Mother was incarcerated on five different occasions, the
    longest of which extended approximately four months. Mother failed or refused several drug
    screens during the custody proceeding. She was arrested for driving under the influence of
    an intoxicant (“DUI”) as recently as September 16, 2012. DCS filed a petition seeking
    termination of Mother’s parental rights relative to all four children on August 21, 2012.1 The
    older twin sons reached the age of eighteen on June 3, 2013, and were accordingly dismissed
    from this action. A bench trial was conducted on February 15, 2013. The trial court granted
    the petition upon its findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had
    abandoned the Children, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency
    1
    DCS also sought termination of the parental rights of the biological father (“Father”) of the
    Children in the same petition, which the trial court granted. Father has not appealed.
    -2-
    plans, and (3) the conditions leading to removal still persisted. The court further found, by
    clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
    Children’s best interest. Mother timely appealed.
    II. Issues Presented
    Mother presents the following issues for our review, which we have restated slightly:
    1.     Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of
    Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to
    support.
    2.     Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of
    Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to establish
    a suitable home.
    3.     Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of
    Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated
    parent.
    4.     Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of
    Mother’s parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the
    permanency plans.
    5.     Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to establish that the
    termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Children.
    III. Standard of Review
    In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine “whether
    the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a
    preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 
    193 S.W.3d 528
    , 530 (Tenn. 2006). The
    trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record, accompanied by a
    presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. Id.;
    Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo with no
    presumption of correctness. In re Bernard T., 
    319 S.W.3d 586
    , 597 (Tenn. 2010). The trial
    court’s determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and
    shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v.
    Garrett, 
    92 S.W.3d 835
    , 838 (Tenn. 2002).
    -3-
    “Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their
    children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling, 
    92 S.W.3d 374
    , 378 (Tenn. 2002). It is well established, however, that “this right is not absolute
    and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence justifying
    such termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 
    776 S.W.2d 96
    , 97 (Tenn. Ct.
    App. 1988) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 
    455 U.S. 745
    , 
    102 S. Ct. 1388
    , 
    71 L. Ed. 2d 599
    (1982)). As our Supreme Court has instructed:
    In light of the constitutional dimension of the rights at stake in a termination
    proceeding under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–1–113, the persons seeking to
    terminate these rights must prove all the elements of their case by clear and
    convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–1–113(c); In re Adoption of
    
    A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 808
    –09; In re Valentine, 
    79 S.W.3d 539
    , 546 (Tenn.
    2002). The purpose of this heightened burden of proof is to minimize the
    possibility of erroneous decisions that result in an unwarranted termination of
    or interference with these rights. In re Tiffany B., 
    228 S.W.3d 148
    , 155 (Tenn.
    Ct. App. 2007); In re M.A.R., 
    183 S.W.3d 652
    , 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
    Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief or
    conviction regarding the truth of the facts, In re Audrey S., 
    182 S.W.3d 838
    ,
    861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt
    about the correctness of these factual findings. In re 
    Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 546
    ; State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Mims (In re N.B.), 
    285 S.W.3d 435
    ,
    447 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
    In re Bernard 
    T., 319 S.W.3d at 596
    .
    IV. Abandonment by Willful Failure to Support
    The trial court, inter alia, terminated Mother’s parental rights on the statutory ground
    that she abandoned the Children by willfully failing to support them. Tennessee Code
    Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(1) (Supp. 2013) provides, as relevant to this action:
    (g) Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based
    upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The following grounds
    are cumulative and non-exclusive, so that listing conditions, acts or omissions
    in one ground does not prevent them from coming within another ground:
    (1) Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-102, has
    occurred; . . .
    -4-
    Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A) (2010) defines abandonment, in relevant part,
    as:
    (i) For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the
    filing of a proceeding or pleading to terminate the parental rights of the
    parent(s) or guardian(s) of the child who is the subject of the petition for
    termination of parental rights or adoption, that the parent(s) or guardian(s)
    either have willfully failed to visit or have willfully failed to support or have
    willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child;
    ...
    (iv) A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the institution of an
    action or proceeding to declare a child to be an abandoned child, or the parent
    or guardian has been incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) months
    immediately preceding the institution of such action or proceeding, and either
    has willfully failed to visit or has willfully failed to support or has willfully
    failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child for four (4)
    consecutive months immediately preceding such parent’s or guardian’s
    incarceration, or the parent or guardian has engaged in conduct prior to
    incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; . .
    ..
    Pursuant to the statute, the court must find that a parent’s failure to visit or support was
    willful. In re Adoption of A.M.H., 
    215 S.W.3d 793
    , 810 (Tenn. 2007). As this Court has
    previously explained:
    The concept of “willfulness” is at the core of the statutory definition of
    abandonment. A parent cannot be found to have abandoned a child under
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) unless the parent has either “willfully”
    failed to visit or “willfully” failed to support the child for a period of four
    consecutive months.
    In re Audrey S., 
    182 S.W.3d 838
    , 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
    Failure to visit or support a child is “willful” when a person is “aware of his or her
    duty to visit or support, has the capacity to do so, makes no attempt to do so, and has no
    justifiable excuse for not doing so.” 
    Id. at 864.
    -5-
    This Court further explained:
    The willfulness of particular conduct depends upon the actor’s intent. Intent
    is seldom capable of direct proof, and triers-of-fact lack the ability to peer into
    a person’s mind to assess intentions or motivations. Accordingly, triers-of-fact
    must infer intent from the circumstantial evidence, including a person’s actions
    or conduct.
    
    Id. (citations omitted).
    Further, as Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(G) expressly
    provides: “Specifically, it shall not be required that a parent be shown to have evinced a
    settled purpose to forego all parental rights and responsibilities in order for a determination
    of abandonment to be made.”
    In its final judgment, the trial court included the following specific findings regarding
    Mother’s willful failure to support the Children:
    The Respondent, [Mother], has been incarcerated during the four consecutive
    months prior to the filing of this petition. [Mother] has been incarcerated from
    9-17-11 to 9-18-11, from 9-26-11 to 11-9-11, on 1-26-12 and released same
    day, from 2-1-12 to 6-12-12 and from 7-19-12 to 7-20-12.
    [Mother] willfully failed to support said children for four (4) months
    immediately preceding her incarceration. [Mother] has not contributed to the
    support of the children since they were placed in custody on 12-20-10 and 4-
    15-11. [Mother] is able bodied and capable of working and supporting the
    children prior to her incarceration. [Mother] was aware of her duty to support
    the children. [Mother] made no attempt to support the children prior to her
    incarceration and has provided no justifiable excuse for failing to support the
    children.
    (Paragraph numbering omitted).
    Having carefully reviewed the record in this cause, we conclude that the trial court’s
    findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The petition seeking termination
    of Mother’s parental rights was filed on August 21, 2012. The proof adduced at trial
    demonstrated that Mother had been incarcerated for part of the four months immediately
    preceding the petition’s filing and had failed to support or to make reasonable payments
    toward the support of the Children for four consecutive months immediately preceding her
    incarceration. Mother had, in fact, paid no support whatsoever during the time the Children
    had been in state custody, which was approximately two years at the time of trial. There was
    -6-
    no proof that Mother was incapable of working, as she represented to DCS that she was
    employed. Further, all three permanency plans referenced Mother’s duty to pay child support
    for the Children, directing both the amount of such support and where it should be sent. The
    assigned DCS caseworker also testified that Mother was aware of her duty to pay child
    support. There is clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that Mother willfully failed
    to support these Children for at least four months prior to her incarceration. The trial court
    did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights based on this statutory ground.
    V. Abandonment by Failure to Establish Suitable Home
    The trial court found, as an additional statutory ground for terminating Mother’s
    parental rights, that she abandoned the Children by failing to establish a suitable home.
    Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A) also defines abandonment, in relevant part, as:
    (ii) The child has been removed from the home of the parent(s) or guardian(s)
    as the result of a petition filed in the juvenile court in which the child was
    found to be a dependent and neglected child, as defined in § 37-1-102, and the
    child was placed in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing
    agency, that the juvenile court found, or the court where the termination of
    parental rights petition is filed finds, that the department or a licensed
    child-placing agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child
    or that the circumstances of the child’s situation prevented reasonable efforts
    from being made prior to the child’s removal; and for a period of four (4)
    months following the removal, the department or agency has made reasonable
    efforts to assist the parent(s) or guardian(s) to establish a suitable home for the
    child, but that the parent(s) or guardian(s) have made no reasonable efforts to
    provide a suitable home and have demonstrated a lack of concern for the child
    to such a degree that it appears unlikely that they will be able to provide a
    suitable home for the child at an early date. The efforts of the department or
    agency to assist a parent or guardian in establishing a suitable home for the
    child may be found to be reasonable if such efforts exceed the efforts of the
    parent or guardian toward the same goal, when the parent or guardian is aware
    that the child is in the custody of the department; . . . .
    In its final judgment, the trial court included the following specific findings regarding
    Mother’s failure to establish a suitable home:
    The children were removed from the parents, [Mother] and [Father], as the
    result of a Petition filed in Juvenile Court in which the children were found to
    be dependent and neglected as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. §37-1-102(12) and
    -7-
    the children were placed in the Department’s custody. The Juvenile Court
    found that the Department made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the
    children or the circumstances of the children’s situation prevented reasonable
    efforts from being made prior to the children’s removal.
    For a period of four (4) months following the removal of the children from the
    parents, the Department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parents,
    [Mother] and [Father], to establish a suitable home for the children, but the
    parents have made no reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and have
    demonstrated a lack of concern for the children to such a degree that it appears
    unlikely that [Mother] or [Father] will be able to provide a suitable home for
    the children at an early date. That four month period of time following the
    removal for Robert [D.] was from 12-20-10 to 4-20-11 and for Savannah [D.]
    from 4-15-11 to 8-15-11.
    The reasonable efforts the Department made in the first four months include
    making the children available for visitation, arranging supervision for the
    visitation, providing transportation for visitation, administering or attempting
    to administer drug screens to the parents, home visits to the parents’ homes,
    pointing out environmental issues in home and instructing parent on how to
    remedy, arranging, paying for and providing transportation to a psychological
    intake appointment for the mother, provided information where the parents
    could obtain free [alcohol and drug] A&D assessments and paying the
    mother’s electric bill.
    The parents’ lack of reasonable efforts includes not having suitable housing,
    continuing to abuse drugs and not cooperat[ing] with A&D treatment.
    (Paragraph numbering omitted.) The trial court concluded that Mother had abandoned the
    Children by failing to provide a suitable home pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-
    1-102(1)(A)(ii).
    The evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s factual findings. Robert,
    having been found to be dependent and neglected by order of the trial court on December 20,
    2010, was placed in the custody of DCS. Through that order, the court further found that
    DCS had made reasonable efforts to prevent Robert’s removal but that Mother had
    continually refused to cooperate with in-home services needed to allow Robert to remain in
    her home. Similarly, Savannah was placed into DCS protective custody by the trial court
    on April 19, 2011, after Mother failed a court-ordered drug screen. By its order, the court
    found that reasonable efforts were made by DCS to prevent removal of the Children or that
    -8-
    the emergency nature of Savannah’s condition or other circumstances prevented reasonable
    efforts prior to the Children’s removal.
    During a period of twenty-six months following Robert’s removal and a term of
    twenty-two months following Savannah’s removal, DCS made reasonable efforts to assist
    the Mother in establishing a suitable home for the Children. DCS visited Mother’s home,
    provided information and advice to Mother regarding environmental hazards, and paid
    Mother’s utility bill. DCS provided in-home services to Mother, which addressed such issues
    as parenting and housekeeping skills. DCS also scheduled a psychological assessment for
    Mother, which included paying for same and providing transportation. DCS further provided
    Mother with information regarding a free alcohol and drug assessment and obtained a
    placement for Mother at a treatment facility, which Mother was unable to attend due to her
    subsequent incarceration.
    Despite these efforts by DCS, Mother made no reasonable effort to provide a suitable
    home for the Children. At the time of trial, Mother was still residing in the same home that
    previously presented environmental concerns; the home remained without electricity or
    running water. Mother’s only means of heating the home was by use of a kerosene heater,
    but when DCS visited the home less than two weeks before trial, Mother was staying with
    a neighbor because she had no money to buy kerosene. Despite having completed outpatient
    treatment in 2011, Mother experienced a subsequent relapse, continuing to fail drug screens
    and incurring a recent DUI charge. Mother had been incarcerated multiple times during the
    most recent custody event, and other individuals who appeared to be under the influence of
    drugs were staying at her home at various times when DCS visited. Mother’s dearth of effort
    demonstrates a lack of concern for the Children to such a degree that it appears unlikely that
    she will be able to provide a suitable home at an early date. The efforts of DCS to assist
    Mother clearly exceeded the efforts of Mother toward providing a suitable home for the
    Children. The trial court did not err in finding that Mother had abandoned the Children by
    failing to provide a suitable home and terminating her parental rights based on this statutory
    ground.
    VI. Abandonment by Exhibiting Wanton Disregard Prior to Incarceration
    As previously stated, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A) (2010) defines
    abandonment, in relevant part, as:
    (iv) A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the institution of an
    action or proceeding to declare a child to be an abandoned child, or the parent
    or guardian has been incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) months
    immediately preceding the institution of such action or proceeding, and either
    -9-
    has willfully failed to visit or has willfully failed to support or has willfully
    failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child for four (4)
    consecutive months immediately preceding such parent’s or guardian’s
    incarceration, or the parent or guardian has engaged in conduct prior to
    incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child;
    ....
    (Emphasis added.) Regarding the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard, the statute
    does not limit the parent’s conduct to any particular four-month period prior to incarceration.
    In re Audrey S., 
    182 S.W.3d 838
    , 865 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
    The trial court found in its final decree, inter alia:
    The Respondent, [Mother], engaged in such conduct prior to incarceration as
    to exhibit a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. The
    Respondent’s conduct in wanton disregard for the welfare of the children was
    continued drug abuse, ongoing criminal activity, repeated incarcerations,
    violating orders of protection, failure to support the children, neglect of the
    children, failing to maintain stable or appropriate housing for the children, not
    addressing the children’s truancy issues, refusing services to address these
    issues, exposing the children to domestic violence, and exposing the children
    to drugs which contributed to the children’s A&D issues.
    The evidence adduced at trial preponderates in favor of these findings. There was no
    question that Mother continued to use drugs until the time of trial, despite efforts by DCS to
    obtain appropriate treatment for her. During the time the Children were in state custody,
    Mother failed and refused numerous drug screens and was repeatedly incarcerated for
    charges involving drug and alcohol use. Although Mother had recently sought outpatient
    treatment, she had not returned to see her drug counselor for five weeks. Mother provided
    no explanation. The DCS caseworker testified that the Children had significant truancy
    issues while living with Mother and had been exposed to drug use and domestic violence.
    At least one child had developed serious drug and alcohol issues himself, requiring two
    hospitalizations.
    The applicable statute does not define “wanton disregard.” We have previously
    explained the purpose behind this statutory section, however, as follows:
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) also reflects the commonsense notion
    that parental incarceration is a strong indicator that there may be problems in
    the home that threaten the welfare of the child. Incarceration severely
    -10-
    compromises a parent’s ability to perform his or her parental duties. A
    parent’s decision to engage in conduct that carries with it the risk of
    incarceration is itself indicative that the parent may not be fit to care for the
    child. However, parental incarceration is not an infallible predictor of parental
    unfitness. Accordingly, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv)’s second test
    for abandonment does not make incarceration alone a ground for the
    termination of parental rights. An incarcerated or recently incarcerated parent
    can be found guilty of abandonment only if the court finds, by clear and
    convincing evidence, that the parent’s pre-incarceration conduct displayed a
    wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Thus, the parent’s incarceration
    serves only as a triggering mechanism that allows the court to take a closer
    look at the child’s situation to determine whether the parental behavior that
    resulted in incarceration is part of a broader pattern of conduct that renders the
    parent unfit or poses a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child.
    In re Audrey 
    S., 182 S.W.3d at 866
    (internal citations omitted).
    Tennessee courts have recognized in numerous cases that a parent’s drug abuse and
    criminal activity can constitute a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. See In re
    S.L.A., 
    223 S.W.3d 295
    , 299 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); In re Audrey 
    S., 182 S.W.3d at 867-68
    ;
    In re Daysia D., M2012-00608-COA-R3-PT, 
    2012 WL 4503202
    at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sep.
    28, 2012). For example, in Daysia, the mother was convicted of selling drugs within a
    school zone. 
    Id. at *3.
    Mother admitted at trial that she also smoked marijuana at home
    while the children were present but in a different room. 
    Id. This Court
    found that such
    behavior constituted a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare. 
    Id. In the
    case of In re Chyna L.M.D., E2012-00661-COA-R3-PT, 
    2012 WL 3776699
    at
    *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2012), the father was on probation when the child was
    conceived. He subsequently violated his probation by failing to appear for court and testing
    positive for illegal drugs. 
    Id. The father
    was offered the opportunity to participate in the
    “Community Alternatives to Prison Program” (“CAPP”), which would have allowed him to
    complete his sentence in a halfway house and remain in the community with his girlfriend
    and child. 
    Id. When the
    father appeared in court for a hearing, however, he behaved in such
    a manner that the CAPP offer of enhanced probation was withdrawn. 
    Id. Consequently, the
    father’s probation was revoked, and he was returned to prison. 
    Id. This Court
    found that
    such conduct was sufficient to establish that the father exhibited a wanton disregard for the
    welfare of his unborn child. 
    Id. at *5.
    Similarly, in the case at bar, Mother continuously engaged in drug use and criminal
    behavior, which affected her ability to provide a suitable home for the Children. The
    -11-
    Children were exposed to drug use and domestic violence in the home. Mother failed to
    remedy her drug problem, which had existed for many years. Mother instead chose to
    embark upon a course of continuing drug abuse and criminal activity, leading to multiple
    incarcerations. We conclude that Mother clearly engaged in conduct prior to her
    incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Children. There is
    clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental
    rights on this statutory ground.
    VII. Substantial Noncompliance with Permanency Plans
    The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights, inter alia, on the ground that
    she failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities set out in her
    permanency plans. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(2) (Supp. 2013) provides,
    relevant to this action, as follows:
    (2) There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or
    guardian with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency
    plan pursuant to the provisions of title 37, chapter 2, part 4.
    In its findings regarding Mother’s efforts under the permanency plans, the trial court
    stated in relevant portion:
    The Respondent, [Mother], has not substantially complied with the provisions
    of the permanency plans and therefore her parental rights should be terminated
    pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2).
    The initial permanency plan for Robert dated 1-19-11 requires her to submit
    to an A&D assessment, follow the recommendations from the A&D
    assessment, submit to random urine and hair follicle drug screens, have a safe
    and stable home with utilities, have a mental health assessment, follow the
    recommendations from the mental health assessment, actively participate in
    family counseling with Robert, participate in child’s educational meetings.
    The Court ratified the initial permanency plan on 4-8-11 and found that the
    plan was reasonable, necessary and in the best interest of the children.
    The initial permanency plan for the other children and a revised plan for
    Robert dated 5-3-11 requires her to only take medications prescribed to her by
    doctor, take medications as prescribed, submit to random urine and hair follicle
    drug screens, make prescription medications available to DCS case manager
    for pill counts, submit to an A&D assessment, follow the recommendations
    -12-
    from the A&D assessment until successfully completed, refrain from others
    who are known to abuse drugs or alcohol, obtain a mental health assessment,
    follow all recommendations from the mental health assessment, sign releases
    of information, maintain housing, pay utilities and rent monthly, provide proof
    to DCS of paying rent and utilities, obtain and maintain legal means of
    support, develop a budget, attend and actively participate [in] family
    counseling with Robert, and be involved in children’s education by attending
    meetings. The Court ratified the initial permanency plan on 5-27-11 and found
    that the plan was reasonable, necessary and in the best interest of the children.
    The revised permanency plan dated 10-24-11 requires her to only take
    medications prescribed to her by doctor, take medications as prescribed,
    submit to random urine and hair follicle drug screens, make prescription
    medications available to DCS case manager for pill counts, submit to an A&D
    assessment, follow the recommendations from the A&D assessment until
    successfully completed, refrain from others who are known to abuse drugs or
    alcohol, not use any illegal drugs, obtain a mental health assessment, follow
    all recommendations from the mental health assessment, sign releases of
    information, maintain housing, pay utilities and rent monthly, provide proof
    to DCS of paying rent and utilities, obtain and maintain legal means of
    support, develop a budget, follow all orders of the court, not incur any further
    legal charges, attend and actively participate [in] family counseling with
    Robert, and be involved in children’s education by attending meetings. The
    Court ratified the revised permanency plan on 12-16-11 and found that the
    plan was reasonable, necessary and in the best interest of the children.
    The requirements in the permanency plans are all reasonably related to
    remedying the conditions that necessitate foster care.
    [Mother] has not completed the following requirements in the permanency
    plans: she has not successfully completed A&D treatment or aftercare, she
    continued to test positive for illicit drugs, she has incurred new criminal
    charges, she has not followed the recommendations from her mental health
    assessment and she does not have appropriate housing with all utilities.
    The Department made reasonable efforts to assist [Mother] in complying with
    the requirements in the permanency plan by making the children available for
    visitation, arranging supervision for the visitation, providing transportation for
    visitation, administering or attempting to administer drug screens to the parent,
    home visits to the parent’s home, pointing out environmental issues in home
    -13-
    and instructing parent on how to remedy, arranging, paying for and providing
    transportation to a psychological intake appointment for the mother, provided
    information where the parent could obtain free A&D assessments, paid the
    mother’s electric bill, arranging, paying for and transporting her to a
    psychological evaluation, arranging and paying for hair follicle drug screens
    and attempting to assist her in obtaining in-patient treatment.
    [Mother] was advised on 5-3-11 and 10-26-11 that failure to substantially
    comply with the permanency plans was grounds for termination of parental
    rights.
    (Paragraph numbering omitted.)
    Upon careful review, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports
    these findings. DCS personnel’s testimony established that Mother was living in a home
    with no utilities, including no running water. Mother had never provided any proof of her
    employment or her prescriptions to DCS. Although Mother had submitted to a few drug
    screens, usually not when initially requested, she also had failed or refused numerous other
    drug screens. The caseworker testified that during one or two visits to Mother’s home,
    another individual was present who appeared to be under the influence of drugs. Mother also
    continued to incur criminal charges and was repeatedly incarcerated.
    The psychological examiner retained by DCS to perform Mother’s mental health
    evaluation testified that Mother suffered from a serious substance abuse problem, such that
    it was difficult to discern whether Mother’s symptoms were indicative of mental health issues
    or the result of substance abuse. The examiner further testified that Mother needed to be
    detoxified and participate in inpatient treatment. He opined that Mother’s prolonged
    addiction would be particularly difficult to overcome. The drug counselor who had met with
    Mother during three outpatient appointments at the close of 2012 testified that Mother had
    not returned for five weeks by the time of trial. Mother had never contacted the counselor
    to explain why she had not honored her appointments. The counselor concluded that Mother
    was not trying to remedy her drug problem. As the counselor testified, she advised Mother
    concerning free Narcotics Anonymous meetings and suggested that Mother attend ninety
    meetings in ninety days. Mother, however, failed to attend any such meetings.
    Regarding a parent’s substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, this Court
    has previously explained:
    Terminating parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2)
    requires more proof than that a parent has not complied with every jot and tittle
    -14-
    of the permanency plan. To succeed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2),
    the Department must demonstrate first that the requirements of the permanency
    plan are reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that caused the
    child to be removed from the parent’s custody in the first place, and second
    that the parent’s noncompliance is substantial in light of the degree of
    noncompliance and the importance of the particular requirement that has not
    been met. Trivial, minor, or technical deviations from a permanency plan’s
    requirements will not be deemed to amount to substantial noncompliance.
    In re M.J.B., 
    140 S.W.3d 643
    , 656-57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
    In the present action, the Department demonstrated that the requirements of the
    permanency plans were reasonable and related to remedying the conditions initially causing
    the Children to be removed from Mother’s custody. The evidence also preponderates in
    favor of a determination that Mother’s noncompliance with the reasonable requirements in
    her permanency plans was substantial, as she never seriously addressed her drug problem,
    did not follow the recommendations of her mental health evaluation, continued to incur
    criminal charges, associated with others who abused drugs, and did not maintain a suitable
    home with utilities to which the Children could return. We therefore conclude that there was
    clear and convincing evidence of the statutory ground of Mother’s substantial noncompliance
    with the requirements of the permanency plans. The trial court did not err in terminating
    Mother’s parental rights based upon same.
    VIII. Persistent Conditions
    The trial court also found that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated based
    upon the statutory ground of persistent conditions. Although Mother did not appeal the trial
    court’s determination in this regard, we will nonetheless address this ground in our analysis
    due to the “importance of permanently placing children and the just, speedy resolution of
    cases.” In re Angela E., 
    303 S.W.3d 240
    , 251 n. 14 (Tenn. 2010).
    Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3) provides, as an additional ground for
    termination of parental rights:
    The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by order
    of a court for a period of six (6) months and:
    (A) The conditions that led to the child’s removal or other
    conditions that in all reasonable probability would cause the
    child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect and that,
    -15-
    therefore, prevent the child’s safe return to the care of the
    parent(s) or guardian(s), still persist;
    (B) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be
    remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely returned
    to the parent(s) or guardian(s) in the near future; and
    (C) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child
    relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early
    integration into a safe, stable and permanent home; . . . .
    The trial court made the following findings with regard to this statutory ground:
    The children have been removed from the custody of their parents for more
    than six (6) months; the conditions which led to the removal of the children
    from the home of [Mother] and [Father] still exist and other conditions exist
    which in all probability would cause the children to be subject to further abuse
    and/or neglect, making it unlikely that the children could be returned to
    [Mother] or [Father] in the near future; there is little likelihood that these
    conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the children can be returned
    to [Mother] or [Father] in the near future; the continuation of the parent or
    guardian and child relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chance of an
    early integration into a stable and permanent home and therefore their parental
    rights should be terminated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3).
    The conditions that led to the removal of the children from the homes of
    [Mother] and [Father] were drug abuse, mental health issues, poor parenting
    including lack of supervision and criminal activity on the part of both parents.
    The conditions that prevent the children’s return to the parents’ homes are their
    ongoing criminal activity, drug abuse, failure to successfully complete A&D
    treatment, her failure to follow mental health recommendations, his failure to
    obtain a mental health assessment, their lack of appropriate housing, the lack
    of utilities in her home and his lack of income. She attended three A&D
    treatment sessions at CPR recently, but then quit going with no explanation.
    She refused a drug screen on 2-4-13.
    (Paragraph numbering omitted.)
    Upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude that these findings are supported
    -16-
    by a preponderance of the evidence. The Children were removed for a period of more than
    six months, and the predominant condition leading to removal, Mother’s drug problem, still
    persists. Mother did not comply with treatment recommendations and continued to fail or
    refuse drug screens. She accrued drug and alcohol-related criminal charges up to the date
    of trial. There is little likelihood that this condition will be remedied in the near future, as
    the evidence at trial demonstrated that Mother had battled this issue for at least thirteen years
    and was doing little or nothing to address it. The evidence also demonstrated that
    continuation of the parent and child relationship greatly diminishes the Children’s chances
    of integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. We conclude that the trial court
    properly terminated Mother’s parental rights based on this statutory ground as well.
    IX. Best Interest of Children
    Finally, Mother contends that there was not clear and convincing evidence that
    termination of her parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. We disagree. When
    a parent has been found to be unfit by establishment of a statutory ground for termination of
    parental rights, as here, the interests of parent and child diverge, and the focus shifts to what
    is in the child’s best interest. In re Audrey 
    S., 182 S.W.3d at 877
    . Tennessee Code
    Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2013) provides a list of factors the trial court is to consider
    when determining if termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. This list is
    not exhaustive, and the statute does not require the court to find the existence of every factor
    before concluding that termination is in a child’s best interest. In re Audrey 
    S., 182 S.W.3d at 878
    (“The relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the unique facts of
    each case.”). Further, the best interest of a child must be determined from the child’s
    perspective and not the parent’s. White v. Moody, 
    171 S.W.3d 187
    , 194 (Tenn. Ct. App.
    2004).
    Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) lists the following factors for consideration:
    (1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment
    of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in
    the child’s best interest to be in the home of the parent or
    guardian;
    (2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting
    adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services
    agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does
    not reasonably appear possible;
    (3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular
    -17-
    visitation or other contact with the child;
    (4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been
    established between the parent or guardian and the child;
    (5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment
    is likely to have on the child’s emotional, psychological and
    medical condition;
    (6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with
    the parent or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual,
    emotional or psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child,
    or another child or adult in the family or household;
    (7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or
    guardian’s home is healthy and safe, whether there is criminal
    activity in the home, or whether there is such use of alcohol,
    controlled substances or controlled substance analogues as may
    render the parent or guardian consistently unable to care for the
    child in a safe and stable manner;
    (8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional
    status would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or
    guardian from effectively providing safe and stable care and
    supervision for the child; or
    (9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support
    consistent with the child support guidelines promulgated by the
    department pursuant to § 36-5-101.
    In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of
    the Children, the trial court stated:
    1.     [Mother] and [Father] have not made an adjustment of circumstances, conduct
    or conditions as to make it safe and in the children’s best interest to be in the
    home of the parent.
    2.     [Mother] and [Father] have failed to effect a lasting adjustment after
    reasonable efforts by available social agencies for such duration of time that
    lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear possible.
    -18-
    3.     The physical environment of [Mother] and [Father]’s home is unhealthy and/or
    unsafe for the children.
    4.     There is criminal activity in [Mother] and [Father]’s home.
    5.     [Mother] and [Father]’s use of alcohol or controlled substances renders them
    consistently unable to care for the children [in] a safe and stable manner.
    6.     [Mother] and [Father]’s mental and/or emotional status would be detrimental
    to the children and/or prevent them from effectively providing safe and stable
    care and supervision for the children.
    7.     [Mother] and [Father] have not paid child support consistently with the child
    support guidelines promulgated by the Department pursuant to Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 36-5-101.
    8.     [Mother] and [Father] have not paid a reasonable portion of the children’s
    substitute physical care and maintenance when financially able to do so. They
    have not regularly provided food, clothing, toiletries, school supplies or the
    other things the children needed on a daily basis.
    9.     [Mother] and [Father] continue to make lifestyle choices that prevent them
    from being able to parent the children or to provide a home for the children.
    10.    The children need to be released from the stigma of being foster children.
    Thus the Court finds that [DCS] has proven by clear and convincing evidence
    that grounds for termination of parental rights exists and has proven by clear
    and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children that all the
    parental rights of said Respondents to said children be forever terminated; . .
    ..
    Again, we determine that the evidence adduced at trial supports the trial court’s
    findings. This was the third custody proceeding involving these Children. At the time of
    trial, DCS had been involved with this family for approximately thirteen years. Mother had
    failed to make an adjustment of her circumstances or conduct such that it would be safe for
    the Children to be returned to her, despite reasonable efforts by DCS. By the time of trial,
    the Children had been in state custody for approximately two years. Mother’s drug problem
    had persisted for many years without any substantial effort at remedying same by Mother.
    An appropriate adjustment does not appear reasonably possible. Although Mother had
    -19-
    continued visitation with the Children, there was no testimony regarding whether she
    maintained a meaningful relationship with them. Testimony was presented evincing that
    returning the Children to Mother would be detrimental to them emotionally, psychologically,
    and medically. Mother had not attended to the Children’s medical, educational, or emotional
    needs while they were in her care, and the testimony established that she was unlikely to do
    so in the future.
    DCS personnel testified that the Children were doing well in their current placements
    and that Robert especially needed significant environmental structure in order for his needs
    to be met. DCS employees opined that permanency could be achieved for the Children and
    that it was detrimental for the Children to remain in foster care indefinitely. Additional
    testimony was presented that Mother had, in recent months, aided one of her older sons in
    an attempt to run away from his DCS placement. According to the testimony, Robert was
    caught possessing cigarettes after Mother’s visit with him in December 2011.
    The DCS employees’ testimony established that Mother had subjected the Children
    to an environment of drugs and domestic violence when they were in her home. Mother
    continued to test positive for illicit drugs, incur criminal charges, and allow other persons
    who were under the influence of drugs to remain in her home. According to the
    psychological examiner who assessed Mother, she needed to be detoxified and undergo
    serious inpatient drug treatment before her mental status could be accurately evaluated. He
    also explained that Mother’s continuing drug use created a risk for the Children. The
    evidence supports a determination that Mother’s mental and emotional status would prevent
    her from effectively providing safe and stable care for the Children. Finally, Mother had paid
    no child support despite being aware of her duty to do so.
    Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is clear and
    convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the
    Children. We discern no error in the trial court’s determination that Mother’s parental rights
    should be terminated.
    X. Conclusion
    The judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of Mother is affirmed.
    Costs on appeal are taxed to appellant, Sandra W. This case is remanded to the trial court,
    pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court’s judgment and collection of
    costs assessed below.
    _________________________________
    THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE
    -20-