David E. Lind, et ux. Myra Gwinn Lind v. Allen M. Well, Clyde N. Well, and Aster Vance Webb ( 1998 )


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  •                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE                   FILED
    March 2, 1998
    DAVID E. LIND, et ux MYRA                       Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    ) C/A NO. 03A01-9710-CH-00473
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    GWYNN LIND,                   )
    ) KNOX CHANCERY
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,   )
    ) HON . SHA RON BEL L,
    v.                            ) CHANCELLOR
    )
    ALLEN M. WEBB, CLYDE N. WEBB, )
    and ASTER VANCE WEBB,         ) AFFIRMED
    ) AND
    Defendants-Appellants.  ) REMANDED
    CHARLES G. TAYLOR, III, McDON ALD, LEVY & TAYLOR , Knoxville, for
    Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    STEVEN G. SHOPE , Knoxville, for Defendants-Appellants.
    O P I N IO N
    Franks, J.
    In this boun dary line dispute the defen dants app eal from a judgmen t in
    favor of plaintiffs, insisting that the evidence established their right to the disputed
    area by adverse possession.
    The plaintiffs filed this action to establish the boundary between the
    parties, and defendants in their pleadings did not raise their right to the disputed area
    by adverse p ossession. H oweve r, on the mo rning of trial d efendan ts essentially
    concede d the boun dary line was w here plaintiff s had allege d, but as the C hancellor, in
    her judgm ent recited:
    The parties then announced that in regard to the claim concerning
    location of the boundary between the parties’ respective lots, the parties
    were stipulating that the only issue to be decided by the Court was
    whether or not the defendants had a valid defense based upon adverse
    possession. It was agreed that, if the defendants could not prove that
    they were entitled to the disputed property by adverse possession, then
    plaintiffs w ould prev ail.
    After hearing testimony, the Chancellor ruled that “the defendants had
    not ‘openly and notoriously’ occupied the plaintiffs’ property for a sufficient length of
    time to establish a valid claim by adverse possession.”
    In order for the defense of adverse possession to be sustained, we
    explained in Panter v. Miller, 
    698 S.W.2d 63
     4 (Tenn. App . 1985):
    The burden is on the one alleging to prove his defense of adverse
    posses sion. See Tipton v. Smith, 
    593 S.W.2d 298
    . Adverse possession
    is neve r to be p resum ed, but a ll of its ele ment m ust be p roved. Drewery
    v. Nelms, (1915) 
    132 Tenn. 254
    , 
    177 S.W. 946
    . In order to be adverse,
    the pos session must b e open , notorio us, con tinuou s, actual a nd visib le.
    Sequatchie Val. Coal & Iron Co. v. Coppinger, (1895) 
    95 Tenn. 526
    , 
    32 S.W. 465
    . The caliber of proof necessary to show those required
    elemen ts is depe ndent u pon the use to w hich the land is su sceptib le.
    Blanken ship v. Blan kenship, (1983 Tenn . App. W .S.) 658 S.W.2 d 125.
    Id. At 636.
    “Clear and po sitive pro of” is re quired to estab lish adv erse po ssession . Kidwell v.
    VanDeventer, 686 S .W.2d 899 (T enn. A pp. 198 4).
    At the conclusion of the evidence, the Chancellor observed:
    For thirty years or so, or perhaps short of that, the defendants used
    portions of the land in question to plant seedlings, bedding plants and
    some shrubbery. I believe that his planting probably more likely than
    not exte nded in to the dis puted a rea, wh ich wa s a heav ily wood ed area .
    The plants that the Court has been shown today . . . were indigenous or
    natural to the w ooded ar eas. . . . so they are no t the types of pla nts in
    general that would put one on notice that they were anything other than
    natural plantings that was natural to the area. There were some beds
    apparently in which seedlings were planted, but, as the defendant has
    told us, these were pretty well hidden, not to hide them from the
    plaintiffs, but to prevent thievery. Most telling, as the defendant has
    testified, people around would probably not know an activity was going
    on. And under the testimony, the area was so thick, as most witnesses
    have said, it w ould not inv ite a stroll throug h the area to investigate
    activ ity.
    The evidence e stablishes that defendants ha d conducted nu rsery
    2
    operations on the lot adjoining plaintiffs’ lot beginning in 1950's. This activity had
    ceased by the time plaintiff purchased his lot in 1992. Plaintiff testified that he
    walked the boundary in question when he purchased the lot and there was no
    indication that anyone was using the property for any purpose. There were no fences,
    buildings or structures, and the property was heavily wooded. The engineer who
    made a b oundary surv ey for plaintiffs testified that pla intiffs’ land w as heavily
    wooded an d he did not observ e anything that would indicate d efendants were
    conducting a “business activity” in the heavily wooded area. The Marshalls who
    reside across the road from the disputed property since 1954, testified that they never
    had any kno wledge th at defend ants had co nducted n ursery activities on the property
    which plaintiffs purchased. Mr. Marshall conceded on cross-examination that he
    never went into the woods and explained “I would have to have a machete to cut my
    way thro ugh the wood s”.
    Defend ant Allen W ebb testified that he had continuou sly used the 20 ft.
    strip from 1975 through 1988 by planting Rhododendrons, Mahonia, Lobelia and
    some ferns, and conceded that the plantings “were not obvious”. Webb further
    testified after observing that his mother had run “people off who were trying to take
    the stuff that was in there”:
    Q.     Is that one of the reasons you tried to hide it back there?
    A.     Yes, sir.
    Q.     You tried to put them way back in the woods so they were not
    easily observed from the road?
    A.     That’s part of it. Yes, sir, it was.
    Q.     Anybody driv ing by wou ldn’t know you planted stu ff back in
    there, right?
    A.     That’s corr ect.
    Q.     And the owner of that lot 183, if they had driven by they
    wouldn ’t have any ide a you were o ccupying tha t land, wou ld
    3
    they?
    A.      I would doubt that they would.
    We agree with the Trial Judge that the evidence offered by the defendant
    that the occa sional use o f the dispute d area by plan ting and co ncealing n ursery plants
    in part of the disputed area d oes not constitute open an d visible possession. To im part
    notice, it has be en said that:
    Notice of possession of that ope n and visib le character w hich from its
    nature is calculated to apprise the world that the land is occupied and
    who the occupan t is; such an ap propriation o f land by claim ant as to
    apprise, or co nvey visible no tice to, the com munity or neig hborhoo d in
    which it is situa ted that it is in his ex clusive use and enjoym ent.
    2 CJS Adverse Possession §50, p.714.
    Considering defendants’ evidence alone, the elements required to establish adverse
    posses sion are not esta blished . See Se quatch ie Val. C oal & Iro n Co.
    We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand with the cost of
    the appeal assessed to appellants.
    __________________________
    Herschel P. Franks, J.
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________
    Don T. McM urray, J.
    ___________________________
    William H. Inman, Sr.J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03A01-9710-CH-00473

Judges: Judge Herschel P. Franks

Filed Date: 3/2/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014