Mohamed Ali v. Board of Paroles ( 2001 )


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  •                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs May 31, 2001
    MOHAMED ALI v. TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLES
    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
    No. 01-1711-III  Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor
    No. M2001-02302-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 16, 2002
    Appellant, an inmate of the Department of Corrections, appeals the dismissal of his Petition for
    Certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. He was convicted in 1993 of one count of
    rape and one count of attempted bribery of a witness. He received sentences of twelve years and
    three years, respectively, to be served consecutively. He seeks mandatory parole under Tennessee
    Code Annotated section 40-28-117(b) and other relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
    WILLIAM B. CAIN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BEN H. CANTRELL , P.J., and
    PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, J., joined.
    Mohamed Ali, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro Se.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Mark A. Hudson,
    Senior Counsel, for the appellee, Tennessee Board of Paroles.
    OPINION
    Appellant, an inmate in the Department of Corrections, was sentenced in 1993 to an effective
    term of fifteen years. He has four times been rejected for parole on the basis provided by Tennessee
    Code Annotated section 40-35-503(b)(2)(1997) that his parole “would depreciate the seriousness of
    the offense of the crime of which the defendant stands convicted or promote disrespect for the law.”
    He first asserts that he is entitled to mandatory parole under the provisions of Tennessee
    Code Annotated section 40-28-117(b).
    This section of the Code has never been repealed because it is still effective in certain cases
    involving crimes committed prior to July 1, 1982, and convictions occurring prior to May 26, 1983.
    See Eslick, v. Campbell, no. M1998-00944-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. Lexis 413 (Tenn. Ct.
    App. June 27, 2000); Ishaaq v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., No. M2000-01957-COA-R3-CV, 2001
    Tenn. App. Lexis 934 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001). Such has been the law since Chapter 227,
    Section 29 of the Public Acts of 1989 amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-28-115(b) and
    Chapter 406, Section 12 of the Public Acts of 1983 amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-
    35-503. As Appellant does not allege that he committed the crimes for which he was convicted prior
    to July 1, 1982, and as his petition shows on its face that he was convicted of these crimes in 1993,
    he is not and never has been eligible for mandatory parole under any statute, including Tennessee
    Code Annotated section 40-28-117(b).
    Next, Appellant complains that he has four times been rejected for parole because of the
    seriousness of his offenses under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-503(b)(2). A prisoner
    has no constitutional or inherit right to parole prior to the expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz
    v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 
    442 U.S. 1
    , 7-8 (1979). There is no constitutionally
    protected liberty interest in parole in Tennessee. Wright v. Trammell, 
    810 F.2d 589
     (6th Cir. 1987);
    Kaylor v. Bradley, 
    912 S.W.2d 728
    , 733 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
    The Tennessee Supreme Court has held: “In our view, consideration of the seriousness of the
    offense, the number of victims, and the risks to re-offend is appropriate to the parole decision.
    Consideration of these factors does not demonstrate that the Board acted illegally, fraudulently,
    arbitrarily, or in excess of its jurisdiction. Moreover, consideration of such factors does not
    implicate any constitutional right under the circumstances.” Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. Of Paroles,
    
    956 S.W.2d 478
    , 482-83 (Tenn. 1997).
    The Petition for Certiorari fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and was
    properly dismissed by the trial court. Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Bd., 
    879 S.W.2d 871
    (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and costs are assessed against Appellant.
    ___________________________________
    WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
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