Hooper v. Owens ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN SECTION AT KNOXVILLE FILED
July 24, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
MARY S. HOOPER, individually and as )
surviving spouse and next of kin of )
ROBERT HOOPER, deceased, ) KNOX CIRCUIT
)
Plaintiff/Appellant )
) NO. 03A01-9703-CV-00103
v. )
)
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS ) HON. DALE C. WORKMAN,
CORPORATION, et al., ) JUDGE
)
Defendants/Appellees ) AFFIRMED
Michael Y. Rowland and Janet Edwards, Rowland & Rowland, P.C., Knoxville, for the
Appellant
Dwight E. Tarwater, Thomas A. Bickers, Andrew R. Tillman, Knoxville, for the
Appellees
OPINION
INMAN, Senior Judge
This is an action for damages for wrongful death. The plaintiff alleged that her
husband died of malignant mesothelioma caused by asbestos to which he was last
exposed in 1962. He died on August 7, 1994, 32 years after his last exposure. This
action was filed August 19, 1994 against various manufacturers of products
containing asbestos. As relevant here, it was dismissed on motion for summary
judgment which applied the bar of the statute of repose, T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a). The
plaintiff appeals and presents for review the issue of whether the application of the
statute of repose violates Article 1, Section 17 of the Constitution of Tennessee, the
open courts provision. We hold that it does not and affirm the judgment.
Our review of this case is de novo on the record with no presumption of the
correctness of the trial court’s findings. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26
(Tenn. 1995).
T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a) provides as pertinent that:
Any action against a manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person or
property caused by its defective or unreasonably dangerous condition must be
brought within . . . six (6) years of the date of injury, in any event, the action
must be brought within ten (10) years from the date on which the product was
first purchased for use or consumption, . . . 1
The plaintiff argues that the latency period for mesothelioma exceeds the ten-
year limitation and thus the statute operates to abolish her right to seek
compensation for her husband’s injury contrary to Article 1, Section 17 of the
Constitution of Tennessee, which provides:
That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law
and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay.
The appellees respond that the statute was enacted in 1978 and has
withstood repeated onslaughts, citing Jones v. Five Star Engineering, Inc., 717
S.W.2d 882 (Tenn. 1986); King-Bradwell Partnership v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 865
S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tenn. App. 1993.), appeal denied (Tenn. 1993); Kochins v. Linden-
Allmak, Inc., 790 F.2d 1128, 1140 (6th Cir. 1986); Wayne v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Mathia v.
Eli Lilly and Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983); Spence v Miles Laboratories, Inc., 810
F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Tenn. 1992), aff’d, 37 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1994); Buckner v.
G.A.F. Corp., 495 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff’d, 659 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir.
1981).
In Jones, supra, our Supreme Court expressly adopted and approved the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Kochins in upholding the statute over due process
challenges of the Federal and State Constitutions and the open courts provision of
the Tennessee Constitution. Jones at 883; Kochins, 799 F.2d 1141.
1
The limitation does not apply to an asbestos-related injury occurring after July
1, 1979. T.C.A. § 29-28-103(b); Wyatt v. A-Best Prod. Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn.
App. 1995).
2
We agree with the appellees that a statute of repose cannot be re-examined
on a case-by-case basis. As stated in Jones:
Whenever the General Assembly enacts a statute of limitations or a statute of
repose, there are bound to be cases lying just outside the line which the
legislative body has drawn. This would be true whether the statute of repose
fixed a ten-year period, as here, a three-year period as in Harrison, supra, a
four-year period as in Harmon, supra, or any other prescribed period of time.
The statute in question was enacted after lengthy debates and full
consideration by the General Assembly. In our opinion, it represents a
reasonable balancing of the conflicting interests and concerns with which the
Legislature had to deal.
Jones, 717 S.W.2d at 883 (citing Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn.
1978); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessup Assoc., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981).
This Court is not at liberty to revise the opinions of the Supreme Court, or to
infringe the legislative function and prerogative. The judgment is affirmed at the
costs of the appellant.2
_____________________________
William H. Inman, Senior Judge
CONCUR:
_______________________________
Houston M. Goddard, Presiding Judge
_____________________________
Don T. McMurray, Judge
2
The allegations as to latency, etc. are not supported by the record, see Byrd
v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). As did the trial judge, we accept these
allegations as true for the purpose of deciding the constitutional issue.
3