Charles R. Browder and Teresa Noland Browder v. Jerry C. Morris and Chris Castleberry ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE, WESTERN SECTION
AT JACKSON
_______________________________________________________
)
CHARLES R. BROWDER and ) Shelby County Circuit Court
TERESA NOLAND BROWDER, ) No. 63317 T.D.
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants. )
) FILED
VS. ) C. A. NO. 02A01-9602-CV-00039
) May 1, 1997
JERRY C. MORRIS and )
CHRIS CASTLEBERRY, ET AL ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate C ourt Clerk
Defendant/Appellees. )
)
______________________________________________________________________________
From the Circuit Court of Shelby County at Memphis.
Honorable Wyeth Chandler, Judge
Randall J. Fishman,
Mark A. Mesler,
BALLIN, BALLIN & FISHMAN, P.C., Memphis, Tennessee
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
J. Cecil McWhirter,
McWHIRTER & WYATT, Memphis, Tennessee
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees Jerry C. Morris and Chris Castleberry.
James W. Cook,
CARD, COOK & HOLT, Memphis, Tennessee
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee General Accident Group.
Robert L. Moore,
THOMAS, HENDRIX, HARVEY, JOHNSON & MITCHELL, Memphis, Tennessee
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Paul Davis Systems, Inc.
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
FARMER, J.
CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S. : (Concurs)
HIGHERS, J. : (Concurs)
This is an interlocutory appeal by appellants, Charles R. and Teresa Noland Browder,
from the trial court’s denial of a motion seeking to amend their complaint to name an additional
party defendant pursuant to T.C.A. § 20-1-119. The statute was enacted in response to the supreme
court’s decision in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), which abolished the
doctrine of contributory negligence in Tennessee and adopted principles of comparative fault. The
statute allots a plaintiff in cases of comparative fault additional time beyond the normal running of
the statute of limitations within which to join a previously unnamed defendant by either amendment
of the complaint or institution of a separate action. The issue presented here is whether the statute
as enacted contemplates the joinder of a third party defendant whose liability, if any, is vicarious
only.
The following facts are before us: On July 25, 1994, the appellants filed suit against
Jerry C. Morris and Chris Castleberry for injuries Mr. Browder allegedly sustained in an automobile
accident with Morris on July 26, 1993.1 The complaint alleges that at the time of the accident,
Morris was operating a vehicle owned by Castleberry “with the consent, permission, authority, and
about the business of Mr. Castleberry.” The named defendants as well as the appellants’ liability
insurer, General Accident Insurance Company, filed answers to the complaint. General Accident’s
answer was filed on September 19, 1994. Upon motion, the trial court allowed General Accident
to amend its answer, to conform with certain facts made known during discovery, and assert that at
the time of the accident Morris was operating an automobile owned by Castleberry, but was on or
about the business of his employer, Paul Davis Systems, and that Paul Davis Systems was an
unnamed defendant. General Accident’s first amended answer was filed October 19, 1995. On
November 2, 1995, the appellants moved to amend their complaint to specifically name Paul Davis
Systems as an additional defendant. As noted, the motion was denied with this appeal resulting.
The issue on appeal as framed by Appellants is as follows:
Whether the trial court erred by denying the Plaintiffs’ motion
to seek leave of court to file an Amended Complaint against Paul
Davis Systems, Inc., where the Defendant, General Accident
Insurance Company, filed an Amended Answer, naming Paul Davis
1
Mrs. Browder’s claim was for loss of consortium.
Systems as an unnamed defendant, and where the Plaintiffs then
sought to name this party as a defendant pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated Section 20-1-119?
The statute provides, as here pertinent:
Comparative fault -- Joinder of third party defendants. -- (a) In
civil actions where comparative fault is or becomes an issue, if a
defendant named in an original complaint initiating a suit filed within
the applicable statute of limitations, or named in an amended
complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations, alleges in
an answer or amended answer to the original or amended complaint
that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury
or damage for which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and if the plaintiff’s
cause or causes of action against such person would be barred by any
applicable statute of limitations but for the operation of this section,
the plaintiff may, within ninety (90) days of the filing of the first
answer or first amended answer alleging such person’s fault, either:
(1) Amend the complaint to add such person as a defendant
pursuant to Rule 15 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and
cause process to be issued for that person; or
(2) Institute a separate action against that person by filing a
summons and complaint. . . .
(b) A cause of action brought within ninety (90) days pursuant
to subsection (a) shall not be barred by any statute of limitations.
This section shall not extend any applicable statute of repose, . . . .
(c) This section shall neither shorten nor lengthen the
applicable statute of limitations for any cause of action, other than as
provided in subsection (a).
....
(e) This section shall not limit the right of any defendant to
allege in an answer or amended answer that a person not a party to the
suit caused or contributed to the injury for which the plaintiff seeks
recovery.
It is agreed that resolution of the issue requires a proper interpretation of the language
“caused or contributed to” as utilized within the statute. Appellants assert2 that the statute should
not be so narrowly construed as to prohibit the joining of those defendants who, it is alleged, share
only financial responsibility for a plaintiff ’s alleged injuries. Appellants rely upon the legislative
history of the statute as supporting their position. To the contrary, Paul Davis Systems, on whose
behalf a brief has been filed with this Court, argues that the statute was not intended to apply to those
who share only vicarious responsibility as that person or entity “has done nothing to contribute to
the circumstances giving rise to the injury suffered by the plaintiff. . . .”
2
Appellees Morris, Castleberry and General Accident have adopted the arguments of
Appellants for purposes of this appeal.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the legislative intent, with
all rules of construction being but aides to that end. Locust v. State, 912 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tenn.
App. 1995). We must initially look to the language of the statute itself in determining the intent of
the legislature. Courts are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the
legislature within the four corners of the statute, unless an ambiguity requires resort elsewhere to
ascertain legislative intent. Austin v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. 1983). A
statute is ambiguous if it is capable of conveying more than one meaning. In re Conservatorship
of Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn. App. 1995). We must consider the language employed in
context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction which would extend or limit
its meaning. Weaver v. Woods, 594 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tenn. 1980); Wilson v. Johnson County, 879
S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tenn. 1994). We are to assume that the legislature used each word in the statute
purposely and that the use of these words conveys some intent and has a meaning and purpose.
Locust, 912 S.W.2d at 718. Where words of the statute are clear and plain and fully express the
legislature’s intent, there is no room to resort to auxiliary rules of construction, Roberson v.
University of Tennessee, 912 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Tenn. App. 1995), and we need only enforce the
statute as written. Clayton, 914 S.W.2d at 90.
With these basic rules of statutory construction in mind, we hold the statute before
us is amenable to but one interpretation and, thus, unambiguous. It is assumed that the legislature
carefully chose and purposely used the words “caused or contributed to.” These words must be
construed to mean what they say. Roberson, 912 S.W.2d at 747. Under their plain meaning, the
statute limits a plaintiff to additionally name only those defendants who allegedly “caused or
contributed to” the plaintiff’s injuries. By definition, one who is “vicariously” liable is not one who
has “caused or contributed to” another’s injuries. We find no other language in the four corners of
the statute to suggest an alternative or expansive meaning. As we have determined the statute
unambiguous in this respect, it is unnecessary and, indeed, improper to refer to the legislative history
offered for explanation by Appellants. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978);
D. Canale & Co. v. Celauro, 765 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn. 1989).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was correct in denying the appellants’
motion to amend their complaint to join Paul Davis Systems as an additional defendant as the parties
agree that its liability, if any, is vicarious only. Paul Davis Systems neither caused nor contributed
to Plaintiffs’ injuries or damages. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings
herewith consistent. Costs are assessed against Charles R. and Teresa Noland Browder, for which
execution may issue if necessary.
___________________________________
FARMER, J.
______________________________
CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S. (Concurs)
______________________________
HIGHERS, J. (Concurs)