Providence Crossings, LLC v. SC Realty Capital, L.P., SC Capital, LLC, and Smith Realty Interests, L.P. - Concurring ( 2010 )


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  •                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs June 1, 2010
    PROVIDENCE CROSSINGS, LLC v. SC REALTY CAPITAL, L.P., SC
    CAPITAL, LLC AND SMITH REALTY INTERESTS, L.P.
    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
    No. 06-364-II    Ellen H. Lyle, Chancellor
    No. M2009-01307-COA-R3-CV - Filed November 2, 2010
    F RANK G. C LEMENT, J R., J., concurring.
    I write this concurring opinion because I find it very difficult to believe that the
    contractual rights at issue were not foreclosed upon and, thus, passed to the bank as a result
    of the foreclosure, in which event Defendants would be entitled to summary judgment as a
    matter of law as the trial court found. However, as the majority correctly notes, there may be
    a small crack in the evidentiary chain that pertains to material facts at issue. I am not fully
    convinced there is a deficiency, but for purposes of summary judgment the court must be
    convinced that material facts are not in dispute.
    The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no
    genuine disputes of material fact exist and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 
    90 S.W.3d 692
    , 695 (Tenn. 2002). To be entitled to summary
    judgment, the moving party must affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving
    party’s claim or show that the moving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim
    at trial. Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 
    271 S.W.3d 76
    , 83 (Tenn. 2008); Hannan v. Alltel
    Publ’g Co., 
    270 S.W.3d 1
    , 8-9 (Tenn. 2008); McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 
    960 S.W.2d 585
    , 588 (Tenn. 1998).
    Because there may or may not be a crack in the evidentiary chain as it pertains to a
    material fact, I am unable to conclude that Providence, the plaintiff, cannot prove an essential
    element of its claim at trial. Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83; Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 
    270 S.W.3d 1
    , 8-9 (Tenn. 2008); McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 
    960 S.W.2d 585
    , 588
    (Tenn. 1998). Accordingly, I concur with the majority.
    ______________________________
    FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2009-01307-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.

Filed Date: 11/2/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014