Daniel v. Office of Personnel Management , 245 F. App'x 969 ( 2007 )


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  •                        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2007-3118
    BRENDAN A. DANIEL,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
    Respondent.
    Brendan A. Daniel, of Abita Springs, Louisiana, pro se.
    Lisa L. Donahue, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
    States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With her on the brief
    were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and
    Donald E. Kinner, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Paul St. Hillaire,
    Attorney, Office of Personnel Management, of Washington, DC.
    Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection Board
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2007-3118
    BRENDAN A. DANIEL,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
    Respondent.
    DECIDED: August 9, 2007
    Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, SCHALL, Circuit Judge, and BUCKLO, District Judge. *
    PER CURIAM.
    DECISION
    Brendan A. Daniel petitions for review of the final decision of the Merit Systems
    Protection Board (“Board”), affirming the Office of Personnel Management’s (“OPM’s”)
    decision to terminate his civil service disability retirement annuity because his income in
    2005 exceeded eighty percent of the current rate of pay for the position he occupied
    *
    Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, District Judge, United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    before retirement. Daniel v. Office Pers. Mgmt., No. DA0841060623-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Nov.
    2, 2006). We affirm.
    DISCUSSION
    I.
    On November 19, 1996, Mr. Daniel retired under the Federal Employees’
    Retirements System (“FERS”) from his position as a Maintenance Worker due to
    disability. Daniel, slip op. at 2. In 2005, because he was under the age of sixty, as
    required of all similar disability annuitants, Mr. Daniel reported his 2005 annual income
    to OPM. Id. Mr. Daniel’s income was higher than usual for 2005 because his employer
    required him to work overtime due to the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Id. at 4. OPM
    determined that Mr. Daniel’s 2005 income was more than eighty percent of the current
    rate of pay for a Maintenance Worker in the position from which he had retired. OPM
    therefore concluded that Mr. Daniel had been restored to earning capacity. Accordingly,
    by notice dated June 24, 2006, OPM notified Mr. Daniel that his annuity benefits would
    terminate on June 30, 2006. Id. at 2-3. In a reconsideration on July 20, 2006, OPM
    affirmed its initial determination, after which Mr. Daniel appealed to the Board.
    II.
    The administrative judge (“AJ”) to whom the case was assigned expressed
    sympathy for Mr. Daniel’s situation, but stated that “the statutory provision that controls
    his situation does not provide for a waiver of the 80% limit, nor does it provide for an
    exception under any circumstances.” Id. at 4 (citing 
    5 U.S.C. § 8455
    (a)(2)). The AJ
    noted that Mr. Daniel did not dispute that his 2005 income exceeded the eighty percent
    limit. 
    Id.
     Accordingly, the AJ affirmed OPM’s decision, but pointed out in a footnote that
    2007-3118                                    2
    OPM had informed Mr. Daniel of how he could seek reinstatement of his disability
    annuity. 
    Id. at 5
    . After the AJ’s decision became the final decision of the Board, Mr.
    Daniel appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    III.
    Our scope of review in an appeal from a decision of the Board is limited.
    Specifically, we must affirm the Board’s decision unless we find it to be arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained
    without procedures required law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
    unsupported by substantial evidence. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c); Kewley v. Dep’t of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    153 F.3d 1357
    , 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    The FERS statute provides that disability retirement annuities are terminated if
    the annuitant’s earning capacity is restored:
    If an annuitant receiving a disability annuity from the Fund, before
    becoming 60 years of age, is restored to an earning capacity fairly
    comparable to the current rate of pay of the position occupied at the time
    of retirement, payment of the annuity terminates 180 days after the end of
    the calendar year in which earning capacity is so restored. Earning
    capacity is deemed restored if in any calendar year the income of the
    annuitant from wages or self-employment or both equals at least 80
    percent of the current rate of pay of the position occupied immediately
    before retirement.
    
    5 U.S.C. § 8455
    (a)(2).
    On appeal, Mr. Daniel does not dispute his 2005 income or OPM’s and the
    Board’s application of section 8455(a)(2). Rather, he argues that OPM and the Board
    should have considered the unique circumstances that gave rise to his increased 2005
    income.   Additionally, he cites the Stafford Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 
    88 Stat. 143
    (codified at 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207
    ), and regulatory provisions relating to waiving the
    recovery of overpayments to individuals.
    2007-3118                                    3
    As the Board correctly held, section 8455 does not provide for any exceptions or
    waivers in its application. Neither OPM nor the Board has authority to waive statutory
    requirements or to estop the government from denying benefits as required by law. See
    Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 
    496 U.S. 414
    , 416, 434 (1990). Therefore, the
    Board did not err in upholding OPM’s termination of Mr. Daniel’s disability annuity.
    Mr. Daniel’s reliance of the Stafford Act (also known as the Disaster Relief Act of
    1974) is misplaced.     The Stafford Act was enacted to provide federal relief and
    assistance to states in times of disaster. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 5121
    . The Stafford Act does
    not mention or alter anything relating to FERS. Nor do the regulations cited by Mr.
    Daniel in 5 C.F.R. pt. 831, subpt. N, help him in this case. That subpart deals with when
    an annuitant has received overpayments and limits the government’s ability to seek
    recovery of the overpayment when it would be against “equity and good conscience.” 
    5 C.F.R. § 831.1401
    . Mr. Daniel has not received an overpayment; OPM terminated his
    annuity properly under section 8455.
    Like the Board, we are sympathetic to Mr. Daniel’s circumstance and note that he
    may seek reinstatement of his annuity, as suggested by OPM. Daniel, CSA-8097469,
    slip op. at 2 (Office Pers. Mgmt. July 20, 2006). However, under existing law, we are
    unable to disturb the decision of the Board.
    For the forgoing reasons, the final decision of the Board is affirmed.
    No costs.
    2007-3118                                      4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2007-3118

Citation Numbers: 245 F. App'x 969

Judges: Bucklo, Michel, Per Curiam, Schall

Filed Date: 8/9/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023