Charles N. Delattie v. South Mark Realty Partners, LTD., d/b/a Hickory Lake Apartment Community - Concurring ( 1996 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN SECTION AT NASHVILLE
_____________________________________________________________________________
CHARLES N. DELATTE, Davidson Circuit No. 92C-235
C.A. No. 01A01-9504-CV-00141
Plaintiff/Appellant.
Hon. Barbara N. Haynes, Judge
v.
SOUTH MARK REALTY
PARTNERS, LTD., d/b/a HICKORY
LAKE APARTMENT COMMUNITY,
FILED
Jan. 19, 1996
Defendant/Appellee. Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
DAVID S. GARDNER, Nashville, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
RICHARD D. MOORE, Levine, Mattson, Orr & Geracioti, Nashville,
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
AFFIRMED
Opinion Filed:
_____________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
_____________________________________________________________________________
TOMLIN, Sr. J.
Charles N. Delatte ("plaintiff") filed suit in the Circuit Court of Davidson
County against South Mark Realty Partners, Ltd. ("defendant") seeking damages
for injuries sustained by him when a metal hand railing on a stairway in the
common area of defendant's apartment complex collapsed, causing him to fall.
The trial court granted defendant's motions for summary judgment. The sole issue
presented by this appeal is whether the trial court was in error in so doing. For the
reasons herein set forth, we find no error and affirm.
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Rule 10 (Court of Appeals). Memorandum Opinion.— (b) The Court, with the
concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the
actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no
precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be
designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall not be published, and shall not be cited
or relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated case.
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The underlying facts are not in dispute. Defendant owned a large
apartment complex in Antioch, Davidson County. Plaintiff leased one of the
apartments in 1990. In May 1991, plaintiff fell down an exterior concrete stairway
leading from a portion of the common area in front of his apartment to the parking
lot below. He contends that his fall was caused when a metal hand railing on one
side of the stairway collapsed. Plaintiff's complaint charged defendant with
common law negligence and negligence per se in violation of T.C.A. § 66-28-
304(1)-(3) (1993), a portion of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
(URLTA), and in violation of certain provisions of the Standard Building Code as
incorporated into the Metropolitan Code of Nashville. The trial court granted
plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff added additional
allegations of negligence per se as well as a claim for intentional harm, seeking
punitive damages.
Defendant initially filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the
ground that the exterior stairway leading to its parking lot was not subject to the
provisions of either the Housing Code or the Standard Building Code as adopted
by Metropolitan Nashville. The trial court granted defendant's motion, dismissing
plaintiff's allegations to the effect that defendant was guilty of negligence per se
for violating sections of the Building Code as adopted by Metropolitan Nashville.
On November 4, 1994 a further hearing was held by the trial court on
defendant's motions for partial summary judgment and for summary judgment.
The trial court dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's claims of negligence per se as
well as his claim for punitive damages. This order of the court read in part as
follows:
It appears to the Court, after considering the entire record in
this case, and after considering the arguments and representations
made in court by counsel for the respective parties, that the plaintiff,
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Charles Delatte, concedes that his claims of negligence per se
against the defendant and his claim for punitive damages against
the defendant should be dismissed. (emphasis added)
Wherefore it is ordered that the plaintiff's claims of negligence
per se against the defendant are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
It is further ordered that plaintiff's claim for punitive damages
against the defendant is also dismissed with prejudice.
The trial court continued the hearing on the balance of the issues remaining for
two weeks for the purpose of allowing plaintiff "additional time to produce
evidence which might change the Court's mind” to the effect that defendant was
entitled to summary judgment. At the subsequent hearing, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant on all remaining issues. This appeal
followed.
Summary judgment should be granted only when ?there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." T.R.C.P. 56.03; Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1993). The
issues that lie at the heart of evaluating a summary judgment motion are: (1)
whether a factual dispute exists; (2) whether the disputed fact is material to the
outcome of the case; and (3) whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue
for trial. Id. at 214. An additional issue is whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 215.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, both the trial court and this
court must consider the matter in the same manner as a motion for a directed
verdict made at the close of the plaintiff's proof—i.e., all the evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent to the motion and all
legitimate conclusions of fact must be drawn in favor of the opponent. It is only
when there is no disputed issue of material fact that a summary judgment should
be granted by the trial court and affirmed by this court. Daniels v. White
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Consolidated Industries, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tenn. App. 1985).
I. THE NEGLIGENCE PER SE ISSUES
At a subsequent hearing, the trial court considered the remainder of
defendant's summary judgment motions relevant to the dismissal of allegations of
negligence per se, common law negligence and plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages. It was following this hearing that the trial court entered the order
hereinabove referred to, wherein it stated that plaintiff conceded that his
negligence per se claims against defendant were without merit. This was an
interlocutory order at that time and could have been modified by the trial court
upon motion of either party at any time prior to its becoming final. At no time did
plaintiff challenge this judgment.
In his brief before this court, plaintiff completely ignores the holding of the
trial court on this issue. On the other hand, defendant takes the trial court’s
judgment for what it says, and argues to this court that plaintiff has waived this
issue. This contention is reinforced by the fact that plaintiff chose not to file a reply
brief to defendant’s position as to this issue. Taking everything into consideration,
we are of the opinion that plaintiff did waive this issue by this inaction.
Without in any way relenting from this conclusion, should this be considered
a viable issue, we are of the opinion that it is without merit. Relying on the opinion
by the middle section of this court in Smith v. Owen, 841 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. App.
1992), plaintiff contends that the existence of a defective handrail (revealed by
the fall) and an injury resulting therefrom will serve as a sufficient basis for a claim
of negligence per se. Plaintiff’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. In Smith,
defendant was found guilty of negligence per se on these facts: the building code
adopted by the City of Cookeville expressly prohibited the renting of a dwelling
for living purposes without a prior inspection to ascertain that its condition met
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certain standards specified in the code. Id. at 829-30. The proof showed that
defendant did in fact rent the premises in which plaintiff’s child sustained injuries
without making such inspection, and that an inspection would have revealed the
defect that caused the injury. Id. at 829.
In so holding, the Smith court held that defendant, who had no actual
knowledge of the condition that caused the injury, was put on constructive notice
of his duty by virtue of the provisions in the Cookeville building code. Id. at 831.
In order to recover under negligence per se in this case, plaintiff would be required
to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that defendant breached
the duty of care imposed on him by the URLTA. When faced with defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, this plaintiff did not do so. This issue is without merit.
II. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as
to his common law negligence claims. This court has previously stated the rule of
landlord premises liability:
As a general rule, the landlord is not liable for injuries to the tenant
caused by dangerous or defective conditions on the leased premises
unless the landlord knew or in the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence should have known of the dangerous condition at the time
he leased the premises.
Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tenn. App. 1987). Where the landlord retains
possession of a part of the premises for use in common by different tenants, the
landlord is under a continuing duty imposed by law to exercise reasonable care
to keep the common areas in good repair and a safe condition. Id. at 347-48.
While this duty does not require constant care and an inspection by the landlord,
when he has actual or constructive notice of a dangerous or defective condition
in an area under his control, he must act within a reasonable time to remedy the
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condition. Id. at 348. Liability does not ensue until the landlord has notice, actual
or constructive, and a reasonable opportunity to repair the defect. Id.
Depositions and affidavits filed in support of defendant’s motion for summary
judgment establish that defendants did not have prior notice of an unsafe
condition of the handrail involved in plaintiff’s fall prior to the fall itself. Plaintiff
concedes that defendant did not have actual notice of the corroded condition
of the hand rail in question prior to plaintiff’s accident.
Under the law of this state, a moving party is entitled to summary judgment
when the nonmoving party cannot establish an essential element of his case.
Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 213-16 (Tenn. 1993). After the parties seeking summary
judgment have made a properly supported motion as in the case before us, the
burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specifics facts, not legal
conclusions, by using affidavits or the discovery materials listed in Rule 56.03,
establishing that there are indeed disputed, material facts creating a genuine issue
that needs to be resolved by the trier of fact and that a trial is, therefore,
necessary. Id. at 215. The nonmoving party may not rely upon the allegations or
the denial of his pleadings in carrying out this burden as mandated by Rule 56.05.
Id. The evidence offered by the nonmoving party must be taken as true. Id.
Moreover, the facts on which the nonmovant relies must be admissible at the trial.
Id.
Applying these principles to the facts presented in this appeal, we first note
that in connection with defendant’s motion for summary judgment, it was
established by deposition and affidavits that prior to plaintiff’s fall on May 5, 1991,
defendants had no prior knowledge or notice of an unsafe condition of the
handrail in question. Plaintiff concedes that defendant did not have actual notice
of the corroded condition of the hand rail prior to his accident. It thus becomes
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incumbent upon plaintiff to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether defendant had constructive notice of the unsafe condition of this
particular handrail.
The general rule in this jurisdiction as far as the predication of liability on
constructive knowledge is as follows:
If liability is to be predicated on constructive knowledge by the
Defendant, the proof must show the dangerous or defective
condition existed for such length of time that the Defendant knew,
or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of its existence.
Worsham v. Pilot Oil Corp., 728 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tenn. 1987). Plaintiff relies upon the
affidavits of Angie Fisher, Wilfred Gallardo, and the deposition testimony of
defendant’s maintenance man, David Devine, in an attempt to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether defendant had constructive notice of the
defect in the handrail in plaintiff’s fall prior to the fall itself. Plaintiff’s reliance
thereon is misplaced and in our opinion does not create a genuine issue of fact.
As for the affidavit of Angie Fisher, this affidavit fails to comply with Rule 56.05
T.R.C.P. Rule 56.05 states in part:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein.
Fisher’s affidavit states in part that ?the handrail which caused Mr. Delatte’s injury
was defective and loose and likely to cause injury for at least one week prior to Mr.
Delatte’s fall.” This affidavit fails to meet the requirement of Rule 56.05 set forth
above, in that the court cannot tell whether Fisher personally observed the defect
and did so at least one week prior to the fall or whether she heard it for someone
else or was simply repeating a rumor. In addition, there is nothing in the affidavit
stating that this statement, as well as others, were made upon her own personal
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knowledge.
Plaintiff offered the affidavit of Wilfred Gallardo, a certified safety specialist,
as an expert witness on the issue of the allegedly defective handrail design.
Gallardo testified that the defective design of the handrail anchoring posts
allowed water to accumulate in the base of the rail, which would result in
corrosion if defendant did not properly inspect and maintain the handrail. Plaintiff
contends Gallardo’s testimony is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact on the question of constructive notice. The viability of expert opinion affidavits
is controlled by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 703. This rule states in part that ?[t]he
court shall disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or inference if the
underlying facts or data indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” T.R.E. 703. Gallardo’s
affidavit does not state that it was made upon any personal knowledge or
observation of defendant’s property, and if so, when it was done. It also relies
upon the application of certain provisions of the Standard Building Code which
stands uncontradicted as inapplicable to outside stairways such as the one
involved here. Furthermore, the photographs submitted with Gallardo’s affidavits
were not authenticated in any way.
As for the deposition of defendant’s maintenance man, David Devine, he
gave no testimony to the effect that any circumstances existed that should have
caused defendant to be aware prior to the fall that something was amiss with the
handrail on the stairway down which plaintiff fell. To the contrary, Devine stated
that during the two and a half years he was employed by defendant, he knew of
no complaints received by management or maintenance staff regarding this
particular handrail.
It is our opinion that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of defendant as to these issues. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
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is affirmed. Cost in this cause on appeal are taxed to plaintiff, for which execution
may issue if necessary.
________________________________________
TOMLIN, Sr. J.
________________________________________
HIGHERS, J. (CONCURS)
________________________________________
FARMER, J. (CONCURS)
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