In This Action F Or Damag Es For Injuries Sustained In a Motor Ve Hicle ( 2000 )


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  •                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    FILED
    January 27, 2000
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    E1999-02271-COA-R3-CV
    KELVIN JACKSON,                              ) C/A NO. 03A01-9906-CV-00198
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                   ) KNOX CIRCU IT
    )
    vs.                                          ) HON. DALE C. WORKMAN,
    ) JUDGE
    EDWARD W. SUNKENBERG,                        )
    ) REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Defend ant-App ellant.                ) FOR A NEW TRIAL
    T. SCOTT JONES, BA NKS & JON ES, Knoxville, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    R. KR EIS W HITE, A DAIR , SCHU ERM AN & WHIT E, Brentw ood, for D efendan t-
    Appellan t.
    O P I N IO N
    Franks, J.
    In this action f or damag es for injuries sustained in a motor ve hicle
    accide nt, a jury aw arded p laintiff $ 10,000 .00 as d amag es, and d efend ant has appea led.
    The issue on appeal is whether the Trial Judge properly applied
    Tennessee Code Annotated §24-5-113 to the facts of this case. The Statute provides
    in part:
    (a)(1) Proof in any civil action that med ical, hospital or doctor bills were
    paid or incurred because of any illness, disease, or injury may be
    itemized in the complaint or civil warrant with a copy of bills paid or
    incurred attached as an exhibit to the complaint or civil warrant. The
    bills itemized and attached as an exhibit shall be prima facie evidence
    that the bills so paid or incurred were necessary and reasonable.
    (2) This sec tion shall app ly only in personal in jury actions brou ght in
    any court by injured parties against the persons responsible for causing
    such injuries.
    (3) This prima facie presumption shall apply to the medical, hospital and
    doctor bills itemized with copies of bills attached to the complaint or
    civil warrant provided, that the total amount of such bills does not
    exceed the sum of two thousan d five hundred d ollars ($2,500).
    ...
    This action was originally filed in General Sessions Court for Knox
    County by filing a civil warrant with attached itemized copies of plaintiff’s medical
    bills, which totaled $3,356.50. Plaintiff obtained a judgment in Sessions Court and
    the defen dant timely app ealed the ca se to the Circ uit Court. In th e Circuit C ourt,
    defendant argue d that plaintiff’s medical bills should no t be introduced withou t expert
    proof , becau se they ex ceede d $2,50 0.00, on the auth ority of the above -quote d statute .
    The Trial Judge apparently ruled that the statute would apply up to $2,500.00 of the
    bills, and that without competent proof, the plaintiff could not recover any amount
    above that limit for his medical expenses.
    Plaintiff, throu gh his testimo ny, introduced a copy of a c hiropractic b ill
    totaling $2,650.00 over the objection of the defendant. At the time the bill was
    introduced, the Trial Judge instructed the jury that they would later be instructed
    regarding “ the medic al bill presum ption” and that said presu mption on ly extended to
    the sum of $2,50 0.00, and that without fu rther proof plaintiff could no t recover more
    than $2,500.00 for his medical bills.
    At the con clusion of th e proof, the Trial Judge charged th e jury and told
    the jury again tha t the statutory presu mption of reasonab leness and necessity only
    applied up to $2,500.00. He further instructed that the presumption could be rebutted
    by evide nce of fered b y the defe ndant.
    On appeal, defendant insists that since the plaintiff’s total medical
    expenses exceeded $2,500.00, plaintiff should not have been able to utilize the
    presumption created by the statute, and that under the strict construction of the statute,
    the bill which totals $2,650.00 was improperly admitted without expert medical
    testim ony.
    This Co urt has prev iously recogn ized that plain tiffs are requ ired to
    present competent proof regarding the reasonableness and necessity of their medical
    expen ses. Hogan v. Reese, 
    1998 WL 430627
     (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). In Hogan this
    Court addressed the question regarding the applicability of T.C.A. §24-5-113 by
    stating:
    At common law, reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses
    allegedly caused by the defendant are elements constituting a part of the
    burden of proof resting upon the plaintiff. To relieve this burden on
    small claims, the legislature by chapter 734 of the Public Acts of 1978
    2
    created a prima facie presumption of necessity and reasonableness under
    certain conditions.
    This act of the General Assembly is presently codified as T.C.A. §24-5-
    113(a)(1)(2 ) and (3). Th e next cha nge in the p resent codif ication as to
    the 1978 act was chapter 481 of the Public Acts of 1981 raising the
    original $500 maximum amount to the present maximum amount of
    $2,500.
    As Hogan notes, the statu te simply mea ns that plaintiff s are not fo rced to bring in
    expert medical proof of reasonableness and necessity where “the total amount of such
    bills does not exceed the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00).”
    In this case, while plaintiff said he was only claiming $2,500.00 in medical expenses,
    the “total” of the bill he sought to introd uce at trial clearly exceeded $2,500.00 . In
    West v. Hudson, 
    1988 WL 122431
     (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988), (permission to appeal
    denied by the Supreme Court March 27, 1989), this Court explained that when a
    plaintiff has medical bills totaling more than $2,500.00, plaintiff m ust present expert
    medical testimony regarding the reasonableness and necessity of those charges. It was
    therefore e rror for the T rial Judge to a dmit into ev idence plain tiff’s medic al bills
    which ex ceeded th e $2,500.0 0 total.
    The jury instruc tion given b y the Trial Cou rt was erron eous. No t only
    was the medica l bill improperly admitted without com petent proof, the Trial Co urt
    instructed the jury that they had to presume that $2,500.00 of plaintiff’s medical
    expenses were reasonable and necessary. The Trial Court’s instruction in this case
    regard ing the m edical b ills was c learly erron eous an d was mislead ing to th e jury. See
    Ladd by Ladd v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 939 S .W.2d 83, 94 ( Tenn . Ct. Ap p. 1996 ).
    Accord ingly, we vac ate the Trial C ourt’s judgm ent and rem and for a n ew trial.
    The cost of the appeal is assessed to plaintiff.
    __________________________
    Herschel P. Franks, J.
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________
    Houston M. Godd ard, P.J.
    3
    ___________________________
    D. Michael Swiney, J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E1999-02271-COA-R3-CV

Judges: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks

Filed Date: 1/27/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014